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This thesis considers the history of stevedoring work and workers in Durban between
1959 and 1990. In particular I focus on the two distinct themes of "labour management"
and "technological change" in order to denlonstrate the transformations that have
occurred in the port. In examining the dranlatic technological changes in the harbour I
analyze the particular difficulties that the industry faced in coping with the deluands of
the changes in the structure of the global shipping industry. In discussing the different
reginles of labour adnlinistration in the harbour I show the relationships between the
implementation ofApartheid and the practice of stevedoring work in Durban. Finally I
show how these thenles are related in carefully considering the positions of these workers
at the nloments of technological change, retrenchment and unionization. I suggest that we
cannot understand these processes of change without understanding the specific kinds of
control under which these workers laboured during Apartheid.
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Railway yard in San Jose
I wandered desolate
In front of a tank factory
And sat on a bench
Near the switchman's shack
A flower lay on the hay on
The asphalt highway
-the dread hay flower
I thought- It had a
brittle black stem and
corolla of yellowish dirty
spikes like Jesus' inchlong
crown, and a soiled
dry centre cotton tuft
like a used shaving brush
that's been lying under
the garage for a year.
Yellow, yellow flower,
and Flower of industry,
Tough spiky ugly flower,
Flower nonetheless,
With the form of the great yellow
Rose in your brain!
This is the flower of the WorId.
- Allen Ginsberg, "In back of the real", 1954
The image that Ginsberg conjures up of the harsh environment of industrial work speaks
profoundly to many generations of workers. Yet this environnlent is changing, although
little is written of the precise implications that the new post-industrial, late capitalist,
informational economy will have for the vast numbers of the world's population
employed in industrial work. This thesis is an attenlpt to relate theoretical accounts of this
new economy to the experiences ofworkers in an industrial environment. In this thesis I
seek to en1pirically investigate the effects of a changed economic environnlent on
workers.
In nlany ways, the arguments that I have developed about the working of the
stevedoring industry in Durban can be applied to workers everywhere. But in an
inlportant sense, a study of these stevedores reflects the particular and local realities
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under which these workers laboured. Primarily this will be shown by examining the
institutions that controlled African stevedores in South Africa, institutions that were
moulded out of an ideology that was unique to South Africa, Apartheid.
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deternlination to write sonlething about the South African working class at a tinle when it
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forge this detenlllnation into fIrst a workable idea and later a coherent project. He has
been an excellent and thorough supervisor and I am deeply grateful to hinl.
There have been nlany others who have helped nle through the process of
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Jeff Guy, Catherine Burns, Marijke du Toit, Julie Parle, Sandi ThonlSon and David
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Congress of South African Trade Unions
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General Workers Union
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supervisor
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Transport and General Workers Union
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Introduction
Picture Durban harbour today; the largest port in Africa at the end of the twentieth
century. Many huge ships enter and exit the harbour everyday, transporting millions of
tons of cargo every year. A redeveloped harbour, with huge cranes to lift the giant
containers aboard the ships;
Looking at the port, there is a genuine sense of work occurring. Yet much of this work is
being done mechanically, and there is scant evidence of any workers.
Contrast the image with one that could have presented years ago, of few
mechanical aids assisting workers, and the bulk of the work being done by African
workers, organized in gangs who called themselves Buffalos, because of the sheer
physical strength involved in the work. These workers were at the centre of the harbour
operation and were able to bring the entire harbour to a standstill with a strike.!
1 The first three pictures can be found at Tony Pearson. African keyport : story ofthe Port ofDurban: 29
degrees 52min south and 31 degrees 02min east. Durban: Accucut, 1995. p. 124,270 and 110 respectively.
The final picture is found in a pamphlet entitled Durban: South Africa's Garden City, written and produced
by Durban Publicity Association, 1954. p. 16.
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This thesis presents the contrast between these two pictures. It is a narrative about labour
control and Apartheid, about technological change and the decline of the stevedoring
labour. I have, as far as possible, tried to place workers at the centre ofmy analysis and to
investigate the particularity of stevedoring work and its transfonnation in South Africa.
While recognizing the specificities of the industry that I am investigating, it is critical to
take account ofthe ways in which the experiences ofthese stevedores reflects the realities
of workers outside of the stevedoring industry in Durban. On the one hand, these
stevedores were very much a part of a wider history of labour administration and control
during Apartheid. On the other, a study of these workers suggests that they form part of a
wider group of industrial workers throughout the world for whom job security and
regular industrial work can no longer be taken for granted.
Technological Transformation and the Re-making of Work
We live in an age where the nature ofwork has been fundamentally transformed.
Throughout the world, industrial work that used to employ the majority of the population
is disappearing, much of it being done by machines. New employment sectors, such as
the service sector, are becoming significant employers for much of the population. But
the change in working environment comes with changed conditions and an erosion in the
security ofwork. For Manuel Castells, a prominent theorist of the "information
revolution", what is important is not so much the perceived move from industrial to
postindustrial society, but rather the processes of the "informating" ofwork. He suggests
that this process leads to the "individualization of work and the fragmentation of
societies".2 Castells argues that the primary consequences of the advanced technologies
of the information age have been to re-make the relationship between management and
workers, and to create a new category of flexible employment. While a core group of
workers have learnt new skills, the majority fmd themselves offering work on a
temporary or intermittent basis. Ultimately, workers have been divided into those who
have been skilled in new technologies and those who haven't, and they have become
2 Manuel Castells. The Rise o/Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. p. 201-208.
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more vulnerable than ever to the threat of redundancy.3 David Harvey recognizes this
division in the labour force in his analysis of the new economy of flexible accumulation,
and recognizes its unevenness among regions and countries. But he also describes the
perils that the new regime of flexible capitalism holds for an older style of industrial
workers.4 The increased possibility of factories relocating in response to union
organization and worker militancy severely limits workers' abilities to demand better
working conditions.
But apart from these descriptions, what is at stake in these technological
transformations? Castells' lightly dismisses any notion of technological determinism as a
"false dilemma", claiming instead that 'society cannot be understood without its
technological tools'.5 Yet this claim seems too simple, for who precisely is society?
Castells does recognize different agents involved in these processes, but insists that
information technology "does not create or destroy employment per se".6 What should be
noted is that this study concerns itself with a particular type of"industrial" emplOYment
and its destruction in the last 30 years. It is certainly relevant to question the roles of
specific historical actors in shaping technological change. Yet this concern is not new. To
quote Marx, then Braverman;
tiThe appropriation ofliving labour by capital is directly expressed in machinery. It is a scientifically
based analysis, together with the application ofmechanical and chemical laws, that enables the machine to
carry out the workformerly done by the worker himself. The development ofmachinery only follows this
path, however, once heavy industry has reached an advanced stage, and the various stages have been
pressed into the service ofcapital, and on the other hand, when machinery itselfhas yielded very
considerable resources. Invention then becomes a branch ofbusiness, and the application ofscience to
immediate production aims at determining the inventions at the same time as it solicits them. But this is not
the way in which machinery in general came into being, still less the way it progresses in detail. This way
is a process ofanalysis - by subdivision oflabour, which transforms the worker's operations, so that, at a
certain point, the mechanism can step into his place. Thus we can see directly here how a particular means
3 Manuel Castells. The Rise ofNetwork Society. p. 264-279. It is critical to make the distinction between
workers who have marketable skills and access to knowledge and those who are excluded from this. For the
former, flexible work is often not a bad thing, since they can market themselves and earn higher wages. For
the latter group, the new regime of flexible work undermines job security.
4 David Harvey. "The political-economic transformation of late twentieth-century capitalism" in The
Condition ofPostmodernity. London: Blackwell, 1990. esp. p. 140-153, 173, 191.
5 Manuel Castells. The Rise ofNetwork Society. p. 5.
6 Manuel Castells. The Rise ofNetwork Society. p. 265.
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oflabour is transferredfrom the worker to capital as a result ofthis transposition. Hence we have the
struggle ofthe worker against machinery. What used to be the activity ofthe living worker has become that
if h h·" 7o t e mac me .
"The remarkable development ofmachinery becomes, for most ofthe workingpopulation, the source not of
fr/~dom, but that ofenslavement, not ofmastery, but that ofhelplessness ". 8
What is required from these general assertions about the information age is a specific
analysis of technological change and the power relations involved in these changes.
Following Michael Burawoy, we need to concentrate on the particular politics of
production to make any coherent sense of these general changes.9 Even from the limited
pictures presented in the opening quote, we get a clear idea that profound changes have
occurred in the Durban Harbour. This provides the major context for my arguments in
this thesis.
The major transformation in the port industry has been around containerization.
Containerization began with the innovation of changing the means of transporting cargo
from a variety of individual packages, boxes, bags and crates ofdifferent shapes and sizes
to standardized size rectangular boxes that could be placed one on top of each other.
These standardized boxes then grew in size in the 1970s and 1980s to twenty and forty
ton standard units. 10 The implications of this change in cargo handling have been
enormous. New infrastructure to facilitate this change has required harbours to dredge
deeper channels and build massive shore cranes, and has required huge financial
investment. Older ports have made way for newer ones, and traditional shipping routes
have been altered. Broeze's focus on international shipping companies reveals that these
companies have become part of a wider chain of land and sea transport, have jettisoned
traditional links with home ports and countries, and have become part of a wider global
7 Karl Marx. The Grundrisse. Edited and Translated by David McLellan. New York: Harper and Row,
1971. p. 140.
8 Harry Braverman. Labor and monopoly capital: The degradation ofwork in the twentieth century. New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. p. 194-195.
9 Michael Burawoy. The Politics ofproduction: Factory regimes under capitalism and socialism. London:
Verso, 1985.
10 Frank Broeze. "Containerization and the Globalization ofLiner Shipping" in David Starkey (ed) Global
Markets, Research in Maritime History, no 14, 1998. p. 2.
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'service' industry. 11 Castells does recognize that the impact of the new economy on
labour varies from place to place based on the relationship between management and
labour, the decisions made by management, and the particular industry concerned. 12 This
study, while considering these processes, focuses primarily on the effects on these
changes on stevedores, a particular group of dock workers whose traditional work
loading and off-loading cargo on-board ships has been threatened- and ultimately
destroyed- by these global processes.
Despite the fact that many of these technological changes happened during the
Apartheid era, while workers were politically isolated, Durban has not been isolated from
containerization. In 1974 work began on a container terminal, which was completed by
1977. Despite an Apartheid state that had become disorganized and insecure in its own
labour policies, and the first legal unionization ofworkers in the late 1970s, retrenchment
ofDurban stevedores soon followed. From an all time high of2800 permanent workers in
the mid 1960s, this figure dropped to 1200 in 1985 and to approximately 300 permanent
workers by the mid 1990s. By this stage, much of the stevedoring work was being done
by casual workers who had no work security whatsoever. It is important to remember that
containerization was introduced as a labour and time saving device, but its effects on
workers have been disastrous. The "new" employment created by containerization in
harbours is marginal, but containerization's effects on stevedoring labour have been that
of truly devastating.
Wrapped up in these wider structural changes in the international port industry
and in work in general, are the specifics of labour administration and worker
consciousness oftransformation. Indeed it is impossible to consider these wider structural
changes without an investigation of the particular history ofAfrican workers in South
Africa and their unique experiences of the attempted social engineering projects of the
Apartheid state.
11 Frank Broeze. "Containerization and the Globalization ofLiner Shipping". p. 24-25.
12 Manuel Castells. The Rise o/Network Society. p. 249.
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Apartheid Labour Administration and African Workers
Radical theorists ofApartheid in the early 1970s first explored the relationship between
Apartheid and Capitalism in detail. Harold Wolpe suggested that Apartheid was a
mechanism to guarantee a cheap and controlled labour force, under conditions where the
premise of migrant labour was itself unsustainable due to declining agricultural
conditions in reserved 'native' areas. 13 In examining the mining industry, Frederick
10hnstone argued that profitability depended on a supply ofAfrican migrant workers, and
that Apartheid should best be understood as a system of class domination. 14
Deborah Posel has argued that in understanding the nature of the Apartheid state
these theorists tended to underestimate the conflicts that developed between state
administrators and employers. 15 While one important tenet of Apartheid labour ideology
was certainly to protect white workers and limit African urbanization, employers of
African workers were primarily interested in securing maximum profit, and sometimes
did not share the practical belief that investment in Apartheid structures would yield
stability in their workforce. This is most forcefully illustrated in the conflicts that
developed through the 1950s between state officials and stevedoring employers.
Indeed, the attempt to put Apartheid into practice required substantial effort in
administration. As Posel has shown, influx control and the labour bureaux system did not
function particularly efficiently during the 1950s in controlling the movement ofAfrican
workers or limiting urbanization. 16 She claims that this led to a shift in emphasis in the
Apartheid ideological position from a recognition of differentiation between urban and
rural African workers towards a position that suggested instead that urban Africans
13 Harold Wolpe. "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid" in
Economy and Society. Vol. 1 no. 4, 1972. p. 430-431.
14 Frederick Johnstone. Class, Race and Gold: A study ofclass relations and racial discrimination in South
A/t-ica. Boston: University Press of America, 1976. p. 2-4, 217.
1 Deborah Posel. The Making ofApartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise. Cape Town: Clarendon
Press, 1991. p. 19
16 Deborah Pose!' .The Making ofApartheid In a recent study of the Bewysburo, Keith Breckenridge has
shown just how chaotic the operation of registering workers and administering passes actually was. He
claims that the failure ofthis system to operate in a controlled manner meant that increasingly the state had
to rely on violence to control African movement in the cities, and in a sense, force the pass system to
movement. See Keith Breckenridge. "From Hubris to Chaos: the makings of the Bewysburo and the end of
documentary government." Unpublished Paper, University ofNatal, Durban, May 2002.
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belonged in their respective tribal areas.17 The result was a far greater emphasis on
"traditional African cultures" and in effect, far greater political and administrative power
to government appointed administrators from various ethnic groups in homelands.
In his investigation of colonial rule and its legacy in Africa, Mahmood Mamdani
suggests that Apartheid be viewed as a "fully-fledged" system of indirect rule. 18 In
Citizen and Subject, Mamdani discusses a move in African colonial policy towards a
system that placed the onus of rule and authority over Africans on African authorities.
Developed in the 1890s by Lord Lugard, indirect rule sought to create a bifurcated state,
with a separate system ofrule and laws for Africans and colonists. This could only occur
through a "re-invention of tribalism" and the wholesale support for tribal authorities by
colonial administrators. Mamdani sees Apartheid as the Perfection of this system, using
as his evidence legislation such as the Bantu Authorities Act (1951), that systematically
sought to increase the power of African chiefs and allowed them to fund their own
administration, and the development of separate territorial authorities, some ofwhich
developed into self governing or "independent" regions. 19
The move towards the creation of traditional authority over Africans certainly had
a dramatic effect on African workers. By the 1960s, and especially with the 1964 Bantu
Labour Act, workers in urban areas had to be recruited through networks ofhomeland
authority. In the stevedoring industry in Durban, the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply
Company was formed in order to control all stevedores working in Durban and assist
homeland authorities in the administration and recruitment of African workers. In the
workplace itself, African administrators controlled the compound, decided which workers
worked when, and supervised the labour process. What is important to stress, and
perhaps to add to Mamdani' s analysis, is that the administration ofAfrican workers under
Apartheid was not simply one that occurred in the designated African areas. Apartheid
administrators went even further, and attempted to control the workforce at work using
the strategy of indirect rule.
17 Deborah Pose!' The Making ofApartheid. p. 228-232. William Beinart understands the shift in policy
under Verwoerd as a move away from the lanuguage of "baaskaap", towards ideas of separate "cultures"
and "nations". See Beinart. Twentieth Century South Africa, 2nd Edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2001. p. 147.
18 Mahmood Mamdani. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy oflate colonialism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 89.
19 Mahmood Mamdani. Citizen and Subject. p. 101, 89.
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By focusing on the primary institutions ofApartheid, Mamdani provides an
interesting and useful analysis of the operation ofpower and authority in South Africa.
Yet by self-consciously focusing on these institutions he assumes that, at least for migrant
workers, Apartheid strategies were successful, if only for a limited time. Without looking
at workers and particular industries, and noting the lack of industrial strikes and upheaval
during the 1960s, it seems as ifhis assumptions hold. Yet to sustain or question his
assumptions, it is necessary to investigate notions of "authority" and "culture" in
particular workplaces during Apartheid.
Culture and African Workers
The shift in the focus ofApartheid towards African administration and "culture" raises
the critical question as to understanding precisely the cultural dimensions ofAfrican
workers living in South Africa. In Apartheid ideological-speak, Africans in South Africa
were divided into a number of different tribes, who had existed timelessly before the
intervention of colonialism. According to this ideology, the best way to restore lost
African culture was to remove people from urban areas and place them under the
authority of homeland leaders. Apart from the obvious fact that the land given to these
homeland authorities represented a mere fraction of the total land available in South
Africa before colonialism, white South Africa still needed Africans to work in urban
areas. Thus the efforts ofApartheid administrators could not remove Africans from urban
areas entirely. But what they could do was to resort to and to refine the migrant labour
system, already in practice in South Africa since the nineteenth century. The Apartheid
state moved towards the destruction of any permanent presence ofAfricans in urban
areas, and required that migrant labourers be recruited through African administrators in
homeland areas. In practice this was achieved with a varying degree ofsuccess depending
on which particular area and industry migrant workers came from. This was, however, a
difficult and expensive undertaking from the standpoint of employers, who often needed
to replace workers, and, particularly in the 1970s, began to ignore Apartheid legislation in
their demand for labour.
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The particular focus of this study is on African, and predominately Zulu,
stevedores working in Durban. The efforts of state legislators and administrators are in
many ways mirrored in the administration of stevedores during this period. In the late
1950s, a new "company" was established to administer all stevedores working in Durban,
centralizing all stevedores in a compound and controlling which workers were recruited
and when they actually worked. Direct control over workers was given to African
compound officials and to izinduna, who oversaw the labour process. Close links were
cemented between the particular homeland authorities in Zululand and senior officials in
the labour supply company. During the 1960s the Labour Supply Company appeared to
work very effectively in terms ofApartheid policy, and this has led David Hemson to
suggest that this company achieved the ideals of the Apartheid labour bureaux system in
relation to stevedores in Durban.20
Yet the apparent success in controlling African workers in the Durban docks by
the Labour Supply Company does not mean that we can simply assume that it succeeded
in understanding and imposing a "Zulu cultural system" on stevedores. The relationship
between work and culture first has to be explained and understood before we can evaluate
the success of the Labour Supply Company. In the first instance it is useful to elaborate
on some of the important theoretical understandings of this relationship.
For Marx, labour is a moment, in the sense that labour is a necessary element of
capitalist relations, and only achieved at the culmination of a process in which pre-
capitalist social relations are discarded.21 Capitalist production can ofcourse occur before
capitalist relations have been realized, but it is only once a "contractual" relationship
between the capitalist and worker has been established, once the worker has dispensed
with all other means of livelihood, that the proletarian and capitalist relations as a whole
comes into being.22
20 David Hemson Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: The Dockworkers ofDurban, University of
Warwick, 1979. p. 388.
21 In characterizing Labour as a "moment", Marx understands "labour" as the culmination of a historical
process in which the work in increasingly alienated from his work and the product ofhis labour. There is a
discussion ofthis in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of1844. Dipesh Chakrabarty also finds
a discussion of this in The Grundrisse. See Robert Tucker (ed). The Marx-Engels Reader. United States:
Norton, 1972. p. 59-62. Also see Dipesh Chakrabarty. Rethinldng Worldng-Class History. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989. p. 3-4. Finally compare note 2 in Chapter 2.
22 Perhaps this is why labour historians have been so concerned with studies of "Proletarianization" .
William Sewell is particularly concerned with moving labour history away from this paradigm, towards a
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EP Thompson problematizes this position by noting that the process of capitalist
transformation does not occur simply from above, and simply as a function ofmaterial
relations. What is critical for Thompson is the agency and experience that workers bring
to the process of class formation. He notes, for instance, that the inherited political,
religious and social traditions were crucial in the making of the English working class
and that these traditions led to the particular form ofworking class that developed in
England.23
Dipesh Chakrabarty takes Thompson's assertions to the context ofBengali Jute
workers and suggests that cultural forms and perceptions ofwork, discipline and
hierarchy are critical in understanding particular workers within capitalist production.
What is crucial for Chakrabarty is that he believes that we cannot reduce even the
experience of capitalist production to a universal experience. The way that workers
experience this production comes both from the type of authority that they have been
subjected to and their culture.24 This also comes from the particular nature of capitalist
production in different places, from industrial expansion in England to colonial
exploitation in India.
Of course, this raises the question once again of the objectives of the Apartheid
state. If the primary objectives of the state by the late 1950s were to create a stable
migrant labour system, with a strong emphasis on different African cultures
administering their own "peoples", an analysis of this system surely allows us to
interrogate Chakrabarty's position more closely. Given Chakrabarty's basic suggestion
that the particularities ofIndian workers' culture explain the development of capitalism in
Calcutta, it would be appropriate to investifate this conclusion outside India. Given that
the South African state developed a system ofauthority in the harbour along cultural lines
then, given Chakrabarty's position, it could have proved to be an effective and efficient
mechanism in the control ofworkers. What this thesis will aim to do, through a close
examination of work and culture in the Durban harbour, is to test this assertion.
concentration on "the profoundly uneven and contradictory character of changes in productive relations".
Sewell, quoted in Frederick Cooper, Decolonization andAfrican Society: The lahor question in French and
BritshAfrica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 13
23 EP Thompson. The Making ofthe English Working Class. London: Penguin, 1980 (1968). p. 213
24 Dipesh Chakrabarty. Rethinking Working-Class History. p. 233.
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Since the stevedores working in Durban are predominantly Zulu, it is appropriate
to consider the difficulties in understanding their "culture". Keletso Atkins has
demonstrated that in 19th century Natal conflicts developed between colonists and
African workers over different conceptions of time and authority.25 For the colonists,
authority and time came from particular European perceptions, both of an industrial
world and of superiority over Africans, whereas African conceptions of time had more to
do with lunar cycles, and the conceptions of authority more to do with particular roles in
Zulu culture, notably one of generational respect and authority. The meeting of these two
systems resulted in a compromise between colonists and workers that led to the evolution
of the tOg! (daily or casual) system.
Following the 1879 Zulu war and the destruction ofZulu independence, it became
important to incorporate these Zulu people into the emerging capitalist economy in South
Africa. Instead of directly subjugating the Zulu population and forcing them to work,
however, the Natal administration decided on a system that would limit Zulu entry into
the urban economy. This system became known as the Shepstone system, whose main
aims were to re-create an African system of authority, based on subservience to colonial
rule that would facilitate recruitment and maintain order. Whatever the conflicts over
space and authority may have been in the Zulu kingdom before 1879, what the Shepstone
system did, as Jeff Guy points out, was to re-create the main functions of chiefly
authority, alter the process of appointment of chiefs, and introduce hut-tax. All of this
was done within the general maintenance of homestead production.26 African
administration over workers was thus introduced before the turn ofthe century, primarily
to introduce a migrant labour system in which workers were dependent on a chiefs
authority to work, but could not remain in urban areas for more than a limited time. So
even before the turn of the century, it was difficult to say what 'culture' Zulu people
would respond to at work.
As I have already mentioned, Apartheid moved to create a similar, more
intensified project on a national scale at the end of the 1950s. Many scholars have sought
25 Keletso Atkins. The Moon is Dead! Give us our Money! The cultural origins ofan African work ethic in
Natal, South Africa, 1843-1900. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1993. p.67-83.
26 Jeff Guy. "The destruction and reconstruction of Zulu society" in Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone
(eds) Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa. London: Longman, 1982. p. 188-190.
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to understand and explain the relationship between African workers and culture. In
studying the African urban population in Johannesburg in the early decades of the
twentieth century, Van Onselen has shown how gangs developed around common
cultural associations. But notably, these gangs, which came to be a threat to
Johannesburg's "orderly" population, were built around associations of "culture", based
on very loosely defined notions of ethnicity, and developed their own rules within the
constraints of their "work" and their environment.27 Jean and John Comaroffhave sought
to understand work and culture among the Tshidi and have suggested that there was an
important distinction that developed in migrants' consciousness between work in the
context ofpre-capitalist production and industrial labour, and that this understanding
changed over generations?8 Others have shown how African workers remolded
Apartheid understandings of cultural divisions in to protective and even productive
associations, that, although in some ways authoritarian, in no way mirrored a mythical
African tribal path.29
The argument that I am drawing together is this: we cannot understand culture as
an homogenized entity that is represented by a single consciousness. We must realize that
Culture is itself a dYnamic process that produces and destroys divisions, and cannot be
divorced either from power or from particular contexts, whether they are industrial or
agricultural.30 While this work does not aim to investigate the many transformations in
Zulu culture during the period, what I do seek to establish is the importance of culture in
the particular workplace that I am investigating. But precisely what is this "culture"? As I
have already mentioned, the Labour Supply Company in Durban came to be seen as a
27 Charles van Onselen. New Babylon, New Nineveh: Everyday life on the Witswatersrand, 1886-1914.
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2001. Most specifically, see the chapter on Nongoloza's "regiment of the
hills". p. 379-382. The vast majority ofNongoloza's gangs was of Zulu origin, although other ethnic
groups were not excluded. Authority within the gangs seemed to rely on a combination of re-made Zulu
hierarchy and the practical conditions of a gangs operating inside and outside prisons.
28 Jean and John Comaroff. "The Madman and the Migrant: work and labor in the historical consciousness
of a South African people" in American Ethnologist, no 14, 1987.
29 See for example, Dunbar Moodie. Going/or Gold, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1994 and Jeff
Guy and Motlatsi Thabane. "Technology, Ethnicity and Ideology: Basotho Miners and Shaft-Sinking on the
South African Gold Miners" in Journal o/Southern African Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, January 1988.
30 It is worth mentioning that in this thesis I do not engage with the broad theoretical debate centred around
migrancy and cultural identity, initially framed by Phillip Mayer and Max Gluckman in their ethnographic
accounts of 'cultural dualism' among migrants in different areas in Southern Africa. For an interesting
overview of this debate see James Ferguson. Expectations ofModernity: Myths and meanings ofurban life
on the Zambian copperbelt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. p. 86-93. For an alternative
position in the debate see Dunbar Moodie. Goingfor Gold
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model Apartheid institution, yet the success of the company, I will argue, has more to do
with the conditions ofwork in the industry itself than with "Zulu culture" or "tradition"
per se. The culture created in the stevedoring industry was one that derived from a
combination of the difficult conditions of industrial work and from the particular power
relations at work.
The particular responses of stevedores towards their conditions ofwork reflects
the fact that what developed in the industry was a paternalistic relationship between the
workers and their immediate African superiors, the izinduna. This relationship was not
one that existed in Zulu tradition, for these izinduna were created as African superiors
only in the context of the work itself. But paternalism, as Eugene Genovese has pointed
out, is not a relationship that is simply a one sided exercise ofpower. Instead, paternalism
encompasses a set ofmutual obligations and responsibilities, where both parties
experience vulnerability, albeit unevenly SO.31 This was most powerfully witnessed in the
docks when izinduna, rather than workers themselves, challenged the authority of senior
officials in the Labour Supply Company because of constant worker pressure and
discomfort at the practices of the company. It was also powerfully manifested in
stevedores' reliance on the knowledge of izinduna, when unions organized the docks in
the early 1980s. Workers would rely on the advice of izinduna, not only in making
decisions about unions, but also about their future as workers in a declining industry.
However, these relationships were also marked by a clear separation in power and in
roles and both parties were aware of their positions.
Before considering the traumatic period of the 1980s for stevedores, it is worth
noting some theoretical reflections. While I accept Chakrabarty's argument that the
experience of work and consciousness of industrialization is different everywhere, his
argument about these reflecting different cultural practices in different societies is too
loosely defmed, and does not reflect either the enormous changes that cultures experience
in different material contexts or the particular conditions of any industry. Tentatively,
perhaps, it is worthwhile to remember Marx once again and suggest that consciousness
does have much to do with the industrial and class relationship in which individuals work
31 Eugene Genovese; Roll, Jordan, Roll: The world that slaves made. United States: Vintage Press, 1976.
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and live. People may not react as hollow reflections of these class relationships, but
neither do they react as similarly hollow reflections ofculture.
Before proceeding, I must clarify my use of "culture". Inasmuch as I use the tenn
fairly freely, in accordance with both the language ofApartheid and with the theoretical
positions I have already sketched, this thesis does not attempt to sustain any grand
conception or definition of "culture". It may well have been more expedient to avoid the
tenn altogether, but it is so entrenched in both the discourse of the state and theoretical
discourse that I found the use of "culture" unavoidable. In examining labour
administration during this period, the most that this thesis attempts to say about "culture",
based on the empirical evidence of the working of the industry, is that both the Apartheid
conceptions and some of the theoretical conceptions of culture are extremely limited.
Rather than suggesting that this thesis examines culture, I would suggest that it examines
a certain consciousness arising out of the particular politics in the workplace.32 This
"political" consciousness is at the very heart of this investigation, and the thesis needs to
be read in this manner.
Unionization, politicized ethnicity and the experience of declining work
It is the1980s that powerfully bring the two main themes of this thesis together. The
1970s had seen the building of container tenninals, and by the end of the decade the first
major retrenchments had begun. In 1979, the Labour Supply Company was dissolved,
being regarded by companies as inefficient and expensive. Recruitment of new workers
stopped, but the majority of workers remaining in the docks were migrants and initially,
at least, the work patterns controlled by the izinduna continued. However, with
retrenchment and the international restructuring and ultimately, marginalization of
stevedoring work, gang sizes were reduced and the role of the izinduna became less and
less significant. In this climate of retrenchment, izinduna could do little to stop
retrenchment and help workers.
32 This particular reading of "production politics" comes largely from Michae1 Burawoy. The Politics of
production: factory regimes under capitalism and socialism. p. 10-12.
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There were two other significant themes in the stevedoring industry in Durban
during this period. The first was that trade unions made significant inroads into the
industry, in line with increased national radicalism ofworkers and government
recognition of the need for African trade unions in the late 1970s. Particularly during the
early years ofunionism on the docks, a union called the General Workers Union was
especially effective in containing retrenchment, organizing good retrenchment packages
for workers, and generally improving conditions (for example, pressurizing companies to
introduce safety standards). One of the things that this union was also able to do was to
bridge the gap between izinduna and workers by organizing both parties and emphasizing
their common struggle to continue working in the docks.
The second theme was the emergence of politicized ethnicity in the docks. The
Inkatha movement had emerged in Natal in the 1970s as a cultural association for Zulu
people. Its main focus had initially been to promote African business in the Kwazulu
homeland and provide an association to which Zulu people could belong. Initially not
overtly political, other than in not challenging the main tenets ofApartheid, it developed
rapidly into a political organization as ANC-aligned movements began powerfully
asserting them in the country through unions and the United Democratic Front in the
early 1980s.33 While early union federations such as FOSATU sat uncomfortably beside
it, the formation of COSATU in 1985 and its specifically political demands pushed
Inkatha into attempting to provide an alternative political voice. Despite its liberal
overtones, such as a free-market economy and opposition to sanctions, its methods were
those ofviolence. In 1986 Inkatha formed an alternative union structure, the United
Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) to challenge COSATU. Despite its
pretensions towards unionism, UWUSA proved to be little more than a way to prevent
Zulu workers joining COSATU-aligned Unions. On the East Rand and in Natal between
1986-1993 violent clashes between Inkatha and ANC-aligned workers erupted.
It is also worth mentioning that this period was one during which the Apartheid
state was 'in crisis'. Unlike earlier periods of strong economic and political conditions,
33 Gerhard Mare has skillfully traced fukatha's development and strategies in two works. See Mare and
Hamilton. An appetite for power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of (loyal resistance'. Johanneburg:
Ravan Press, 1987; Mare, Brothers Born ofWarrior Blood: Politics and Ethnicity in South Africa.
Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992.
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the state faced challenges from both an African population becoming more militant and
organized in their demands, and an international commwrity impatient with the rate of
change in South Africa- and willing to back their impatience with economic sanctions.
Local business leaders also began openly to reject Apartheid as inefficient. Previously
tightly administered ventures by the state, such as the Labour Supply Company, were no
longer controlled, and influx control simply became too expensive to administer. Because
the state was more concerned in staying in power at all costs, and spent a great deal of
resources in maintaining a faltering system, companies were able to alter what had
become inefficient Apartheid labour administration.34 For an industry based around
migrant workers, the state was no longer a prominent actor. Instead, the 1980s was a
period that allows us to ponder how deeply Apartheid divisions had become entrenched
in worker consciousness.
The experience of the decline of stevedoring work in Durban was a tragic one for
African workers in Durban. The first phase ofheavy retrenchments between 1979-1985
was tempered by good organization by the General Workers Union and various schemes
such as guaranteed work days and long unpaid leave to stall retrenchment. After a series
of struggles between wrions, stevedores chose the best wrion based on its commitment to
the workers' cause. Yet in 1985, with more retrenchments pending, the General Workers
Union abandoned the docks, disillusioned at fighting an obviously losing battle. After
1985, the COSATU-aligned Transport and General Workers Union formally represented
the stevedores, but were significantly less successful in either gaining the support of
workers or the recognition ofmanagement. This failure must be attributed to COSATU,
whose strategy became focused towards the more militant and politically conscious urban
workforce. Within this strategy, the migrant stevedores in Durban became an
insignificant area of organization.
The second phase ofretrenchments from 1985-1991 again hit the stevedoring
workforce very hard. But there was little inspiration to be drawn by stevedores from this
period. The major stevedoring company was determined to casualize as many workers as
possible, leaving only a core ofworkers that they were prepared to train in the new
34 Robert Price. The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1991. p. 100-108.
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methods of cargo handling. In 1987 UWUSA, after much worker intimidation and some
worker resistance, became the majority union in the docks. It displayed very little
understanding of the industry and did not fight casualization effectively. In 1991 it left
the docks, leaving the stevedores without morale for work and cynical about the
effectiveness of trade unions.
Part of the insight that this period in the docks provides us with, is in to the actual
working of politicized ethnicity. It also challenges the general assumptions made by
scholars that the conflicts in Natal between' 1986-1993 were simply between urbanized
African workers and Zulu migrants.35 The misplaced assumption is that Apartheid had
been so successful that it crafted ethnic division so centrally in the migrants'
consciousness that he or she would not be able to clearly understand the political changes
occurring. Of course this period also centrally confronts the failures of COSATU
organizing strategies and shows that it was either too disorganized to concentrate on all
workplaces, or that it too believed that migrants were not worth serious organizing.
It is important to compare the process of casualization in Durban with that of the
international stevedoring industry. In Europe, with much longer traditions ofmilitancy,
retrenchment has occurred, but many more workers have been retained as pennanent by
the application of a rotational system.36 It may well be true, in returning to the Marx.
quote given at the beginning of this chapter, to argue that technological advancement has
replaced the need for workers. But within these "objective material conditions" it is
crucial to reflect on the specific agency detennining the kind of future that workers have.
And in this narrative of industrial transfonnation in South Africa, stevedoring workers
did lose, not only because of the oppressive labour policies ofthe past but also because of
the failure ofunions.
35 Most notably, Mahmood Mamdani. Citizen and Subject, p. 246-256.
36 Kees Marges, Secretary General ofthe International Transport Workers Federation. Containerisation and
Automation: how to survive as dockworkers. Address to a conference on 'Container handling automation
and technologies', 22 and 23 February 1999. Accessed on 25 February 2002 at
b.tt.P.:.I!.y:!y:!y!'jtt..Q.rg.~.1J.kLS..~9.t.i.Qn.~lgQ.!;*~r.f!fi.l.Q.J..Z<;~p_?gm.~JJ.t.m
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A Note on Method and Organization of the thesis
This thesis aims to portray several "re-makings" ofwork in the Durban harbour. It
attempts to suggest some wider trends relating to the implementation and effects of
Apartheid policy and the relationship between technology and work. Where government
records have been available, for the earlier periods in particular, I have used these as
guides to analyzing the practices of labour management. After 1975, when government
records are not available, I have relied on testimonies by workers and management. I
have also had a limited number ofunion and company records at my disposal, which
have been especially helpful in the period of the early 1980s. Regrettably, I have not been
able to delve as deeply as I would have liked into the difficulties ofpoliticized ethnicity
in the late 1980s, as many stevedoring workers simply refused to talk about this issue.
Indeed, it is worth noting that the perspectives of the transformations that this thesis
describes are largely from management and unionists. Yet I have been fortunate to have
enough worker interviews to be able meaningfully to contrast their perceptions of the
changes that occurred.
The thesis is organized into three chapters that follow its three main arguments. The
fITst chapter argues that technological change in the Durban harbour remade labour
practice, and that although unique conditions of labour control existed, these
technological changes were part of a wider global process. In this chapter, I further
situate containerization within the framework of "the new international economy". It is
only once containerization is placed within this broader context that the arguments that I
have presented here and in the conclusion ofthis thesis regarding the conditions ofwork
in the new economy make any sense. In addition to these crucial arguments, the purpose
of this first chapter is to present the overall economic transformations in the harbour, in
order to give the reader a context for the specific changes described in chapters two and
three.
The second chapter presents an account of the relationship between Apartheid labour
practice and stevedoring work in Durban during the period of 1959 to 1978. I argue here
that the practices ofpower and authority at work are critical in shaping and maintaining
the industry. I attempt to show how, despite both the determination ofboth the state and
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the stevedoring companies to implement Apartheid in the workplace, this project proved
to be both theoretically and practically Wltenable.
In the third chapter I present "a social history" of the technological transformation of
the port during the 1980s. I also tie this closely to both the arguments about paternalism
that I developed in Chapter Two and to the turbulent political context of the 1980s. This
chapter also addresses the difficulties of trade unionism during this period and I argue
that the legacy of oppressive labour relations complicated the emergence of trade unions,
and unlike in other parts of the world, workers were practically defenseless in a new
technological age.
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Chapter 1: Breaking the Buffalo: The Transformation of Stevedoring Labour in
Durban, 1959-1990
In Durban, South Africa, stevedoring workers were the most physically powerful workers
of all, and were known as "Onyathi" in Zulu, or Buffalos, which aptly described the
physical nature of their work. The Durban harbour and the stevedoring industry was very
labour intensive throughout the century. As in most industries in South Africa, African
workers built and maintained the docks. These buffalo developed the linkage that made
Durban a thriving city and sustained the Apartheid economy. Yet today the buffalo are all
but gone, replaced by onboard warehouses known as containers and container terminals.
Machines have replaced the men once so integral to the survival of the city.
Since the early 1970s, harbours worldwide have been 're-made' by technological
change. Broadly speaking, these changes have involved a new method for handling and
transporting cargo. Commodities which were previously stored in the hold of ships are
now packaged into large containers that are secured and carried on the deck of ships.
Containers are onboard warehouses that, ifproperly secured, prevent substantial damages
to cargo and can quickly be loaded on and offtrucks and trains, saving time and money in
warehousing and the inevitable idle time waiting for goods to go through human hands.
To facilitate container transport, new ships have had to be built to accommodate
these twenty or forty ton on-board warehouses. Harbours have had to be deepened by
dredging to accommodate the new ships, and container terminals and massive cranes
have had to be built. This has often disadvantaged older ports whose infrastructure was
designed according to older patterns, because they have struggled to fmd space within
their existing harbour to build these new structures. In addition, as the initial capital
outlay is quite substantial, many cities have struggled to find money to develop their
ports.
What is remarkable about these changes, all ofwhich can broadly be described as
containerization, is the pace at which they have occurred. Research into container
transport began in the mid 1960s, and by the 1980s the container had become the
standard for cargo circulation across the world. This rapid development has intensified
difficulties for many ports and dramatically re-configured the power ofvarious ports
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according to container facilities. 1 Traditional shipping routes have also changed, with
ports in the Far East gaining huge prominence and Atlantic Ports declining significantly
in relative terms.
Workers have not been isolated from containerisation. Stevedoring work that
primarily involved loading and off-loading cargo from holds using simple nets and
winches has been substantially reduced. These workers have become peripheral, having
to be content with the excess cargo that is still transported on older ships. Many of them
have faced casualization (or re-casualization) throughout the world. The workers who
have remained as permanent have had to learn new skills of lashing and securing cargo
and using new machinery. The work-gang that for most of the century was a crucial part
of stevedoring has also all but disappeared, replaced instead with workers who are multi-
skilled, and able to perform all of the functions that were previously fixed as part of a
gang.
While containerization has made a significant impact on harbours and stevedores
worldwide, enough to be called a global process, it is incorrect to assume that global
processes occur uniformly everywhere. It is important to realize that social, economic and
cultural conditions in particular countries mediate the entry ofparticular kinds of global
innovations.
In this chapter I set out to examine the stevedoring workers and work in Durban
since 1959, partly in order to establish an economic framework or context for the rest of
this thesis. In an opening section, I discuss the practice of stevedoring work
internationally in order to situate the reader in the main terms of the discussion that
follows. I then discuss the casua1labour market and its persistence in stevedoring
worldwide. Having given the very necessary background, I then focus on Durban and
describe the struggle between casual workers and Apartheid labour controls, and the
changes that occurred in policy and practice within stevedoring work. I describe how the
stevedoring industry in Durban implemented Apartheid legislation and came to be seen as
1 In the Far East, ports like Busan in Korea were designed specifically around containerization. Within
twenty years, Busan was the fifth busiest port in the world. Other ports, such as Sydney, designed second
harbours because of the difficulties with re-designing their initial port structures. In 1994, 5 ofthe top 6
container ports in the world were in Far East. Frank Broeze. "Containerization and the Globalization of
liner shipping" in David Starkey (ed) Global Markets. Research in Maritime History, vo!. 14, 1998. p.15-
20. I must kindly thank David Starkey (University ofHull) for kindly making this paper available to me.
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a model of labour control. I explain how the industry attempted to deal with
containerisation and how, during this period, significant differences appear within the
industry that clearly separate the national and international interests of the stevedoring
trade.
In a concluding section, I will situate containerization squarely within the
framework of the "new international economy". I will suggest that recent theoretical
accounts of this "globalized" economy significantly match the changes that have
occurred in world ports. In making this argument, I will consider Castells' notion of
technology and the creation of flexible work and examine Harvey's discussion of a dual
labour force arising in the 1980s comprising a core of specialized workers and a majority
of casual workers used to supplement the additional labour requirements ofvarious
industries. I will show that the persistance ofcasual labour in the port in the 1990s cannot
be viewed merely in isolation from other world trends in the movement of capital and the
skills needed to harness the new economy.
The central discussion begins during the early Apartheid era. During this time,
conflicts had arisen because of the state's concern with the character of the labour in the
city, as opposed to the interests ofthe shipping lines and stevedoring companies to ensure
maximwn profits by using the cheapest labour possible. The discussion ends in the early
1990s, with stevedoring workers more insecure about their employment than ever, as
neither local companies nor unions nor the state were able to guarantee anything about
their future.
The practice of stevedoring work.
The regional importance of Durban as a harbour bad much to do with its relative
proximity to the Witswatersrand and to the sugar cane fields of Natal. By 1915 Durban
had become the dominant port in South Africa, and by 1955 Durban was handling about
48% of the total cargo handled in country.2 Simple cranes and winches were introduced
from the early decades of the century in order to facilitate the moving of cargo from the
2 Trevor Jones. The Port ofDurban and the Durban Metropolitan &onomy. "ReSearch Monograph,
Economic Research Unit, University ofNatal, Durban, 1997. p. 14 .
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hold of the ship to shore. With the exception of coal, oil, and other petroleum products,
most cargo was transported in so-called "break-bulk" form. Break-bulk cargo was stowed
in the hold of ships and was transported in bags, drums, boxes or simply as loose cargo
and included commodities used by ordinary consumers such as mail, food, sugar and
cars.
Stevedoring work was primarily responsible for this process. Stevedores worked
in gangs varying in size from eight to sixteen members. In a gang work was divided
between: a foreman who would oversee this process entirely, winchmen who would
operate the mechanical winches that pulled the cargo from the hold (in nets or bags),
gangwaymen who ensured that this process was timed correctly, to prevent injury; and a
majority of stevedoring hands who would be responsible for loading the cargo into nets.
These stevedoring hands were responsible for the most physically demanding aspect of
the work, and they often suffered injuries if the process was not timed correctly or ifnets
were overloaded. From Durban to London, gangs were an essential part of stevedoring
work, as a group ofworkers who relied on one another for security. Within gangs, aspects
of respective traditions were preserved and remade.3 (See Pictures 1 to 4 in Appendix
following this chapter)
These patterns in cargo handling were followed more or less internationally,
although often not at the same times. From the mid 1960s, dramatic changes were to
follow in harbours throughout the world. Primarily these changes took the overall form of
unitization, or the consolidation ofcargo into unit loads. Initially this consolidation took
the form ofpalletization, which meant that goods became packaged into easily moveable
unit loads that could be easily handled by a forklift truck. The implication of this for
stevedores was the removal of an important dimension of their work, since cargo arrived
on ships (or at the shore) already packaged and ready for transportation.4 Pallets were
used in Durban from approximately 1970. (See Picture 5 in Appendix).
Although palletization caused a drop in the overall manpower needed, the
situation was exacerbated by the second stage of unitization called containerization.
3 Stephen Hill. The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London. London: Heinemann, 1978. For Durban
consult chapters 2 and 3 ofthis thesis and David Hemson, Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: The
Dockworkers ofDurban. PhD Thesis, University of Warwick, 1978.
4 Stephen Hill. The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London. p. 3-4.
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Despite relying on forklift trucks, labour power was still needed to load and secure
palletized cargo in the hold. Containerization eliminated this need. Cargo was now placed
in massive twenty (and subsequently forty) ton onboard warehouses that were placed on
the decks of ships. Huge shore-side cranes were developed to move these containers,
effectively destroying stevedoring work in the long term. While some stevedoring work
would remain as ports developed the necessary infrastructure, the long-term prospects for
the stevedoring industry remained bleak. (see Picture 6 in Appendix)
The process of containerization did not happen overnight. The idea of
containerization was developed in the mid 1950s by a US truck owner, Malcolm
Mac1ean, who became frustrated at the long turn-around time that trucks spent waiting for
cargo. Initially operating between a few ports in the United States, this technological
change was to spread to the world's harbours during the following thirty years. The
process was inevitably delayed because of the new infrastructure required. In the first
place, new designs needed to be developed for ships and trucks alike to transport
containers. For instance, one ofthe new types of ships became known as the "roll-onlroll-
off' vessel that almost entirely eliminated the need for workers on ships. Secondly, ports
themselves had to invest in costly terminals and to dredge new channels that could handle
these heavier vessels. Besides the massive initial capital outlay for ship-owners and ports,
these new techniques also had to convince ship-owners of their profitability. European
and Australasian companies were only convinced of this by the mid 1960s, and it was
only in the early 1970s that container transport got underway in earnest on a world-scale.
Less developed countries, especially in Africa, took longer to approach these new
technologies seriously.5 They could simply not afford to rely on a gamble to invest
millions in new infrastructure. During the late 1970s and 1980s, many of these ports
serviced older and charter ships. In Durban, work on a container terminal began in 1974
and was completed in 1977.
Crucial actors in international transport are international shipping lines. More than
local stevedoring companies or port operations, shipping lines are motivated purely by
the need to be profitable. Before containerization, shipping lines were more or less bound
to traditional ports of call and well established markets. Like local companies, an
5 Stephen Hill. The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London. p. 5-6.
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international tradition ofworker militancy and a high degree ofunionization meant that
their turn around times were often severely affected. In addition, time losses due to the
limits ofhuman endeavour and the regularity ofpilferage and theft limited their ability to
extract maximum profit. Frank Broeze noted that liner shipping faced a financial crisis by
the mid 1960s.6 He suggests that containerization saved liner shipping, but also
fundamentally changed it. Since the mid 1960s, following from high-powered takeovers
and mergers between companies, shipping lines have become part ofthe global service
economy. The industry has "de-nationalised" entirely by breaking links with traditional
"home" ports and countries and sometimes moving into ownership or partnership with
rail and road companies.7
So what have been the implications ofthese changes for Durban? In 1994, in
terms of container traffic, Durban was the 23rd busiest port in the world and the busiest in
the Southern Hemisphere.8 Investment from both the private and public sectors has seen
the port grow since 1977. Many of the actors mentioned in this primary section will
emerge prominently in the second half of this chapter. But first I must consider the
debates about casual labour in the port and the unique response in South Africa in the
1950s and 1960s.
The Stevedoring Labour Market, Casual Workers and Regulation
Irregular, tOg! or casual workers were a dominant feature of the stevedoring industry in
Durban for the fIrst half of the century. Yet this was in no way unique. In terms of the
international stevedoring industry from London to Mombasa to Durban, casual workers
were relied on because they seemed to serve the irregular nature of work in the industry
best. This use of casual labourers was not unusual in emerging capitalist markets within
colonial states in Africa. In this section I will explain both contexts for casual labour and
show how casual labour was regulated in these different contexts. The difference in South
Africa came with the regulation of casual labour in Durban. This difference, which will
6 Frank Broeze. "Containerization and the Globalization of liner shipping". p. 2.
7 Frank Broeze. "Containerization and the Globalization of liner shipping". p. 24.
8 Trevor Jones. The Port ofDurban and the Durban Metropolitan Economy. p.23.
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be developed at the end of this section, reflects the unique and radically different state
concerns in South Africa.
In London, Gareth Stedman Jones' seminal study of casual labourers during the
second half of the nineteenth century has shown the moral threat that large numbers of
unskilled and 'masterless men' presented to Victorian society. He has discussed how
casual labour from the residuum was seen to be a problem by conservatives, liberals and
socialists alike, and how these people were psychologically characterized as those 'with
weak character and a poor physique'. Reformers in London also believed that these
morally dangerous individuals would be eradicated by progress.9 The problem for
Victorian London was how to regulate an oversupply ofworkers into structured and
permanent employment. This, they hoped, would ensure more stability. Jones notes that
chronic casual poverty was only extinguished in the years following the First World War,
with the dramatic acceleration of industrialization. 10
Despite this change in the overall structure of the London labour market, in the
stevedoring industry casual labour remained. John Lovell has noted that the port industry
was resistant to the changes in the labour market. 11 Stephen Hill added that until the late
1960s, the employers' argument that "you cannot de-casualize dock labour at all" was
widely accepted.12 The basic position ofthe employers was that due to inevitable
fluctuations in trade, there was no way that they could guarantee work for a set number of
men on a daily basis. Despite this, there was relative job security for the casual
stevedores due to a relatively stable supply of cargo ships and the hiring practices of
casual stevedores. There was often more competition between stevedores for the best-
paid work than for work at all. 13 Hiring was left to foremen who would be responsible
for their men on the ships. In practice, this meant that gangs, once established as reliable
work units, would change little.
The de-casualization of stevedoring work in London only occurred in the late
1960s, primarily as a result of the recommendations of the Devlin Committee of Inquiry
9 Gareth Stedman Jones. Outcast London: A study in the relationship between classes in Victorian society.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. p. 11
10 Gareth Stedman Jones. Outcast London. p. 348.
11 John Lovell. Stevedores and Dockers: A study oftrade unionism in the port ofLondon. London:
Macmillan, 1969. p. 217-218.
12 Stephen Hill. The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London. p. 15
13 Stephen Hill. The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London. p. 20.
26
into the port industry (1965). This committee was set up by the government to investigate
the future of stevedoring in the face of impending technological change. The primary
recommendations of the report targeted both workers and companies. 14 For workers, the
report recommended stevedores should become permanent employees of companies, and
that (over time) the labour force should be trimmed by offering voluntary severance
packages and limiting new recruitment. In addition, the piecework jobs that had
characterized the port were to be abolished, and workers would be trained as flexible
workers, who had the ability to fill any place in a gang. For companies, the report
recommended that the number of stevedoring employers also be trimmed from thirty-five
companies to ten. This had already begun to be reflected in practice, however, and by
1972, following mergers and liquidations, there were only four major companies and two
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In Mombasa between 1930-1955, Frederick Cooper discussed the casual labour
market in detail. 16 He has argued that colonial officials perceived casual workers as a
threat to the functioning of the economy. Because workers were not entirely dependent
on employment in the city for their livelihood, they were able to work whenever it suited
them. When demands on their labour power became too strenuous, they were able to
organize and strike, crippling production. If the function of casual labour in the British
colonies had been to prevent labour organization and militancy by circulating labour and
not making them dependent on work in cities, it had failed, leaving employers constantly
in demand ofregular labour. In addition, casual workers often proved to be militant and
their strikes materially disrupted the processes ofcolonial extraction. The solution for the
British colonists was to re-make the labour force, giving them permanence, decent wages,
and a stake in the success of the indUStry.17
14 Stephen Hill. The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London. p. 2-10.
15 Stephen Hill. The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London. p. 7. These mergers, and the English
approach to casualization, provide an interesting resonance and contrast with the pattern followed in
Durban. (described below)
16 Frederick Cooper. On the African Waterfront: Urban Disorder and the Transformation ofWork in
Colonial Mombasa. London: Yale University Press, 1982. Cooper's concern is with labour in the city as a
whole, although dockworkers feature prominently in his analysis. He also notes that the serangs (foremen)
had substantial autonomy in the hiring ofworkers, the supervision ofwork, and the distribution of wages.
See esp. 37-41 of the above mentioned work.
17 In later work, Cooper described colonial casual labour policies until 1940 as an "albatross around
officials necks that blurred the distinction between workers and urban low-life, between the orderly and the
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In South Africa, the casual labour market developed out ofcolonists' demand for
labour in the 19th century, often through a compromise between Africans and colonial
officials. In her study of the development of the togt (casual) labour market in Natal,
Keletso Atkins has argued that the colonial attempts to regulate labour were hampered by
a misooderstanding of an African work ethic whose conceptions of time and authority lay
primarily within their own cultural norms. 18 She has suggested that the casual labour
market in Durban resulted as a compromise between two different cultural systems, and
because Africans were very aware of the economic advantages ofbeing casual workers.
In a study ofMozambican migrants in the second half of the nineteenth century, Patrick
Harries has emphasized that unrestricted labour mobility was used as a bargaining tool
for higher wages and better conditions. 19 For the South African state in the early
twentieth century, unrestricted labour mobility for Africans became a concern, both
because the white public feared being overwhelmed and because Africans were willing to
work longer hours for less remooeration, often tempting employers to replace whites with
Africans. Influx control was introduced for Africans with the 1923 Native Urban Areas
Act, which sought to retain the necessary African labour in cities, albeit under tight
control, through the implementation ofpass laws and the use of strictly policed
compounds.
In the Durban harbour there was a constant demand for labour from the beginning
of the twentieth century.20 Through the first half of the century, stevedoring employers
were able to get away with employing casual workers, presumably using similar
economic justifications to those of their English counterparts in London. This gave
African stevedores substantially more permanence in Durban than other industrial
worker~. By the 1940s, stevedores claimed Durban as their home when told "to go home
to rural areas".21
dangerous". Frederick Cooper. Decolonization and African Society: The labor question in French and
British Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p.261
18 Keletso Atkins. The Moon is Dead! Give us our Money! The Cultural Origins ofan African Work Ethic
in Natal, South Africa, 1843-1900. Portsmouth, Heinemann, 1993. p. 3-6,107.
19 Patrick Harries. Work, Culture and Identity: Migrant Labourers in Mozambique and South Africa c.
1860-1910. Portsmouth and Johannesburg: Heinemann, 1994. p. 42-43.
20 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 35. According to JeffGuy, rebellion
against the colonial state in Natal was often punished by forced labour in the Durban harbour.
21 David Hemson.. "Dock Workers, Labour Circulation and Class Struggles: 1940-1959" in Journal of
Southern African Studies. Vol. 4, 1977. p.93.
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During the 1940s, previous influx control regulations had been entirely
undermined in South Africa as a whole, as the demand for labour grew during the Second
World War. Indeed, the process ofAfrican urbanization had been intensified to such an
extent that by 1948, the ruling United Party had accepted that African urbanization was
inevitable and based its election promises on this acceptance, arguing that this
urbanization should be carefully controlled.22 In response to the generally vague position
of the United Party regarding urban Africans, the National Party produced a forcefully
argued document called the Sauer Report that arguably won the election for them. The
Sauer report protested 'the black oorstroming of the cities' and argued that 'natives from
the country areas shall be admitted to the urban areas only as temporary employees
obliged to return to their homes after the expiry of their employment' .23 The National
Party government sensed the fears of the white electorate that poor and casual African
labour presented a moral and material threat to their existence, in the form ofAfricans
residing in cities, without regular employment, and with a willingness to work for less
than white workers.
For the first 12 years of its power the National Party sought to develop its election
promises into fully working policies. Part of this development was the centralization of
controls in labour bureaux system administered nationally by the Minister ofBantu
Affairs. There is some evidence to suggest that this process faced difficulty with
individual industries, notably in the docks. In 1956 the stevedoring industry faced
pressure from government on the numbers of casual labourers which they employed and
issued a report on the conditions of stevedoring workers based on a request by the
Department ofNative Affairs. Among other things, the report indicated that a little over
2000 Africans were employed in Durban, ofwhich the majority were togt labourers
(labour employed on a day to day basis) and that 'workers themselves prefer to work as
casuals' .24 Stevedoring companies realized that togt labour was far more profitable and
argued that they did not create instability. As Minister ofNative Affairs, Verwoerd
announced in 1957 that, "only 2000 Natives would be allowed in Durban". Stevedoring
22 Dan O'Meara. Forty Lost Years: The ApartheidState and the politics a/the National Party, 1948-1994.
Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1996. p. 33.
23 Sauer Report, quoted in Dan O'Meara. Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the politics o/the
National Party, 1948-1994. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1996. p. 34-35.
24 SAB ARB vol. 3317 file 1196/5/4/1. "Report on Conditions of Employment of Stevedoring Workers".
29
companies protested that this would lead to a serious decline in efficiency, although by
1958 they seemed willing to agree to a centrally administered compound where African
workers would comply with influx control regulations.25 However, this was not an
acceptance of an end to casua1labour on the docks, and tensions between the state and
the companies continued.
The strike by most of the stevedoring workers employed at African Associated
Stevedoring Company on 25 February 1959 proved to be an event that changed the
stevedoring industry and brought it into the general framework ofApartheid labour
policy. Although the demands ofthe strike were not immediately clear, it was ascertained
that the cause was a rise in wages for indunas, winchmen and gangwaymen and not for
the general stevedoring workers as published in Wage Determination no. 183 of 6
February 1959.26 The striking workers were met by the Bantu Affairs Commissioner of
Durban and a manager ofAfrican Associated Stevedores, and told to return to work. The
stevedores demanded an increase in pay, to which the Bantu Affairs Commissioner
replied that the Wage Determination stood. The meeting ended in disorder27• Police then
dispersed the area, and any workers left after a certain time were arrested. It was also
decided to suspend the employment of all to81 labour on the docks and dismiss all
striking workers as agitators?8
Instead ofbeing blamed on individual to81 workers, the strike was seen as
reflecting the dangers ofcasual labour. The report of the industrial dispute by government
officials showed that all stevedoring in the port had been brought to a standstill, resulting
in a loss of almost 2340 'man' hours, and that the cause of the general standstill was a
25 Quote from David Hemson. "Dock Workers, Labour Circulation and Class Struggles: 1940-1959" in
Journal of Southem African Studies. Vol. 4, 1977. p. 117-118.
26 SAB NTS vol. 7695 file 466/332. Police Report. "Strike: Native Dockworkers Durban: 25 February
1959".27 February 1959. .
27 SAB NTS vol. 7695 file 466/322. Notes of a meeting held between the Native Affairs Commissioner of
Durban, A manager from African Associated and 1200-1400 Labourers from the stevedoring industry, 25
February 1959.
28 SAB NTS vol. 7695 file 466/332. Police Report. "Strike: Native Dockworkers Durban: 25 February
1959".27 February 1959. see also SAB MAR vol. 81 file A2/44. Memorandum by Department of Labour.
16 May 1959. See also Daily News. 25 Feb 1959. "Harbour paralysed by stevedore strikes."
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result of intimidation by togt workers, who were dismissed. The report ends by
"pleasantly" noting that the employment of togt workers had been suspended.29
The strike by togt workers was the breaking point for the companies. Already
facing heavy pressure from the government for employing workers who contravened the
specific legislation regulating the movement and employment ofAfrican labour, the
companies could no longer argue that these workers did not affect productivity. The five
major stevedoring companies met government officials over the following month, and by
the beginning ofApril 1959 had refashioned the conditions under which stevedoring
workers were able to be employed in Durban. The companies decided that a central
system of labour should be introduced requiring workers to be recruited on a weekly
basis, reside in company compounds and be signed on to work when work was available.
This resulted in the cutting of the total workforce by about 500.30 Weekly labour
agreements soon became ten month contracts of employment, approved by traditional
leaders in African areas (mostly in Zululand) and by representatives of the Department of
Native Affairs.
The Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company (DSLSC) was born out of an
agreement between African Associated Stevedores, Consolidated Stevedoring and
forwarding agency, Brock and Company, Storm and Company, Jack Storm Ltd. on the 15
April 1959.31 The state's project ofreguIating African labour and eliminating casual
labour in Durban had been successful, and the stevedoring companies had to come to
terms with making this new system of labour control materially viable.
Before discussing the new systems of work and control developed in the Labour
Supply Company, it is necessary to emphasize two points about casual labour and its
regulation. Firstly, the casuals employed in Durban during the 1940s and 1950s, while
not always enjoying job security, were operating in an economic environment where their
labour was in demand. This contrasts sharply with the economic position that casuals
found themselves in during the late 1980s when casual labour once again became an
important feature of Durban harbour. Secondly, unlike de-casualization in London, the
29SAB ARB vol. 1229. file 1042/15/1959."Industrial Dispute involving stoppage of work" 6 March 1959.
See also Ilanga lase Natal. 7 March 1959, New Strategies to Control Dockworkers."
30SAB MAR vol. 81 file A2/44. Memorandum by Department of Labour. 16 May 1959.
31 SAB BAD vol. 3075. file C39/1171/1 Memorandum of Agreement: "The formation of the Durban
Stevedoring Labour Supply Company". 15 April 1959.
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elimination of casual stevedoring work in Durban was not driven by an overall concern
for the industry or by any general economic imperatives. While state intervention
occurred in both cases, the motivation in Durban was primarily to bring the industry into
line with Apartheid ideology. This will be further explored in Chapter 2.
New Methods of Work and Control: The Labour Supply Company
For Apartheid labour administrators, the new centralized system of control in the
Labour Supply Company appeared to become an ideal example of labour control. During
the 1960s, Mr. 1. Kemp, the general manager of the Labour Supply Company, even
suggested that it be used as a model of labour control for other towns and industries.32
However, I will suggest that the success of the labour supply company was firmly
premised on the economic boom that many South African industries experienced in the
1960s.33 The economic boom was reflected in the stevedoring industry by an increase of
total cargo handled in Durban between 1962 (4323 tons) and 1966 (8557 tons).34
The Labour Supply Company was more like a labour bureau for a particular
industry than a company in its own right.35 Its purpose was to house, control and supply
labour to stevedoring companies when they needed it. It was based in a compound in
Southampton Street in the Point area. Two white directors, Mr. 1. Kemp and Mr. W.
Dreyer ran the company with labour superintendents and African indunas.36 They were
responsible for the recruitment of labour, the housing of labour in compounds and the
signing on of workers for particular shifts. The five stevedoring companies fmanced the
32SAB BAO 2401 file 31/3/336. Letter from PI Kemp (general manager) to Dr P. van Rensburg (Dept of
Bantu Administration and Development). 22 April 1966.
33 And on the relationships developed between African workers and indunas, that is explored in Chapter 2.
34 Statistical Year Book, 1976, quoted in David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: The
Dockworkers ofDurban. p. 512.
3S My understanding of the labour bureaux system comes from Doug Hindson and Deborah Posel. Hindson
suggests that the role ofthe labour bureaux was to "combine implementation of influx control [with] labour
placement and direction". While both emphasize the differentiated labour force, permanent urbanized
workers as against migrants, I must emphasize that the vast majority of stevedores were migrants without
rights ofurban residence. Posel's analysis of the excesses and inefficiency ofthe labour bureaux system is
important in understanding the overall working of the system, however I again believe that the specific
mechanisms established in the stevedoring industry in Durban, bypassed much of this inefficiency. See
Hindson. Pass Controls and the African urban proletariat in South Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan, 1987, p.
62-64; and Posel. The Making ofApartheid, 1948-1961, Oxford: Claredon Press, 1991. p. 192-202.
36 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: The Dockworkers ofDurban. PhD. thesis,
University of Warwick, 1979. p.388.
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operation and sat on the board of directors, but had little to do with the daily operation of
the company. From accounts of senior and middle management, any trouble in
compounds or with workers occurred rarely.37
African workers were recruited from specific areas in Zululand (with a
significant minority from Pondoland), and could only live in the compound in the Point
on condition that they respected their fixed term contracts ofnine or ten months.38 The
number of workers that the companies needed were signed on every day at the compound
and transported to their workplaces. There were no more togt labourers or weekly
contracts. During the early days of the DSLSC, in 1961, stevedoring companies decided
to give a basic retainer to workers to ensure that they would be able to keep a constant
workforce even during times of little work. The government-run South Africa Railways
and Harbours (hereafter referred to as SARH) objected to this, because they did not give
any such retainer to workers.39 The stevedoring companies persisted in paying the
retainer. This showed that the stevedoring companies would not yield entirely to
government pressure and marked the beginning of a very tense relationship between the
stevedoring companies, whose management was predominately English speaking, and the
very Afrikaans SARH.40
Despite the retainer, most of the workers' wages came from the work that they
actually performed. During this period, with lots of surplus work available, workers often
received most of their wages based on overtime allowances. 41 The Labour Supply
Company kept detailed records ofeach of the workers, listing where the worker had been
recruited from, the number of contracts he may have had, and any disciplinary offences
committed. A distance was thus created between the companies and the African
workforce that allowed African izinduna to manage the workforce, and from the
37 Interviews by the author: Captain Gordon Stockley (25 June 2001), Hugh Wyatt (4 September 2001).
Both worked in the docks from early 1970s, Stockley as Operations Manager and Wyatt started as a
foreman.
38 The 1964 Bantu Labour Act made it law the African workers had to be recruited specifically through
tribal labour bureaus.
39SAB MAR. vo!. 81 file. A2/44. Department ofLabour. "Re: Native Labour: The Durban Stevedoring
Labour Supply Company". 18 May 1961.
40 An interesting tactic of the primarily English stevedoring companies was to employ Kemp and Dreyer,
two Afrikaans managers- with experience in "Bantu Administration" to run the Durban Stevedoring Labour
Supply Company. Part of their job description was to report to the state on a fairly regular basis.
41 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 526.
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companies' perspective, served to deal effectively with dissent. It also helped to eliminate
the problem of large numbers ofAfrican workers in the city without fixed employment.
Stevedoring companies did have to pay a little extra in terms of this retainer and to the
officials of the DSLSC, but in return they gained a stable supply of labour, available
whenever they needed it, effectively their own labour bureau. The retainer was a very
small amount, particularly insignificant in the context of the economic boom in the 1960s
that meant that workers often worked most days ofthe week and that the companies were
making large profits.
Work itselfbecame more tightly regulated during this period. Before the Labour
Supply Company, stevedores worked in gangs, although these were organized in a
haphazard way, at the last minute, when companies determined how many workers would
be required on any given day. With the Labour Supply Company, workers would be
allocated to particular gangs at the compound. A white foreman would be at the vessel
and together with the induna, co-ordinate the operation. Once workers were finished
clearing or loading a particular ship, they would be fmished for the day. Workers were
paid as gang per ship rather than per hour. This gave workers some leeway as to how fast
they worked. Although it was in their interests to work fast to earn more money, they
could not be transferred from one ship to another without getting extra money for it.
Workers were organized into Stevedoring Labour Units, which was management's term
for the work gang. Each gang consisted of a group of a minimum of eight stevedoring
hands to which were added the semi-skilled winchman and gangwayman. The induna
who led the gang picked the men he wanted. The gang would be divided with general
stevedores in the hold of the ship, gangwaymen and winchmen on the hatch"and indunas
moving between. A foreman would supervise this process from the hatch.42 There was
very little interaction between workers and white foremen, except that the foreman kept a
register ofworkers by referring to the band on each worker's wrist that gave critical
details about the worker, such as his name and length of contract. These bands were heat
sealed onto each worker when he became part of the DSLSC. Company management
believed that this helped to streamline the process ofboth paying and disciplining
42 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: The Dockworkers ofDurban. p. 396-400.
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workers.43 Individual stevedoring labour units developed as regular, and almost
permanent, features over time, meaning that in practice, they were seldom chosen on a
daily basis.
Authority in the Labour Supply Company largely rested with the induna structure.
Many of the interesting developments within this structure will be discussed in the next
chapter, however it is important to emphasize that the labour supply company's sole
function was not simply to create a more stable and efficient stevedoring operation, but
also to centralize labour supply and work around a specific reading of "Zulu culture".
Part of this process was to centralize control in the compound, particularly around the
figure ofa JB Buthelezi. Buthelezi was an uncle ofMangosuthu Buthelezi, who had,
since the late 1950s, had powerful support on Native Administration Boards, and
commanded a certain respect that he turned to political mobilization in the form of
Inkatha in the 1980s. JB Buthelezi was the most senior induna, spoke for all workers at
labour liaison boards, and sat on the management committee ofLabour Supply Company.
In later years, workers would protest Buthelezi's administration, and interviews reflected
diverse worker opinion;
"I would say that this system was better than the togt system...we were able to work every day. Before
sometimes we could not get work. On some days there were no ships for us to work. And when there was
no work we even had to sell our clothes to buy food."44.
"at that time we had no access to seeing Apartheid from the whites the employers. We could only
see the'Apartheid' by people ofour own race. You come to the gate, he doesn't know you, no matter how
poor you are, he doesn't care, he will only take me because he knows my cousin.,,45
During the 1960s, the Labour Supply Company controlled stevedoring operations
in Durban. Its directors prided themselves on having prevented even a single day of
43 Interviews done by the author. Capt. Stockley, 25 June 2001, Yoga Thinnasagren, 6 September 2001. Mr
Thinnasagren worked as a labour superintendent in various stevedoring companies during the 1970s.
44 Mr Nzuza, quoted in Tina Sideris. Sifuna Imali Yethu: The life and struggles ofDurban Dockworkers,
1940-1981. Johannesburg: SAIRR Oral history project, 1983. p. 19
45 Interview by the author. Bongani Dlamini, currently a casual labourer. Mr Dlamini began working on the
docks in the early 1970s.
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strikes since 195946, and attributed its success largely to compound administration in
accordance with Zulu tradition. 47 While the next chapter will problematize the use of
"Zulu culture" as a successful mechanism of labour control, the following sections will
show how the erosion of the economic stability in the docks severely tested these
assumptions and showed that at least part of the success of the company was based on its
relatively secure economic position during the 1960s.
The Crisis in Production
The boom in cargo handling in docks slowed down after 1966, and by 1970 was as low as
at the beginning of the decade.48 Because there was less work available, the stevedores
suddenly found themselves earning a lot less. In addition to this, the final wage
detennination of 1969 based its recommendations on 1966 figures of average earnings,
grossly overestimating the actual wages of the workers.49 A combination of this overall
economic decline and the refusal of stevedoring companies and the state to recognize the
real decline in wages of stevedoring workers led to a strike on the 4 April 1969 of almost
2000 stevedoring workers. The method for dealing with the strike was immediate, and
left little doubt of the state's commitment to urban order. More than 1000 workers were
dismissed and sent home.50 The strike was the fIfst major one in over ten years and, at
the very least, showed workers' detennination to be paid properly.
In the aftennath of the strike, the Department ofNative Affairs in conjunction
with the DSLSC set up new and stricter controls ofrecruitment. By 1972, the emphasis of
recruitment had shifted to strongly Zulu traditional areas such as Nongoma and
Mahlabatini and away from Pondo areas such as Mount Ayliff.51 While Labour
recruitment had always favoured a Zulu labour force, this move entrenched this supply
46 SAB BAO vol. 3049 file C39/29. Dreyer, W. "Some notes on the establishment, methods and
organization of a Stevedoring Labour pool". Durban, 1966. p. 10.
47BAO 2401 file 31/3/336. Letter from PI Kemp (general manager) to Dr P. van Rensburg (Dept ofBantu
administration and development). 22 April 1966.
48 Statistical Year Book, 1976, quoted in David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: The
Dockworkers ofDurban. p. 512.
49 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: The Dockworkers ofDurban. p. 516-517.
50 Natal Mercury, 7 Apri11969. "HalfDurban's dockworkers set offhome".
51 Interview with Dreyer by David Hemson, quoted in David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant
Workers: The Dockworkers ofDurban. p. 581.
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particularly from areas that were known for being conservative and especially
traditionally orientated.
The strike was viewed somewhat more ambiguously by stevedoring companies. It
led to a bottleneck of ships in the harbour, and many of the companies supported the call
ofmany of the dismissed workers to be re-instated. But there were more serious long-
term effects. Because the government viewed general stevedores as unskilled, it was
possible to simply replace strikers with more 'disciplined' workers. But many of those
dismissed workers had gained skills while working during the boom ofthe 1960s. There
was a dramatic increase in the incidence of injury through accident in 1970.52 This is
undoubtedly due to a whole set ofnew workers who were expected to work as
productively as workers in the 1960s. The productivity of stevedores also underwent a
sharp decline in the early 1970s, causing large port delays. A spokesman for Royal Inter-
ocean shipping line is reported to have commented;




The pressures of productivity had not faced the stevedoring companies since the
inception ofthe DSLSC. In addition, shipping lines changed their rate structures (see
below) which largely increased the competition between stevedoring companies. By the
early 1970s, stevedoring companies began employing casual labourers illegally in
addition to the pool of labour available from the DSLSC to meet surplus requirements.
Although this constituted only about 12% of the labour force on any particular day, this
emerged as a challenge to the Apartheid system of labour control and distribution.54 A
series ofmeetings were set up by the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board with the
Stevedoring Companies in order to try and solve this crisis. Stevedoring companies
admitted to using casual labour and insisted at these meetings that they could not function
without using casual labourers on particular days. Officials of the local Bantu
52David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: The Dockworkers ofDurban. p. 534.
53 Natal Mercury, 23 January 1970. "Mechanisation the Answer to Port Delays, say Agents"
54 Durban Repository Archives. PNAB 2/3/7/1 (sub committee ofLabour and Transport). SB. Bourquin
(Chief Director). "Registration and Control of Bantu Dockworkers". May 1975.
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Administration Board stated that casual labourers were "bringing havoc to town" and
"drinking illicitly", and that the "town needed to be cleaned up". Eventually stevedoring
companies agreed that they would attempt to register workers and set up a pool that could
be drawn on for excess labour requirements.55 Yet it seemed that this resolution could
only solve the crisis on a temporary basis and that the whole structure of stevedoring
labour needed to be re-visited.
Problems of Competition, Effects of Containerization
South African stevedoring companies had been controlled by shipping lines since the
days of the great Union Castle mail-ship line, before the turn ofthe century, existing to
ensure that their liners would be serviced as fast as possible. For instance, the Union
Castle line owned African Associated Stevedores.56 Private stevedoring companies were
not guaranteed work and survived on extra stevedoring requirements during especially
busy periods. Towards the end of the 1960s, goods began to be carried in containers,
and many predicted that it would make the stevedoring industry substantially less
important in ports worldwide.57 The shipping lines were aware of the coming
technological changes and flfst demanded a change in method ofpayment from a cost
plus rate standard contract to an all in rate structure, irrespective of the cargo handled.58
This change meant two things; fIrstly, the cost plus rate structure was based on set
amounts depending on what kind of cargos were handled, and made allowance for more
difficult cargos for stevedores; secondly, breaking the standard contract allowed for
stevedoring companies to set their own rates. This meant that stevedoring companies
would continually undercut each other, and shipping lines could always choose the
cheapest option. Independent operators (outside the DSLSC) would employ casual
55 Durban Repository Archives. PNAB 2/3/7/1 (sub committee of Labour and Transport). "Minutes of a
meeting addressing the Labour problems in the point on Harbour areas". 20 November 1974.
56 Mike Morris. "Stevedoring and the General Workers Union, part 1" in South African Labour Bulletin,
Vol. 11, no. 3, 1986. p. 91.
57 There were many such studies done at the time. I happen to have come across research commissioned by
the International Labour Organization and done by AA Evans entitled Technical and Social Changes in the
worlds ports. Geneva ,1969. Evans predicts massive changes to cargo handling techniques and to a decline
in stevedoring labour, with an emphasis among remaining labourers of flexibility and diversity of skills.
58 Mike Morris. "Stevedoring and the General Workers Union, part 1" in South African Labour Bulletin,
Vol. 11, no. 3, 1986. p. 91-92.
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labour, despite the government regulations, and actively compete to provide better rates
for the shipping lines. This caused vigorous protest from the local Bantu Administration
Board.59
This competition and undercutting went on for about five years, and by 1976 the
major shipping lines pulled out of stevedoring altogether, either disappearing or
transporting new containerized cargo.60 The first five years of the 1970s were critical
because they represented a change in the dominant form of cargo transportation
internationally, from break-bulk to containers. Captain Gordon Stockley, whose
involvement in stevedoring in South Africa stretched for twenty years (1974-1994), and
who became a prominent actor in the liberalizing of labour relations in the 1980s,
explains what the tactics of the shipping lines were;
What these guys in the shipping industry knew about was the effects of containerisation. This
made me a little bitter, because they knew what was going to happen to the labour and that we would have
a massive problem, but they weren't too interested in helping or showing us the direction to go. They just
ripped the guts out ofit to get better profits and to hell with the future ofthe industry.61
Facing a declining but still quite large industry, stevedoring companies had to decide the
best way forward. The previous five years of fighting had not done any of the companies
much good, and it was clearly impossible to continue in this manner from the perspective
of sustainability. In 1976 the 12 stevedoring companies operating in Durban, including
many of the old companies previously owned by shipping lines, either merged into 4
main companies or went insolvent. At the end of the 1970s, the four main companies
operating in Durban were South African Stevedoring Services Company (SASSCO),
Aero Marine, Rennies and Grindrods. The dominant company was SASSCO, occuPYing
60% ofthe market.62
59 Durban Repository Archives. PNAB 2/3/7/1 (sub committee of Labour and Transport). "Minutes of a
meeting addressing the Labour problems in the point on Harbour areas". 20 November 1974.
60 Mike Morris. "Stevedoring and the General Workers Union, part 1" in South African Labour Bulletin.
p.92-93.
61 Interview by the author: Gordon Stockley, 25 June 2001. Captain Stockley had been involved with the
Union Castle line in the 1960s and came to stevedoring in Durban in 1973. He was the Operations Manager
of South African Stevedores nationally until his retirement in 1994.
62 Mike Morris. "Stevedoring and the General Workers Union, part 1" South African Labour Bulletin, p. 95.
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The exploitation of the stevedoring market and merger of stevedoring companies
was perhaps the first tangible effect of containerisation. The second was on the front of
stevedoring labour. As companies merged, and the stevedoring trade became
increasingly difficult to make profitable, remaining companies looked at ways of cutting
costs. In the late 1970s, SASSCO, as the dominant stevedoring company, found that it
were investing the most in the DSLSC and not getting any real material benefits.
Furthermore, smaller companies were using the large labour pool of the DSLSC
whenever they needed it, which caused SASSCO to feel as if they were providing the
labour for these smaller companies. SASSCO also felt that it was important to give
workers a company identity and bring workers closer to management.63 The traditional
hierarchies maintained in the DSLSC were expensive, and for a SASSCO management
far more interested in surviving as a stevedoring company than maintaining Apartheid,
the decision to withdraw from the DSLSC proved quite simple. In 1979, the DSLSC was
wound down without a real fight from anybody, in contrast to its difficult and contested
beginnings.
Facing the Challenges of the 1980s
For the National Party Government, the 1980s was a period of intense difficulty
marked by a huge increase in the use ofviolence to maintain its existence. The state faced
increased political opposition both internally and abroad and the economy was in real
trouble. One of the new areas of political opposition that emerged in the 1970s was from
urban Africans generally and the labour movement specifically. As part of a strategy to
de-politicize as much of civil society as possible without losing control, the National
Party embarked on a series of reforms that led to the recognition oftrade unions and a
new form of influx control that recognized a permanent African workforce64. Gone from
NP politics were grand ideological justifications for a moral order called Apartheid, and
increasingly the dialogue changed to staying in control and maintaining power against a
supposed communist revolution instigated by the ANC. These reforms allowed unions
63 Interview by the author. Captain Stockley. 25 June 2001.
64 Dan o'Meara. Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the politics ofthe National Party, 1948-1994.
p.272-273.
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and companies a much freer space in which to operate, organize, and employ African
workers, but were also misunderstood by many within the ranks of the state itself. Many
in the SARH refused to recognize unions and believed that the reforms were a temporary
measure aimed at re-building the economy. Some, believing that 1960s-style labour
relations could go on forever, resented the collapse of the DSLSC and the new initiatives
undertaken by the stevedoring companies.65 The following section will sketch the events
of the 1980s in the stevedoring industry and briefly link them to the changes in state
policy during this time. It does not fully take into account the changing relationships
between the state and private capital. However, it does demonstrate the main arguments
that have run throughout this paper.
With the economic burden of the DSLSC gone, stevedoring companies and
SASSCO in particular made an attempt to build company identity with their workers.
While the technological changes of Containerisation and Roll-on, Roll-off ships had
caused much difficulty in stevedoring internationally, other technological innovations
specifically affected the stevedoring labour process. In particular, the introduction of
forklift trucks and palletization in the early 1970s meant that some break-bulk cargoes
were transported in far more uniform varieties that could be loaded onto a forklift truck
from the ship. These innovations affected the size of the stevedoring gang, with the
numbers ofworkers working on any ship being reduced from ten or twelve to four or six,
and co-ordinating these workers to work effectively became a far more difficult task.66
Before 1979, the African labour force of the DSLSC had been totally excluded from this
process and SASSCO developed policies to train its workers how to handle palletized
cargo, and also developed training programs to teach its workers English and general
literacy skills. In addition, SASSCO attempted to multi-skill workers, giving them the
flexibility to be either stevedoring hands or forklift truck drivers as any particular job
might require.67 SASSCO also recognized the right ofAfrican workers to be represented
by trade unions and in 1981, following vigorous union organizing and a ballot,
recognized the General Workers Union (GWU) as the representative of all stevedoring
65 Interview by the author. Captain Stockley. 25 June 2001.
66 Interview by the author. Hugh Wyatt. 6 September 2001.
67 Interview by the author. Captain Stockley. 25 June 2001.
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workers in the company nationally. In 1982 Rennies Grindrod also recognized the GWU,
giving the union control of almost the entire stevedoring labour force. 68
In an attempt to come to terms with the changed terrain of the stevedoring trade,
SASSCO and Rennies Grindrod entered into negotiations on a possible merger in late
1982.69 At the end of the year, they submitted an application to the competitions board to
create a single stevedoring company in the docks. In their submission, the two companies
recognized the need for a stable and well-paid labour force and the need for capital
investment in the stevedoring industry that could only really occur with the suspension of
the competition between the two companies for the relatively meager resources. A stable
work-force could be trained and developed to meet new industrial demands, and with the
total cost of labour amounting to 400/0 of both companies' costs, it seemed that continued
competition would destroy any future for stevedoring. An additional factor for this
decision was based on the decline by 6.3 million tons ofbreak-bulk cargo handled
nationally between 1976 and 1981.70
The merger brought immediate benefits and problems. Casual labour was once
again eliminated and workers were all given four-day guarantees, insuring that the
company would pay the workers for a minimum offour days work. Through negotiations
with unions, wages in the industry increased at the end of 1982.71 The merger also
resulted in an oversized staff consisting ofboth manage~entand workers. Almost
immediately when South African Stevedores (SAS) came into existence in August 1982,
both management and workers were retrenched.72
In the work arena itself, SAS introduced a system ofmulti-skilling that aimed at
teaching the labour force a variety of skills which ultimately undermined the fiXed place
of a worker in a gang. The idea behind this was to limit the idle time of workers aboard a
ship and make gangs a far more flexible unit. If any worker was able to perform any of
68 The Argus. 23 June 1982. "Dockers Union, industry forge new deal". See also EP Herald. 22 June 1982.
"Deal gives GWU 4-port standing".
69 In 1981, Rennies and Grindrods Cotts had merged into Rennies Grindrod, leaving only two stevedoring
companies on the docks.
70 SASSCO and Rennies Grindrod. "Rationalisation of the Stevedoring Industry: Memorandum to
Competitions Board". August 1982. This document does not come from an archive but rather was given to
me by retired management of South African Stevedores.
71Daily News. 23 December 1982. "Wage increases for stevedores."
72Daily News. 25 August 1982. "Managers Axed after stevedoring merger."
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the stevedoring functions, a ship could be cleared faster and the numbers in a gang
reduced. This was a significant move away from the Stevedoring labour units of the
1960s. In addition, workers were expected to clear as many ships as possible during a
shift, and were paid hourly instead of according to the amount of ships cleared.73 This
was quite unpopular among the workers, who believed that once they had cleared the ship
that they were tasked with, they could have the rest of the day off.
With the trimmed labour force, the company existed through 1983 without
competition. SAS management believed that the future of the industry was in their hands,
and that they could build long-term sustainability in the industry.74 The 1983 Industrial
Relations Report of the SAS Corporate Plan of the next four years highlighted these
challenges, emphasizing the need to develop an even more skilled labour force while also
recognizing the potential for conflict with the state-run South African Transport
Services75 (SATS), particularly because the government-run SATS resented SAS' liberal
attitude to African workers and political unions. The report argued that SAS could not
afford to intimidate SATS, who had sole control over stevedoring licenses, and protected
the fact that SAS had no competition.76
The verkrampte men in SATS had already had an encounter with the General
Workers Union when they tried to organize all dockworkers in Port Elizabeth. The GWU
had been forcefully told that their union would under no circumstances be recognized.77
When Capital Radio interviewed Les Owen, the industrial relations officer in SAS, about
the strike, Owen had explicitly said that South African Transport Services were in the
wrong and that independent unions must be allowed to operate in the docks. Shortly after
the interview, the directors of SAS were summoned to Pretoria and threatened with the
loss of their stevedoring license.78
73 Interview by the author. Captain Stockley, 25 June 2001.
74 Interview by the author. Captain Stockley, 25 June 2001. By this time, Stockley was entirely in charge
of operations in Stevedoring nationally. He was detennined to make stevedoring work, and declared at a
speech at the Durban Country Club in 1982 that he was not prepared to move at the speed of the slowest
ship.
75 South African Transport Services was the old SARH
76 South African Stevedores Corporate Plan 1984-1987. Industrial Relations Report.
77 Mike Morris. "Stevedoring and the General Workers Union, part 2" South African Labour Bulletin, p.
108.
78 Interview by the author. Les Owen: Industrial Relations Manager, SAS: 1980-1985.5 June 2001.
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Relations between the state and SAS were very tense, and when ISCOR
complained that SAS was a monopoly and controlled rates unfairly in the stevedoring
industry, the state had a perfect solution.79 ISCOR gave support to businessmen in the
dock, SATS issued the stevedoring license and Keeley's Stevedoring was bom.80 At the
beginning of 1984, the state actually issued a large number of stevedoring licenses, but
Keeleys was the most significant because it had control of the transportation ofISCOR's
steel contracts. Keeleys employed casual labour "off the street" and paid these workers
substantially less than SAS. By having a much smaller labour cost, Keeleys was also able
to gain a foothold in many of SAS's other markets. The GWU tried to organize in
Keeleys and found that they had absolutely no knowledge of industrial relations, and had
even attempted to make GWU a sweetheart union. 81 The Union even complained to the
state that Keeleys was paying their workers below the minimum rate under the prescribed
determination.82
The material effects of containerisation and the added pressure from the new
companies made a real difference to SAS. In February 1985, they retrenched 600
stevedores83, and had to downscale many of their training operations because of this
undercutting. But if the companies felt containerisation, the unions did too. As the
GWU's main organizer in Durban, Mike Morris expressed his helpless position;
we couldn't actually deal with it. It drove me out ofthe union in the end It was constantly disheartening,
we tried to negotiate the best deal we could, and it was never good enough .... It was an impossible
79 ISCOR, the major Iron and Steel Conglomerate in the country, imported and exported large amounts of
irregular sized pieces of steel during the 1980s through Durban. Its relationship to the state stretched back
to its formation in 1928, when the state considered it indispensable to industrialize South Africa without an
iron and steel industry. It was strongly tied to national (as opposed to colonist) capitalist interests and
protected white workers. See Ari Sitas. African worker responses on the East Rand to changes in the Metal
Industry, 1960-1980. PhD Thesis. University of the Witswatersrand. 1984. p. 68-77.
80 Mike Morris. "Stevedoring and the General Workers Union, part 2" South African Labour Bulletin, p.
112-114.
81 Interview by the author. Mike Morris. 28 June 2001. Morris was an organizer for the GWU in Durban
from 1981 to 1985. Company management such as StockIey concurred with Morris' description of
Keeley's Stevedoring. Stockley also suggested that many of those employed by Keeley's were retrenched
stevedores.
82 Financial Mail. 3 August 1984. "Wage Determination: Payment Problems".
83 Natal Mercury. 18 February 1985. "600 Durban Dockworkers to lose jobs".
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situation and I did not realise, until I did the research afterwards, what a worldwide trend this was ... we
. ., tr h t 84spent our tzme negotzatmg re enc men s.
Marginal Workers: Stevedoring in the 1990s
After 1985, there was a serious decline in effective unionism in the stevedoring
industry.85 This was not helped by the changed strategies ofnew unions on the docks and
the emergence of a union that only aimed to recruit workers for Inkatha. Another major
wave of retrenchment followed in May 1987. 86 Retrenchments continued in the 1990s.
The company cut its permanent workforce right down and used large numbers of casual
labourers every day to make up for the shortage of work. The container terminal handled
even larger quantities of cargo, and stevedore morale plunged. In contrast with
stevedores' earlier sense ofpride in their work, they no longer had any pride in their
work, and felt that the mechanization ofthe port made them "weak".87 Given that
stevedores were highly exploited throughout the century, the final decade of the century
saw their humiliation; they had become marginal and peripheral workers.
In contrast to the woes of the stevedores, Durban harbour was booming. In 1994,
containerized cargo made up more than 30% ofthe total operations of the harbour, and
this percentage rose steadily.88 In their framework for new port developments, the new
government hardly considered the position of the stevedores at all, despite much mention
ofre-dressing the imbalances of the past. They were far more concerned with issues of
customer satisfaction, building new container terminals, and overall growth ofthe
industry.89 In government reports, they blamed the casual stevedoring industry on past
inequalities. They did make one serious attempt to regulate casual labour by
84 Interview by the author. Mike Morris. 28 June 2001.
85 I discuss this in detail in Chapter 3. Also worth considering is David Hemson. "Beyond the Frontier of
Control" in Transformation, no. 30 1996.
86 David Hemson. "Beyond the Frontier ofControl". p. 97-99.
87 David Hemson. "The Global Imperative? Containerization and Durban Docks", Unpublished Paper,
University ofDurban-Westville, 1996. p 10-12. For a more complete account ofthe interviews see David
Hemson. Migrants andMachines: Labour andNew Technology in the port ofDurban. HSRC report, 1995.
88 Trevor Jones. The Port ofDur~an and the Durban Metropolitan Economy. p. 17.
89 Dept ofTransport. White Paper on National Transport Policy, 20 August 1996. This can be found at
~~gQy~~~wb..i.t.~.P~p_~r!.J2.2.9.f!r.~,IJ~p.9..rtPQH9.Yl9.9.9..~b.t.m Accessed on 19 June 2002, 12:00. Dept of
Transport Moving South Africa: A Transport Strategy for the year 2020. Located at
:WWW.!1r.m!~.p.m1~.gQy!?wPI9.1~_~t.~l.m~_l!/..m.~~.._blmJ Accessed on 18 June 2002, 14:00.
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recommending the establishment of a common labour pool for stevedores.9o
Unfortunately, this only functioned successfully for a year before employers withdrew,
claiming the pool was too big, too expensive and ultimately inefficient.91
Theorizing Containerization
What I have argued in this chapter is that containerisation was responsible for re-
making stevedoring labour in Durban. It is also important to note that containerization re-
made stevedoring work internationally. At the heart of this process was the destruction of
the gang as the crucial feature of the labour process. A limited number ofworkers have
since been trained to perform a number of different tasks and have become flexible
workers. Individual workers, instead of gangs, have become the subject of scrutiny by
management. More than ever, the labour process has become controlled by the
employers.92 Since the days ofMalcolm Maclean, the industry has explicitly looked for
technical solutions to eliminate human labour and gain finner control of the labour
process in an attempt to ensure as little "time-wasting" as possible. Especially in Durban,
the experience of the majority of workers counted little when it came to retrenchment.
Throughout this chapter I have alluded to the idea that containerisation is part of
the expansion of international trade that underpins what Castells describes as 'the growth
of the informational economy' and is popularly referred to as globalization. In general,
containerisation broadly aims to accelerate trade turnover and increase productivity, and
the significant feature of this process is the pace at which technological innovation
happens, and becomes not only economically viable, but profitable. Castells points out
90 Best described in Simon Stratton "The Implementation of the Dock Labour Scheme in the Port of
Durban", Unpublished Paper, University of Adelaide, 1999.
91 To some extent, employers were correct. The register of the pool was manipulated and even unionists
admitted it was too big. Interview by the author. Tony Kruger, Chainnan ofDurban Stevedores
Association, 28 November 2000.
92 Harry Braverman. Labour and Monopoly Capitalism: The degradation ofwork in the twentieth century.
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. p. 57. Processes of surveillance at work are nothing new, and
even the gang structure itselfmonitored individuals performance, by the use of time clocks and rubber
bands heat-sealed onto workers' wrists. Foucault, and Weber before him, recognized surveillance as an
essential part of the capitalist system. But information technology enables a further step in this process by
replacing men by machines and by giving the remaining core workers essential functions that immediately
establish any kind ofmistake on the job. See Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish. London: Penguin, 1977.
p. 209, 221-226 Weber, M. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism. London: Unwin, 1971. p.
47-48, 59, 69-70
46
that a defining feature of the information age is the speed at which innovations become
economically profitable.93
Having made this broad comparison, I think it is necessary to look at the
comparative effects of these processes on labour. David Harvey has discussed a new
regime of flexible accumulation in the world economy characterized by the creation of a
segmented labour market consisting of a core group of flexible workers and the
casualization of the majority ofworkers.94 In The Rise ofthe Network Society, Castells
suggests a number of features about the transformation ofwork and employment, which
he claims lead to a 'redefinition of the relationship between capital and labour' .95
Firstly, Castells discusses the increasing interdependence of the global labour
force through the mechanisms of international trade's impact on employment and labour
conditions and the new mode of flexible management. The movement among companies
has thus been to retain a number ofkey workers in the sector and casualize everybody
else96 • This tendency has indeed been present among stevedoring workers, although the
workers that have remained as permanent (the key workers) have themselves needed to
become flexible, used by management for a variety of tasks as they arise, without
becoming managers.
Secondly, Castells has suggested that;
The line of infonnation processing is most productive when it is embedded in the natural production or
handling ofgoods, instead ofbeing disjointed in a stepped up technical division oflabour97•
The entire .process of containerisation has, after all, been about the integration ofnew
forms oftechnology into the actual labour process. Stevedores have had to learn how to
operate forklift trucks and larger cranes, and the increasing reliance on containers is
something that is embedded in the advancement of the industry itself, rather than being
imposed from outside the industry. It seems that the information economy started well
before the 1990s in the stevedoring industry.
93 Manuel Castells. The Rise o/Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. p. 7.
94 David Harvey. The Condition ofPostmodemity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. p. 150.
95Manuel Castells. The Rise o/Network Society p. 277-278.
96 Manuel Castells. The Rise o/Network Society. p. 234-5.
97 Manuel Castells. The Rise ofNetwork Society. p. 211.
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Finally, Castells notes that, "If technology per se does not create or destroy
employment, it does profoundly transform the nature ofwork and the organization of
production".98 Castells may be correct here when considering the global picture ofwork
in the information age, yet by closely considering the historical trajectory (as he invites
us to do) ofwork in a specific industry in South Africa, we can clearly agree that while
technology has transformed the nature ofwork and organization ofproduction, it has also
left many workers as casual labourers, uncertain oftheir future and over-exploited in their
struggle for survival. It seems clear that key features of the information economy,
particularly in relation to labour, came to the docks in the 1970s as a result of
technological innovation. To understand globalization more clearly, it seems that we have
to take specific technologies like containerisation more seriously as the innovations
which ultimately create the conditions in which the information economy can occur.
Conclusion
Throughout the world, ports have had to face containerisation. Yet this relatively simple
technological innovation has produced new power relations and altered social conditions·.
Ports have made huge investments in new container terminals, dredged new paths for
bigger ships, and abandoned the old methods of docking and warehousing. The
increasing efficiency of road transport and communications has also meant that
traditionally strong ports have also lost a degree of their power, because shipping
companies are more freely able to choose the ports at which they dock. This has led a
commentator to suggest that ports no longer have guaranteed markets, and are just one
part ofa set ofmultimodal transportation chains. Shipping companies have far more
freedom to determine where they dock.99 In short, the international shipping companies
have an increased ability to determine local prices, and while labourers need to possess
new skills, be increasingly flexible and have their labour time more strictly controlled.
98 Manuel Castells. The Rise ofNetwork Society. p. 265.
99 Brian Slack. "Pawns in the Game: Ports in a Global Transportation System" in Growth and Change, vol.
24, Fa111993. Although this certainly bears more truth in the northern hemisphere, many ports and
companies in Durban fear that shipping lines may take their operations to Maputo or Beira if costs are not
kept down.
48
Many older ports have become less significant than newer developing ports, resting
largely on particular investment in container technologies.
Durban as a harbour has become a key container port and maintained a leading
position in terms ofports worldwide. In 1994, of the total cargo transported through
Durban of 41.4 million tons could be divided into Conventional Break-bulk Cargo still
made up 21.83% ofthe total. lOO Although there is still some break-bulk cargo handled,
one must remember that this market is increasingly unstable and that previously all the
containerized cargo would have been transported in break-bulk. This chapter has been
about the decline of the stevedoring industry in Durban and the material reality becomes
clear when looking at the total numbers of stevedores permanently employed through the
period; at the height of the DSLSC in 1965 stevedoring labour force peaked at 3500
workers, by 1978 this had shrunk to an average of2500 workers employed, and by 1985
the permanent labour force was some 1200 workers. By the late 1990s, permanent
workers employed in stevedoring were less than 300. Casual workers perform most ofthe
stevedoring work, without any work benefits or state protection. While in Europe
containerization has led to a decline in the permanent worker force, casualization has
been prevented by the initiatives of organized labour unions through the maintenance ofa
register system which shares out the work among stevedores, much like the guarantee
system tried in the early 1980s by the GWU and SAS. IOI
The effects of this decline in Durban have been exacerbated by the failure of the
state to provide any kind of alternative employment for retrenched workers but the legacy
of the relationship between the state and African workers had never seen the state take
any real interest in African workers, save when their presence threatened Apartheid's
ideological platforms. Indeed it is impossible to tell this story without discussing the role
of the Apartheid state and colonial interests in the South African economy. In the early
parts of this chapter I have tried to contextualize the roles ofvarious actors towards dock
labour and how this reflected much broader positions in their thinking.
100 Trevor Jones. The Port ofDurban and the Durban Metropolitan Economy. p. 17.
101 Kees Marges, Secretary General of the International Transport Workers Federation. Containerisation
andAutomation: how to survive as dockworkers. Address to a conference on 'Container handling
automation and technologies', 22 and 23 February 1999. Accessed on 25 February 2002.at
hnp..~!!~!.itf.!.m:g!.1J.k!.s.~9.t.i9n~jg.m~1~.~I~LiIQ~Z9.~p'~gjn.!htm
49
Likewise, it is impossible to discuss stevedoring in this period without discussing
the material consequences of containerisation, and how through a process akin to the
broad term globalization, local markets were undermined and exploited in favour of
international concerns. Further, I have demonstrated the fragility of local initiatives to
protect and develop in the industry in face of rapid international change and shown how
we can understand containerisation as part of a bigger set of technological changes
enabling new kinds ofwork and destroying older methods. It is important to notice how
the historically weak position of the general stevedoring worker in South Africa leaves
him unable to constructively engage with global change.
Despite efforts by different historical actors motivated by vastly different
interests, casual labour has remained an enduring feature of stevedoring labour in
Durban. In the 1960s it was eradicated by the Apartheid government under conditions of
intense control and repression for the political and moral well being of whites in the city.
It must be remembered that these were times of economic growth. During the 1970s
casual labour re-emerged after strikes, bottlenecks in the harbour and conditions of
economic crisis. In the 1980s, joint efforts by stevedoring companies and the labour
movement in South Africa seemed to promise a stable, well-trained labour force, free
from both a system of crudely racist exploitation and from a system of casual labourers
who were treated as unskilled, badly paid and enjoyed little or no job security. Yet it was
at this moment that these initiatives began to fail: new types ofwork were needed,
demanding a far smaller labour market. State investment in container terminals from the
late 1970s ensured the long-term survival of the port, but not of the stevedores, their
numbers were dramatically slashed. The stevedores that remained performed irregular
work, often on older charter ships. Their work was no longer central to the operation of
the harbour. Despite some militancy in the mid-1990s102, they no longer have the power
to hold up production at the harbour. A pool of casual labourers today work in the
harbour, dependent on the extra work which arises everyday but which is not constant
enough to be guaranteed. Unlike earlier times, there are many workers and the supply of
available work is scarce.
102 David Hemson. "Asinamali! Then and Now" in Alternation (1995). Hemson comments that in contrast
with earlier strikes, which made front page news, this strike did not even feature in the local newspapers.
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While Harries, Cooper and others have decisively demonstrated the agency and
abilities of casual labourers to resist industrial discipline and to often ensure better
conditions for themselves during the first half of the twentieth century, it is impossible to
make similar assertions about casual labourers today. The remaining buffalo working in
Durban face a constant battle for survival and have very little strength in an industry
where there is little or no demand for their labour.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A. Cargo Handling: Pre-Unitization
1. 2.
3. 4.
Sources: Pictures 1 and 3: Ross-Watt, D: Housingfor Bantu Stevedores. B. Arch
Thesis, University of Natal, 1970. p. 36
Pictures 2 and 4: Haarhoff, E. Cargo Handling, Operations and Amenity Centre:
general cargo handlingfacilities for the Point harbour, Durban. B. Arch Thesis,
University of Natal, 1970. p.73
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B. Unitization. Picture 5 is Palletization, 6 is Containerization
5.
6.
Sources: Picture 5: Haarhoff, E. Cargo Handling, Operations and Amenity Centre, p. 76.
Picture 6. Pearsan, Tany. African keyport : story ofthe Port ofDurban: 29
degrees 52min south and 31 degrees 02min east. Durban: Accucut, 1995. p. 248.
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Chapter 2: Authority, Paternalism, and the Apartheid State: Administering
Stevedoring Labour in Durban, 1959-19771
In 1959 a strike at African Associated Stevedores brought the harbour operation to a
standstill. The strike was not unusual in the sense that it was built on two decades of
militancy among stevedoring workers. Yet the strike was to mark a turning point of
labour policy and management in the docks. The strike changed the way that stevedoring
operated in the harbour, marked a moment where employers acknowledged the dangers
ofworking class action, and finally gave way to government demands for a new system
of labour control, one that fell closely in line with their envisioned ideals ofApartheid
labour practice. The remaking of labour control following the strike created a new system
of regulation which, unsurprisingly, affected the manner in which work in the harbour
was done.
In grappling with these changes, and especially with the reaction of stevedores
and the changed practice ofwork itself, it is possible to read this remaking in many ways.
Particularly appealing is a certain moment of reformulating or modifying culture itself.
An approach that immediately presents itself is the important theoretical discussion
between E.P. Thompson and Dipesh Chakrabarty over a certain reading ofMarx's notion
ofhistory. For Marx, capitalist labour relations are a constituent element of capitalist
society, and are only realized when workers gain the formal freedom ofa contractual
relation with the owners ofproduction.2 Although certain pre-capitalist practices
persisted after the introduction of capitalism, capitalist relations, and indeed the
proletariat, are only realized once these practices are dispensed with. In following this
1 This chapter owes a considerable debt to the detailed empirical work done by David Hemson in his PhD
thesis. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: The Dockworkers ofDurban, University of Warwick,
1979. Although our focus and arguments are clearly different, in many places further empirical detail can
be found in this mammoth work ofno less than 741 pages.
2 I borrow this particular reading ofMarx's conception on the transition to capitalism from Dipesh
Chakrabarty. This is partly due to the simplicity with which Chakrabarty presents the argument and partly
because I have been unable to locate the specific section in the Grundrisse that the argument relies on. See
Martin Nicolaus' translation ofKarl Marx. The Grundrisse: Foundations ofthe Critique ofPolitical
Economy, Hannondsworth, 1974. p. 105-106,297-308 and 464. Cited in Dipesh Chakrabarty. Rethinking
Working-Class History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. p. 3-4. Also see David McLellan's
translation ofthe Grundrisse, New York: Harper and Row, 1971. p. 106-118.
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discussion, EP Thompson's work suggests that culture, and social and political tradition,
shaped the making of the English working class.3 In effect, Thompson problematizes
Marx's division between pre-capitalist and capitalist social forms by claiming that the
inherited traditions ofthese workers shaped their particular expressions and experience of
work, religion, protest and organization: finally their consciousness. Dipesh Chakrabarty
picks up this point in his discussion ofIndian jute workers and suggests that the dominant
bourgeois tradition that existed in England at the time of the industrial revolution was
essential for the particular "making" of the working class. Chakrabarty argues that in
places where different traditions were dominant, different experiences of capitalist
production would be inevitable.4 He goes on to show that the responses of Indian
workers, in terms of their responses to authority and capitalist production, and in
organizing and protest, were very different to those of English workers. Ultimately
Chakrabarty suggests that "cultural practices" are so significant in the development ofthe
"worker" in capitalist society that Marx's objective defmitions are limited to being
specific observations of the development of capitalism in Europe.
Scholarship focused on the beginnings of capitalist production in Natal does
suggest that there were cultural misunderstandings ofAfrican work practices in the 19th
century.5 However, in the aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu war (1879-1880), JeffGuy shows
that colonial administrators attempted to streamline the system of African labour supply
from Zululand by retaining key features of the pre-colonial period.6 Guy argues that
colonial authority was based on three key features, namely the retention of features of
homestead production, the introduction ofhut tax, and wage labour outside Zululand.
Most importantly, this system was administered by Zulu chiefs rather than colonial
officials. These chiefs controlled the recruitment ofZulu workers and were responsible
for their discipline in the workplaces.7 Yet the power ofthese chiefs was based not only
3 EP Thompson. The Making ofthe English Working Class. London: Penguin, 1969. esp. p. 213.
4 Dipesh Chakrabarty. Rethinking Working-Class History. p. 219-225.
5 Notably Keletso Atkins. The Moon is Dead! Give us our money! The cultural origins ofan African work
ethic in Natal, South Africa. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1993
6 Jeff Guy. "The destruction and reconstruction of Zulu society" in Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone
(eds) Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa. London: Longman, 1982.
7 Ibid. p. 174 & 179. During this period the cash economy became increasingly important for Zulu workers,
not only to pay hut tax, but also because it became accepted for lobola (dowry) payments. It thus became
important for Zulu men to demonstrate their allegiance to these chiefs, despite many having questionable
(from a traditional point of view) rises to power.
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on traditional kinship structures but also on particular chiefs' submission to ultimate
colonial authority. This mode ofcolonial administration, known as the Shepstone system,
meant a very particular introduction ofZulu workers to wage labour. Above all, this
system acknowledged culture as being of primary importance to the management ofZulu
workers.
Hemson has shown that during the 1940s and 1950s casual stevedoring workers
in Durban proved to be among the most militant in Durban. They not only rallied around
struggles to improve their own wages and working conditions, but also joined in wider
political and economic struggles.8 Employers became increasingly frustrated by this
militancy and eventually conceded to the demands of the Apartheid government to re-
make work (in co-operation with government officials) according to their own
ideological model. Following the strike in 1959, the Apartheid government attempted to
remake work, and especially labour control, as close to their perception of culture as
possible. As early as 1952, the Native Affairs Department discussed the introduction of
labour bureaux as limiting labour in the cities by the use of the bewysboek and by being
able to streamline recruitment in African areas to bring labour into the cities, "only when
it was necessary". The secretary ofNative Affairs, Eiselen, claimed that it was the first
attempt in the history of the union to develop a comprehensive system of labour
administration.9 With specific reference to Natal, it is clear that Zulu authorities had
substantial ability to decide who worked when and where, and MG Buthelezi had
significant influence in the Native Affairs Department. lO The problem that emerges for
Apartheid administrators, despite their absolute faith in this system, and their belief that
the successes of the 1960s were premised on this new system of labour control, based on
culture, is that they showed a fundamental ignorance of the possibility ofcultural change.
What I will demonstrate in this chapter is that the successes of the Stevedoring Labour
Company were premised on something entirely different to whatever Zulu culture had
8 David Hemson. "Dock workers, Labour Circulation and Class Struggles in Durban, 1940-1959" in
Journal o/Southern African Studies, vol. 4, 1977. p. 91-92
9 SAB NTS 9794 10311400 Dept ofNative Affairs Head Office. "Discussions about Labour Bureaux". 21
October 1952.
10 SAB SAP 494 15/2/52. Uitreiking van Bewysboeke aan Bantoe 1957-1961. Acting Native Affairs
Commissioner Mahlabathini. "Issuing ofReference books to Natives".
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become.I1 Ultimately there is insufficient evidence that among African stevedores in
Durban, their sense of culture is linked as closely to their work and to political
presentations of identity as Marx, Thompson and Chakrabarty might suggest. These
workers may not have been part of the "moment" of labour in capitalist production, but
neither were they docile workers whose consciousness stemmed directly from a
hierarchical culture.
Instead, I will demonstrate that what occurred in the industry was that work was
indeed remade; and the relationship between izinduna and stevedoring hands changed
significantly and became tied together within the new relations ofproduction. The new
system ofmanagement under the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company brought
with it new responsibilities ofcontrolling work and keeping records ofworkers. This new
authority also gave izinduna the power to decide who worked and how often. But these
new powers did not exist in a vacuum: izinduna were also monitored and controlled from
above, and the compound manager kept his izinduna very closely in check. Workers
became more reliant than ever on izinduna in this new centralized system of control. This
relationship can perhaps best be understood as a paternalistic arrangement that developed
and served to protect both izinduna and the stevedoring workers. 12 In an objective sense,
the remaking of stevedoring work created a greater distance between workers and
izinduna, by offering izinduna more institutionalized power. But in a subjective sense, it
bound them together. As vulnerable as workers might have been to the arbitrary whims of
izinduna, izinduna were ultimately responsible for the functioning of their gangs, and
were subject to the constant pressures ofproduction demands. In exchange for respect
and hard work, izinduna allowed workers certain freedoms while at work and even
covered for workers. In understanding this relationship, Dunbar Moodie' s understanding
11 This thesis does not, regrettably, try to trace the cultural changes happening during this period. This
would require extensive interviews with retired workers in Zululand about the specific upheavals that these
workers must have experienced at home while Bantu Administration was trying to impose its specific will
on chiefs. The evidence which I have presented in this chapter does show that the vision of the Apartheid
government ofZulu culture does not concur with the experiences of African workers in Durban.
12 In a very different context, Eugene Genovese has noted that while Paternalism undermines overall class
solidarity, it recognizes mutual obligations by both parties, and creates a "fragile bridge" over
contradictions that implies a shared respect between oppressors and oppressed. Genovese; Roll, Jordan
Roll: The world that slaves made. United States: Vintage Press, 1976. p. 5.
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ofmoral economy as "mutually acceptance rules for resistance within systems of
domination and appropriation" has proved a useful framework. 13
Management endeavoured to keep these new structures of authority as close as
possible to their approximations ofwhat Zulu culture was. Workers were recruited from
rural areas, and especially after 1970, the focus of this recruitment became especially tied
to Zululand and areas where Bantu administration had a particularly powerful influence.
Yet the fundamental misconception in management and the state's position- during this
period- was that power and authority flowed from above, and that this is what kept the
system running during the 1960s, the heyday of the Labour Supply Company. This
becomes particularly clear in their reaction to the strike of 1969 and the crisis that
followed. By attempting to focus recruitment squarely on Zululand and to bring back a
crucial figure of authority, they hoped to strengthen their own authority in the harbour.
This failed miserably, because they misunderstood the actual processes underlying work
and authority among stevedoring workers.
Indeed, I must emphasize that this chapter does not consider "culture" in any
kind of comprehensive manner. My focus in this chapter is explicitly on what Michael
Burawoy calls "production politics" or the relationships and identities that are built out of
the particular conditions and power relations in the workplace itself. 14 My use of
"culture" throughout the chapter has a dual purpose. In the first instance, I believe that it
is appropriate to use the term "culture" in this specific workplace, where labour
administration and the state celebrate the successes of labour control in these precise
terms, the terms of cultural difference so entrenched in Apartheid labour ideology. In
addition, two ethnographic accounts celebrated the practices of the Labour Supply
Company as fulfilling the cultural understandings ofmigrant Zulu workers. 15 Secondly,
this chapter speaks to "culture" in the sense that it shows the difficulty of its application
13 Dunbar Moodie. Goingfor Gold: Men, Mines and Migration. Johannesburg, Witswatersrand University
Press, 1993. p. 86.
14 Michael Burawoy. The Politics ofProduction: Factory Regimes under capitalism and socialism.
London: Verso, 1985. p. 10-12.
15 Gerald Sack, of the Department of Social Anthropology at the University ofNatal during the 1970s,
produced a thesis IZimpohlo: the bachelors: a study ofblack migrant labourers in Durban and paper
entitled "The 1972-73 Strikes in Natal" praising the application of 'Zulu tradition' in the Labour Supply
Company. Sack also advised an architectural student researching 'housing for Bantu stevedores'. See Sack
quoted in David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 395,415, 594. Also see D.M.
Ross-Watt. Housingfor Bantu Stevedores. B. Arch Thesis, University of Natal, 1970.
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to the context of an industrial workplace and I show that we cannot celebrate or fetishize
culture as an uncritical and immutable set of differences. It was precisely this insistence
of cultural difference that drove Apartheid administrators in their misguided and brutal
attempts to control the African stevedores in Durban.
This chapter is set against a very clear economic backdrop of the booming 1960s
South African economy and its decline in the early 1970s. This undoubtedly affected
stevedores more than most workers, since much of their income came from overtime
earnings that were plentiful during the economic boom. After 1968, overtime became
scarce, and this was clearly the reason for renewed industrial action in 1969 and 1972.
Conditions in the Harbour in the 1950s: Casual workers and militancy
The 1940s and 1950s in South African labour relations were difficult times indeed. The
war economy had seen an increased demand for African labour in the cities, and the state
had turned a blind eye towards an ever growing presence ofAfrican workers in urban
areas. Much of the pass law legislation of the 1930s had been ignored in an effort to
maintain the economy. After the war, the National Party won the 1948 election by
appealing to the white electorate that African urbanization needed to be reversed and
more tightly controlled than ever before. The 1950s saw sustained effort by the National
Party government to enforce this promise by the promulgation of the Population
Registration Act (1950), the Abolition of Passes and Co-Ordination ofDocuments Act
(1952) and the establishment ofthe Bewysburo to administer passes and regulate influx
control. 16
This upheaval was reflected in the stevedoring industry during this period. Togt
labour had been used in the Durban harbour for almost 100 years, primarily because it
suited the irregular nature of the industry. I? The position of the casuals was interesting
16 Two notable pieces detailing this process are Deborah Pose!' The Making ofApartheid, 1948-1961,
Oxford: Claredon Press, 1991; and Keith Breckenridge. "From Hubris to Chaos: the makings of the
Bewysburo and the end of documentary government." Unpublished paper, May 2002. Breckenridge argues
that by the early 1960s, the orderly and controlled distribution of passes had failed, and the state
increasingly relied on violence to maintain order.
17 Keletso Atkins makes an alternative suggestion in her study of the making ofTogt labour in Natal in the
19th century. She argues that togt labour developed as a compromise between Africans and early colonists,
who were unable to understand a uniquely African work ethic. See Atkins, The Moon is Dead! Give us our
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and somewhat paradoxical. They had no guarantee ofwork nor any material interest in
the industry beyond their own wages. These workers were able to take advantage of the
surplus of work and the shortage ofworkers by moving from one company to another
depending on the best rates offered. They were also surprisingly well organized. David
Hemson notes that casual dockworkers had a long history of struggles to improve wages
and working conditions, and engaged in wider political and economic struggles. 18 The
1940s had swelled the number of stevedores working casually in Durban to in excess of
3000. But their casual status did not'mean that these workers were not political or acutely
aware of their own exploitation. Indeed, a 1956 report on the conditions of stevedoring
workers by Sergeant Mentz of Central Native Labour Board mentioned two significant
strikes in the 1950s alone and noted that workers were able to embark on strikes and go-
slows on the issues ofwages and work categorization.19 The evident militancy ofworkers
was a cause of concern for employers, and more acutely, how was the Apartheid state to
deal with the mass of casual labourers working irregularly in Durban and threatening to
upset its neat plans of "re-tribalization"? While the experience of stablizing "the
residuum" in the city was not unique to South Africa, the solution of a tightly controlled
migrant labour system and removal of all other prospective workers was indeed
specifically South African.20 These plans had been developed in the late 1940s and
refmed in the early 1950s by the Apartheid state. During the 1950s in the harbour, it was
employers who refused this solution, believing it to be contrary to the profitability of the
stevedoring industry.
In 1949, the State made its fITst investigations into the problem of surplus workers
in Durban. Through the Durban City Council, African work-seekers were prohibited
entry into the city if there was already full African employment, and the Native
Commissioner for Durban reported that, within a few months, the estimated surplus of
money! The cultural origins ofan African work ethic in Natal, South Africa, 1843-1900. Portsmouth,
Heinemann, 1993.
18 David Hemson. "Dock workers, Labour Circulation and Class Struggles in Durban, 1940-1959" in
Journal ofSouthern African Studies, vol. 4, 1977. p. 91-92
19 SAB ARB 3317 1196/5/4/1 vol. 1 Sgd. S Mentz, Central Native Labour Board. "Report on Conditions of
Employment of Stevedoring Workers".
20 For instance see Gareth Stedman lones, Outcast London and Frederick Cooper, On the African
Waterfront. In the different settings ofLondon and Mombasa, these authors both argue that the state
solution to master-less and often militant casual workers was the development and extension of permanent
employment, within the city itself.
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African workers in Durban was reduced from 10000 to 6000.21 The stevedoring
employers reacted by obtaining to81 licenses, exempting them for the City Council
regulations, premising their applications by arguing that these workers were integral to
the industry and agreeing to the extension of compound facilities. In 1957, the state and
employers clashed again, this time over Verwoerd's (Minister ofNative Affairs)
declaration that only 2000 stevedores would be allowed in the point area, and that
employers should be responsible for housing these workers.22 Employers again protested
that this would cause congestion in the harbour and ships would go to ports outside the
country. While considerable pressure was put on employers, casuals remained working in
the port, although moves were made by employers to find suitable accommodation for
stevedores that would place all stevedores in the same place, irrespective ofwhich
company actually employed them. What was to break the back of the employers was the
renewed worker militancy of the 1959 strike.
The 1959 Strike and the re-making of Labour Organization
The 1959 strike is well documented in the state archives and is undoubtedly a crucial
moment in the history of stevedoring labour in Durban. According to the Divisional
Inspector ofNatal, Strachan, the strike began on the 24 February 1959 when over 200
workers refused to start work at African Associated Agency and Stevedoring Company.23
He suggests that the primary reason for their grievances was dissatisfaction with the
increases that indunas and other grades ofwork classified as semi-skilled received,
without any increase for the ordinary stevedores. By 25 February, the harbour was
brought to a standstill when about 1400 workers refused to work. Strachan notes that he
instructed the somewhat ambivalent employers not to give the workers more time or
allow them to dictate terms. Following a meeting with workers, Strachan and the Police
gave workers till 14.45 to return to work or be arrested, and many workers were duly
21 Report of the Department ofNative Affairs, 1950, cited in David Hemson. "Dock workers, Labour
Circulation and Class Struggles in Durban". p. 116.
22 David Hemson. "Dock workers, labour circulation and class struggles in Durban". p. 117.
23 SAB ARB 1229 1042/15/1959. Strachan, P. (Divisional Inspector Labour: Natal). "Strike: Stevedoring
Industry" addressed to the Secretary for Labour, Pretoria.
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arrested or fired. By 26 February work resumed as normal, except that some workers had
been fired, and that a plan had been made to re-organize the dock labour pool.
At the end ofhis letter, Strachan included minutes of the meeting held between
himself, the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, the management ofAfrican Associated
Stevedoring and the 1400 striking workers.24 The workers' responses from the meeting
indicate that they were well aware that the government controlled wages in the
stevedoring industry, and believed that they did not received the same treatment as the
indunas. The workers also noted that they resolved to continue striking until they
received increases and would not tolerate scab labour introduced by the employers. The
Bantu Affairs commissioner replied to the workers that the strike was illegal and that
there was "no question of negotiation since the law has been promulgated and must be
complied with". He urged the workers to resume work and file complaints through the
proper channels. The minutes conclude by noting that the meeting ended in disorder.
Despite the firm stance of the workers, work did resume in the port the following
day. TOg! labour, an institution of the port since the nineteenth century, was summarily
abolished. Some of these workers were given weekly or monthly contracts, subject to
being "screened" as to whether they were disruptive elements.25 In addition, a plan was
hastily drawn up to reformulate labour supply on the basis of a "pool system",
comprising both members of the Native Affairs Department and employers.
By the 29th March, management from the various stevedoring companies had met
and drafted a memorandum of agreement that would bring the Durban Stevedoring
Labour Supply Company into existence.26 The main aim of the company was to
centralize control of the workforce in a compound, from where all stevedoring employers
would draw their necessary daily labour, and to control all the administration and
recruitment of stevedoring workers. Peter Kemp acted as Trustee of the Company and as
chairman. Kemp's background was as a member the Native Affairs Board. The picture
conjured up suggests an increasing move towards surveillance. It is also interesting to
24 SAB ARE 1229 1042/15/1959. Strachan, P. (Divisional Inspector Labour: Natal). "Notes of a meeting
held at 150a Point Road, Durban on 25 February 1959"
25 SAB ARE 1229 1042/15/1959. Telex from Arbeid Pretoria to Arbeid Cape Town.26 February 1959.
26 SAB BAO 3075 vol. C39/1171/1."Memorandum ofAgreement entered into between African Associated
Stevedoring, Consolidated Stevedoring, Brock and Company, Stonn and Company, Jack Stonn and Peter
Kemp (trustee). 1 Apri11959.
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suggest that authority in the compound was made up of a network ofniches and
individual power relations that existed between an already complex management-worker
relationship.
The other members of the management team of the Labour Supply Company
consisted ofa deputy manager, Dreyer, and an African who would be responsible for
administering the compound as the Bantu Liaison Officer. The companies would have to
bear an extra cost for administration and a small guarantee fee for workers. However,
this was compensated for by the promise of industrial order and the ever-expanding port
industry and cargo loads.
The end of tOg! labour and the introduction ofpermanent work was met with an
ambivalent response by workers. While some commented that permanent work gave
them the money they needed to survive27, Ilanga lase Natal reported that the grievances
that the workers went on strike for had still not been resolved.28 The following month, the
paper noted that the new workers employed were suffering serious injuries due to their
lack of experience.29 Despite these problems, the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply
Company continued on the premise (for the stevedoring companies) that it safeguarded
industrial order. At the same time it fulfilled the objectives of the National Party
Government by maintaining order in the cities, ensuring that workers did not become
proletarianized, and creating a "reserve army" of African workers in rural areas.30
However, it was clear from the 1959 strike that stevedores did not have a good
relationship with the izinduna and demonstrated a remarkable ability to understand the
failures ofthe order. During the meeting with workers following the strike, the
spokesperson for the striking stevedores remarked that "indunas (sic) and workers do not
eat from the same plate - stevedoring workers are forced to eat from the ground, while
indunas are able to eat from a plate".31 Before 1959, the role ofizinduna is not especially
clear. Although employed to provide a channel of communication between white
management and workers, they had no institutionalized function and seem to have acted
27 Mr Nzuzu, Durban stevedore, quoted in Tina Sideris. Si/una imali Yethu: The lives and struggles of
Durban Dockworkers, 1940-1981". SAIRR Oral History Project, 1982, p. 19.
28 "The new strategy to control Dockworkers in Point." llanga lase Natal, 7 March 1959.
~9 "The problem of dismissal has started afresh". llanga lase Natal. 25 April 1959.
.,,0 David Hemson.. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 385.
31 SAB ARB 1229 1042/15/1959. Strachan, P. (Divisional Inspector Labour: Natal). "Notes ofa meeting
held at 150a Point Road, Durban on 25 February 1959"
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arbitrarily in their exercise of authority. It seems that stevedoring workers understood
izinduna as boss boys and had little respect for their authority.
The re-ordering of the system was not simply an attempt to limit casualization
and ensure a smooth operation. What a "smooth operation" also meant was the attempt to
break working class solidarity and tie recruitment, authority and cultural order together so
strongly that dissent would be immediately suppressed. We will see how this played out
in the following section.
Apartheid Labour Administration: Stevedores in Durban during the 1960s
"What the national network oflabour bureaux sought to achieve in relation to thousands ofcompanies, the
Labour Supply Company worked out in relation to the stevedoring companies. ,,32
Despite these changes and the militant tradition of the 1950s, the 1960s was a
surprisingly quiet decade in terms of strikes in the docks. For Apartheid labour
administrators, it was during this period in the docks that the system of carefully
controlled Apartheid labour practice was perfected. Mamdani has referred to this practice
within Apartheid as the perfection of the system of indirect rule, and perhaps this is more
applicable for Natal than anywhere else in South Africa.33 Nevertheless, in order to hold
any real force, this claim requires closer empirical investigation than Mamdani offers.
Since the argument ultimately turns on the nature of authority, it is necessary to
investigate this in detail. Furthermore, while Mamdani' s thesis is certainly attractive, I
maintain that "decentralized despotism" must necessarily be read against both political
economy and the politics in the workplace itself. The economic strength of South Africa
during this period had direct benefits for stevedores who, while employed on 9 month
contracts, received substantially more income during the economic boom of this period.
From both the perspective of the Stevedoring Companies and that of the state, the
operation of the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company was an overwhelming
success during the 1960s. Record turnover of cargo loads were experienced, with an
32 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 388.
33 Mahmood Mamdani. Citizen and Subject. I suggest that Natal is the best case ofMamdani's argument
because ofthe close relationship between African "tribal" administrators and the Native Affairs department
(see introduction).
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industrial calm in the ports very unlike the previous two decades. Workers would work
on 9 or 10 month contracts, and return home for the rest of the year.34 Even weekly
employment had been done away with, and although stevedores didn't actually work
every day, they were classed as permanent employees. It is critical to note that their
actual wages depended on the amount that they worked, so it was clearly in workers
interests to work as much as possible and not have too large a pool ofworkers. The
economic boom contributed so significantly and directly to the stevedoring industry, such
was the demand to clear ships as quickly as possible that more than half of workers'
average wages derived from overtime pay.35 Despite an initial limiting of the labour pool
after 1959, the numbers increased with increased productivity and peaked at 2923
stevedores in 1964 and stabilized at 2600 in 1966.36
The most important piece of legislation in this period was the Bantu Labour Act
of 1964. The Act provided for a broader network of labour bureaux which developed
directly from the Bantustans to urban centres and workplaces. It increased the power of
chiefs and homeland officials to regulate and cancel the contracts ofworkers, and it
ultimately increased the dependence ofAfrican workers on Bantustan administrators for
employment.37 The direct relationship between state policy and the Labour Supply
Company is spelt out in an Ilanga article that discusses the "generous" donation of
money from the Labour Supply Company to a school in Mahlabathini (the home district
ofMG Buthelezi).38
Work itself was regularized in the Labour Supply Company by Stevedoring
Labour Units. According to this system, Izinduna were established and selected eight
stevedoring hands to form a Unit and this unit remains unaltered unless somebody is
incapacitated or goes on leave. Very rarely, according to Company officials, did the units
break up or was there any cause for complaint. In fact, supervisory problems were few
34 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 512.
35 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 526.
36 SAB BAO 2401 31/3/336. Letter from P. Kemp to P. van Rensburg, Dept of Bantu Administration and
Development and David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 512.
37 For a more detailed discussion of the Bantu Labour Act, see David Hemson, Class Consciousness and
migrant workers, p. 385-391,410.
38 "The help offered by Stevedoring Company to KwaZulu." nlanga lase Natal. 4 January 1964.
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and labour relations "between White supervisors and African workers are excellent".39 In
addition, this system allowed detailed records to be kept monitoring injury, illness,
absenteeism and work record.
At first this system seems to follow a conventional pattern of the regularization of
employment and an accompanying increase and diversification of surveillance that had
been written about in detail both internationally and in Africa.40 However, the key point
here is the nature of authority (and tied to this, labour recruitment) that comes into play.
For instead of this being the moment of the emergence of the proletarian urbanized
worker, the system was based squarely on the migrant labour system. This meant that at
the moment ofpotential industrial transformation, workers were required to come from
rural areas and maintain permanent residence there. Indeed, the only way to gain access
to work in the port was to be recruited from outside urban areas.41 This fell in line with
the National Party's frrm commitment to prevent African urbanization at all costs.
Although authority in the Labour Supply Company rested ultimately with the
white management of the company (who were responsible to the Native Labour Bureau
and to the private Stevedoring companies, control of the day-to-day activities lay with a
set ofAfrican officials, or izinduna. The appointment of these officials often had to do
with seniority and the relationship through extended family or kinship networks that
reached into African rural areas.42 Discussing the functioning of stevedoring labour units,
the Labour Supply Company suggested that these units were efficient because they
related to the "distinct social organization ofthe Bantu that values the clan orfamily unit
above that ofthe individuar,43, and because of the authority of the Induna in selecting the
39 SAB BAO 3049 C39/29. W. Dreyer, Deputy Manager, Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company.
"Some notes on the establishment, methods and organization ofa stevedoring labour pool". February 1966.
40 Cf. Michel Foucault. Discipline and Punish. Gareth Stedman Jones. Outcast London. Frederick Cooper.
On the African Waterfront to mention but a few.
41 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers, p. 414-416.
42 Although beyond the scope of the present study, an investigation ofthe appointment ofizinduna remains
somewhat under problematized in the literature. It is clear that at various moments workers deeply resented
the appointment and authority ofthe izinduna, and they are often presented as uniformly supporting and
enforcing the will of management. In Chapter 3 I present a case of izinduna supporting trade unions, and
again the relationship between the izinduna and the shopstewards in the 1980s was not always one of
tension, as one would expect, given the literature. The only way that this could be done with any measure
of rigour seems to be to trace the life histories of particular izinduna, between town and country.
43 SAB BAO 3075 C39/117111. Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company. "Stevedoring Labour
Units".
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gang and being able to communicate with its members. In the port, izinduna performed
two separate functions:
Firstly, izinduna worked on ships, both in the holds and on the hatches, directing
actual work and training new workers in particular skills. While there was one white
foreman to a ship, there were four to eight gangs (stevedoring labour units), each with
their own induna. These izinduna not only decided on the members of their particular
gang, but were also directly involved in the labour process. They shared the lived
experiences of the difficulties of stevedoring work and were often subject to the same
difficult treatment from the white foremen.
Secondly, a minority of senior izinduna ran the compound, where workers lived
for the duration of their contracts. These izinduna did not share the same experiences of
work as those who ran the stevedoring operation. Many of them controlled the overall
recruitment ofworkers from rural areas (as opposed to the work gangs) and were
responsible for ensuring order in the compounds. The conditions of the compound
accommodation in which stevedores lived was dreary, with poor lighting and
approximately 20 stevedores occupied each room.44 Many workers resented the
authoritarian manner in which the compounds were run and especially J.B.Buthelezi.45
These izinduna had the power to dismiss workers without warning and, seemingly ran a
very efficient surveillance network that safeguarded against any form of dissent.46 The
most senior induna, and the head of the compound for most of the existence of the
Labour Supply Company, was lB. Buthelezi. Buthelezi was an uncle ofMG Buthelezi.
The relationship between Buthelezi and his izinduna seems to have been a rather fragile
one. Initially they derived their power from him, but especially the izinduna working on
ships seem to have grown resentful ofhis authority and treatment ofworkers, and would
eventually back a petition to have him removed (see below). Management likened the
44 D.M. Ross-Watt. Housingfor Bantu Stevedores. p. 20. Unfortunately this thesis is more concerned with
analyzing the possibilities for new housing arrangements for stevedores and gives insufficient detail on the
specific placements of izinduna, compound managers, and ordinary stevedoring workers to be able to
establish any kind ofevidence of the relationship between power, surveillance and architecture following
Bentham's panopticon as discussed by Foucault and Linebaugh.
45 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and migrant workers. p. 580, 617.
46 Interview: Siza Makhaya. June 2001. Makhaya became the compound manager after the labour company
collapsed at the end of the 1970s. He abolished the system, but recalled that surveillance was so efficient
that any dissent from the workers could be traced within a hour.
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structures of authority to that of a prefect system, with Buthelezi as head prefect.47 We
shall see that management overestimated the relationship between Buthelezi and his
izinduna and underestimated the relationship between izinduna and workers.
In a report issued to the Department ofBantu Administration and Development in
1966, the deputy manager of the Labour Supply Company noted the success of this
system in terms of industrial calm and Bantu administration during the fITst five years of
operation of the company. Kemp attributed this success primarily to the fact that virtually
all of the workers lived in the centralized compound.48
Paternalism and Moral Economy
The success of the Labour Supply Company requires explanation. An industry
with a tradition ofworker militancy experienced no industrial action for a decade.
Employers spoke favourably of industrial calm and regarded the system as running very
smoothly. The Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company was seen as a model of
labour control by the Apartheid government.49 As I have mentioned already, workers
directly benefited from the growth of the harbour during this period, due to the
structuring of their wages and the substantial overtime allowances that they earned. When
the harbour went into temporary decline between 1969 and 1972, workers did protest and
eventually struck work because their basic wage was insufficient. However, it is
important here to reflect again on the relationships of authority that existed in the
harbour. We have already seen the structures that were developed by the Labour Supply
Company in answer to their perceptions of traditional Zulu culture. Yet neither the
draconian Apartheid laws nor the authoritarian style ofmanagement sufficiently explains
the apparent quiescence of the workers to new system of authority. Instead, what appears
to have made work tolerable was the development ofclose relationships between workers
and izinduna. As has been already outlined above, the majority of izinduna who
supervised the operation ofwork were often caught between the demands of white
47 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 546
48 SAB BAG 2401 31/3/336. Letter from P. Kemp to P. van Rensburg, Dept of Bantu Administration and
Development.
49 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 383.
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company foremen and African workers. Their authority was severely restrained by the
ability ofworkers to stop work or at least slow the operation down. Because these
izinduna were seen as leaders of their particular gang, a constant failure to keep up with
the pace ofproduction might have resulted in them losing their jobs. It was imperative for
izinduna within this relationship to gain the absolute trust of the workforce. From the
inception of the Labour Supply Company in 1959 it is clear that these izinduna relied
substantially less on the use of arbitrary force to discipline their gangs.
In some ways these approaches to authority and discipline in the stevedoring
industry are not unique to Durban. In London, Stephen Hill has suggested that
"Reciprocity was an essential part of the link between foremen and their individual dock
workers, because foremen saw the relationship as an exchange offavours".5o He
suggests that nepotism in hiring and allocation was part of the system, and was justified
by foremen in terms of their necessity for an efficient gang. Despite the fact that a similar
reciprocity existed in Durban, izinduna were not ordinary foremen in a European
industrial context. Their powers ofauthority and abilities to discipline the workforce
were far greater than in any European context. Misbehaviour at work could potentially
result not simply in being fired, but also in gaining a bad reputation among homeland
authorities.51 The relationships between izinduna and the stevedoring workers that
developed were much closer to those of paternalism. These relationships were reciprocal
in the sense that they acknowledged the mutual obligations of both parties, but were
backed up by disproportional powers for the izinduna. It is crucial to realize that these
relationships were built during the 1960s and based on trust that developed within the
gang structure itself and does not fall back into any ill-conceived notions ofZulu
"traditional" paternalism.52 These relationships were built from the shared experience of
difficult and often dangerous stevedoring work.
An interview conducted in 1982 with Mr Ngema is revealing. He worked in the
Durban harbour from the 1950s, starting as a casual worker, and was re-employed as an
induna following the 1959 strike. He believed that conditions improved with the
50 Stephen Hill. The dockers: Class and Tradition in London. London: Heinemann, 1976. p. 23
51 Interview: Siza Makhaya, 12 June 2001.
52 A nuanced suggestion of paternalism in pre-capitalist Zulu society can be found in Jeff Guy. "Gender
Oppression in Southern Africa's pre-capitalist societies" in Cherryl Walker (editor). Women and Gender in
Southern Africa to 1945. Cape Town, 1990.
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introduction of the Labour Supply Company because workers were no longer forced to
do piece work, there was job security and the money was better. He claimed that there
were seldom problems between indunas and workers. He also believed that workers
trusted him and explained that sometimes he would cover for a worker when they were ill
or absent.
"They trust me, they trust me as aforeman. Even during the time when the law said that you must not
'Z d d d" 53answer back to your foreman, they stzZ fruste an respecte me .
As an induna, Ngema's position on J.B. Buthelezi was ambivalent. Although Buthelezi
"treated us nicely", Ngema feared him. He claimed that some workers disliked him, and
believed that he should be removed. Ngema suggests that Buthelezi often "shouted" at
the workers, but that he treated us "according to his plans" and "that there is nothing bad
in that". This suggests that there was a clear division between the senior izinduna in the
compounds and the majority of izinduna working on the ships. Another senior worker
(although not an induna) Mr Ndebele, supports this by claiming that although he was not
an induna he performed the duties of an induna in his absence.54
The paternalistic relationship that developed was not simply one-sided respect of
workers for izinduna. Mike Morris observed during his period working as a unionist that
stevedores were often stealing goods off ships.55 He argued that the gang was the most
important structure for stevedoring work and that izinduna often allowed this process in
exchange for the respect and trust they earned from the workers.56 But izinduna did not
53University of the Witwatersrand Historical Documents. AD 1722 SAIRR Oral History Project interview
no. 45. Mr. Ngema interviewed by Tina Sideris, 17/11/82. My thanks go to Thami Sibiya for translating
this for me.
54 University of the Witwatersrand Historical Documents. AD 1722 SAIRR Oral History Project interview
no. 56. Mr. Ndebele interviewed by Tina Sideris, 23/06/83.
55 It is worth mentioning how entrenched the practices of theft were in dock work. In considering crime in
the 18th century, Peter Linebaugh has noted that the dockers main source of income was to steal wooden
chips from the timber used to build the ships. While having little exchange value, wood was an essential
source of survival for residents of 18th century London, and was even sanctioned to a limited extent by
employers. Linebaugh goes on to describe how these practices were curbed by the introduction of forms of
surveillance and fairly simple technological innovations designed by the Samuel Bentham (Jeremy's
brother!) to monitor every moment ofwork more closely and to remove individual initiative and knowledge
from the labour process. See Peter Linebaugh. The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the 18t11
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. p. 371-401.
56 Interview: Mike Morris, organizer General Workers Union 1981-1985,28 June 2001.
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simply sanction theft and pilferage, they also covered for stevedores' absenteeism and
injury. Furthermore, izinduna were sensitive to workers' discomfort with the senior
izinduna and even petitioned to have J.B. Buthelezi removed in 1972(see below).
Following Genovese's assertion that paternalism undermines the possibility of
class solidarity, the development ofpaternalism in the working relationships of the
stevedores certainly limited the earlier direct confrontations that they had with indunas
and management. Yet the objective possibilities of any successful resistance to the
institution of the Labour Supply Company were very restricted. The administrators of the
Labour Supply Company were determined to maintain industrial peace at any cost. In the
context of tightly policed compound administration, Van Onselen has looked to the
moments when workers subverted the system in other ways besides direct class struggle
and organization. He has suggested that actions like theft, desertion and go-slows are
"hidden forms" of class resistance.57 While stevedores certainly engaged in some of
these activities to avoid or ease exploitation, they also engaged in them to simply
supplement their income. Perhaps more useful in describing their actions is Dunbar
Moodie's interpretation ofEP Thompson's notion of "moral economy,,58. He describes
moral economy as "encompassing mutually acceptable rules for resistance within systems
ofdomination and appropriation". Although "resistance" by stevedores never threatened
to upset the hegemony ofDurban labour supply company directly, obviously irritated
employers later claimed that containerisation at least helped to prevent pilferage and
theft.59
Rocking the Boat: 1969 and 1972 strikes
If, as I have suggested, the success of the Labour Supply Company was balanced on
economic strength, the decline in the overall amount ofcargo loaded, and the reduction in
overall wages, would provide a challenge to the illusions that companies and the Labour
57 Charles van Onse1en. Chibaro. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1980. p. 237-244.
58 Crucial to Moodie's reading of moral economy is constantly contesting authority and its limits. See
Dunbar Moodie. Goingfor Gold. p. 86 Also see Thompson original use of the concept in EP Thompson.
"The English crowd in the eighteenth centuIy" in Past and Present, 1971.
59 Inteview, Tony Kruger, Chairperson of the Durban Stevedores Association, 28 November 2000. Mike
Morris believed that theft of cargo was considerable for stevedoring workers.
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Supply Company held ofhegemony. Yet even though challenges to the system happened
during this time, they revolved more around the wages and the authority of ID Buthelezi
than as a threat to the izinduna structure as a whole. In fact, while indunas did not
actively participate in the strike themselves, they did attempt to get rid ofButhelezi.
The first strike that the stevedoring industry in Durban had seen in a decade
occurred in 1969. Overall cargo loaded during 1968 and 1969 showed a sharp decrease
from the previous year, and consequently, overtime work was not as plentiful as before.
Workers hoped that the new wage determination would offer higher wages. Instead,
Wage Determination 308 of 1969 was based on calculations of workers' wages
(including overtime) of3 years earlier. It recommended that wages stay at the same level
and that workers should be subjected to income tax.60 Naturally, workers were furious,
and they struck work on the 4 April 1969 demanding an increase in basic wages from R6
to R14 a week. The state's response typified the politics of the period.61 Management of
the Labour Supply Company invited police to their meeting with striking workers, and
demanded that strikers return to work. They then dismissed more than 1000 workers,
with Kemp publicly claiming that there was ample manpower to call on.62
A significant change in recruitment pattern followed the strike. After 1969 a
greater percentage of workers came from Northern Natal, especially from two districts
that had previously provided almost no dockworkers, Nongoma and Mahlabathini. The
choice of these districts was deliberate, since they were districts ofMG Buthelezi and
represented absolute adherence to his understanding ofZulu "tradition".63
The stubborn insistence on the part of the Labour Supply Company that these
workers were "unskilled", and thus utterly dispensable, had concrete repercussions. The
pace ofwork slowed substantially, and ships lay idle outside the port. There was also an
increase in the number of injuries among workers. Employers became increasingly
frustrated with state labour policy and the decreased work output that followed as a direct
60 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and migrant workers. p. 518-520.
61 Pose! suggests that by 1968, the Bantu Administration Department entered its toughest ideological phase,
rigid and uncompromising in its implementation of influx control and Mrican labour regulations. Deborah
Pose!' The Making ofApartheid, 1948-1961. p. 249.
62 "Half of Durban's Dockworkers sent home" in The Natal Mercury, 7 April 1969.
63 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 581.
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result. Shipping agents believed that mechanization, rapidly developing in international
ports, would solve the problem ofwork delays.64
Another strike followed in October 1972, primarily about the proposed changes
to the working hours (limiting the possibility of overtime earnings) and wages. During
this strike the workers also made clear demands about removing JB Buthelezi and
articulated their demands to the white press. Under the threat of sacking, the workers did
return to work; however the white press was full of stories and even investigated the
workers' demands.65
Hemson notes that during this period the greatest challenge to J.B. Buthelezi's
administration emerged. It seems that Buthelezi was the one induna whom workers
abhorred. In fact, they even wrote to the KwaZulu government complaining about his
excessively harsh treatment of the workers. In addition, izinduna seem to have taken the
initiative of speaking to the paramount chief about his excessively harsh treatment of
workers, and at the end ofAugust 1972, Buthelezi left the DSLSC.66 The main reason
workers disliked Buthelezi was that he openly argued against workers receiving higher
wages, and tried to persuade them to be happy with what they had. In addition, his
authoritarianism and his willingness to publicly humiliate and fire any worker or induna
exposed him very clearly as a stooge of the employers and the state.67
Seemingly at the insistence of the employers, J.B. Buthelezi returned six weeks
later. September 1972 had seen rising tensions and with a strike imminent, employers
believed that Buthelezi would ensure order. This merely added to the frustrations of
workers, many ofwhom claimed that they would have killed him ifthey had seen him
during the October 1972 strike.
The figure ofButhelezi personifies the employers and the states'
misunderstanding about the source of industrial stability in the 1960s. They believed that
his overall authority and control of the workers of the Labour Supply Company was
critical to the success of the company, and therefore ensured that he returned after a few
difficult weeks in 1972. Workers disliked him intensely, and yet the system worked, not
64 "Mechanisation Answer to port delays, say Agents" in The Natal Mercury, 23 January 1970.
65 See Daily News, 23, 24 & 25 October 1972. and The Natal Mercury, 24, 25 & 28 October 1972
66 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers. p. 618.
67 Interview. Siza Makhaya, 12 June 2001. Also see David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant
Workers, p. 577 & 639.
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because ofhis authority, but because of the relationships that developed between
stevedores and izinduna in the gangs and on the ships.
The instability of the mid 1970s
For all the State's and company management's political repression of the 1969 and 1972
strike and the re-emergence of Buthelezi as a powerful figure, political stability proved to
be economically disastrous. Lack of experienced workers resulted in a logjam at the port.
Eventually the situation forced employers to employ casuals. A number ofnewspaper
articles between 1969 and 1972 tell of the continual buildup of ships outside the
harbour.68
Stevedoring Companies were forced to act. For all the claims about the
excellence of the Labour Supply Company, the price of maintaining authority had been
too high for companies. In 1973 they began taking on casual workers to meet the excess
ofwork needed. This greatly annoyed the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board and the
regional labour office, and despite an initial tolerance of the situation, in November 1974
the Board called a meeting of all stevedoring companies to address the problem. Their
main concern was not how effective the Labour Supply Company was, but instead that
unregistered Africans were being employed by the companies, thus threatening the entire
basis of the migrant labour system.69 In response, employers argued that what they were
doing was necessary from an industrial point ofview, and that to stick to influx control
regulations would cripple the production of the harbour, and damage national interests.
Both sides compromised. The employers agreed to register these workers and Bourquin
(the ChiefDirector of the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board) drafted of a
memorandum which allowed for the temporary condoning of casual labour, the move by
employers to register all casual workers, and the recommendation to investigate the
68 The Natal Mercury, 23 January 1970,20 May 1971,29 November 1971,24 October 1972.
69 Durban Archives Repository. PNAB Sub Committee on Labour and Transport 2/3/7/1. "Labour
Problems: Point and Harbour Areas". Meeting held on 20 November 1974.
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establishment of reserve teams ofAfrican workers in the homelands.70 Despite these
compromises, unregistered casual workers continued to be employed.
In practice, neither the registration of casual workers nor "reserve armies" of
labour were particularly viable. Casual labourers were used to make up the daily excess
ofwork required. The stevedoring companies did not want to employ them on a
permanent basis, give them accommodation or pay them retainers when there was no
work. Bringing in workers from rural areas would have meant these extra responsibilities
for companies. From 1969 and 1972 it was also not clear that these workers would be
especially disciplined or fall in naturally with the demands of the employers. So despite
the sentiments ofBourquin and the Railway and Harbour Police, casuals continued to be
employed.
At the same time, it was becoming evident that stevedoring companies felt less
sure than ever that the Labour Supply Company could meet their requirements. The
Company's operation was to continue for another 6 years, but during this time the
companies themselves changed. Companies were aware that Containerisation was
imminent, and that they would be competing for an ever-diminishing market. Stevedoring
companies began to merge, and by 1978, there were only two stevedoring companies
left.71 In this situation, it was senseless to continue paying for the administration of
workers by outside bureaucrats. The Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company was
finally closed in early 1979.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have been predominately concerned with the "production politics" that
were essential for both the success and failure ofthe stevedoring labour administration in
the Durban harbour. It is clear that that Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company
was finally shut down because its operation had become too expensive. However, from
the moment employers started to employ casua1labourers in addition to the labour
70 DAR. PNAB Sub Committee on Labour and Transport 2/3/7/1. SB Bourquin. "ChiefDirectors
Memorandum: Establishment ofteams of Casual workers in the Neighbouring Bantu Homelands". 28
February 1975.
71 Mike Morris. "The stevedoring industry and the General Workers Union" in South African Labour
Bulletin. Vo!. 11, no. 3, May 1986.
75
provided by the Labour Supply Company in the early 1970s, this company had failed.
This failure reflects something deeper about Apartheid labour administration and its
misunderstanding of cultural practices.
In returning to the debates raised at the beginning of this chapter, I acknowledge
that some form of culture is important in shaping a worker consciousness. I have given
prominence to the work culture that developed out of the particular political conditions in
the stevedoring industry because they were crucial in sustaining production in the
industry. Above all, this chapter demonstrates that the conceptions of "tribal culture" that
the Apartheid state attempted to implement were ultimately useless at the point of
production. For all the resources that the state invested and beliefs that this system was
indeed responsible for the success of the Labour Supply Company, the success of this
company arose out of something entirely different. This is not to suggest that the
particular cultures, values and traditions that workers bring to work play no role in their
consciousness, but to draw two fundamental conclusions. The first is that we cannot,
following Michael Burawoy, forget that the politics of the workplace, the demands of
particular kinds ofwork, and the authority present at the point ofproduction mould
worker consciousness and identity in important ways. Given this conclusion, the second
fundamental point is that we cannot accept fetishized conceptions of culture as
determinant and all embracing in ordinary people or workers' lives. That would be to
accept a basic premise on which Apartheid was built, that cultural differences are so
inescapable that societies should be divided accordingly.
The experiences of stevedoring workers in Durban show that paternalism
developed as a response by workers and izinduna to a changed management style that
attempted to box them in a specific set ofmisunderstood cultural practices. But this
paternalistic relationship did not include those administrators with no actual relationship
with the workers themselves. Nor did it prevent both workers and izinduna combining
forces to lay serious complaint about the imposition ofvery authoritarian controls placed
on workers from the top ofthe management hierarchy.
The importance ofthe paternalist relationship that developed between management
and workers cannot be underestimated. This becomes clear in the next chapter, when,
under conditions ofvirtual collapse of the industry, the workers once again turned to the
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izinduna for support and protection. They also turned to the izinduna for advice and
leadership in choosing which unions to support. This will be developed in detail in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 3: Negotiating decline: Stevedoring work and unionization in Durban,
1978- c.1990
Technological change in societies produces new forms ofsocial relationships. Nowhere is
this felt more strongly than by people at work, who experience these changes directly,
since they have to change their working methods and often find themselves without work.
In the context of industrial revolution around the world, technological innovation and
change produced insecurity and upheaval among workers, many of whom felt threatened
by the onset ofmore efficient modes ofwork and understood them as threatening their
stability. 1 These reactions were not unreasonable, since many technological innovations
have sought to reduce the numbers of workers and the amount of labour time needed to
produce commodities. Whereas chapter one gave an account of the overall process of
technological change in Durban harbour, and chapter two discussed the practices of
labour administration in the port, this chapter will analyze the specific responses of
stevedores in Durban to the technological change.
As I have outlined in chapter 1, the specific technological change in the shipping
industry was called containerization. Unlike other technical changes in ports, such as the
improvement of cranes or the storing of goods, containerization drastically altered the
way in which harbour work was done. It impacted on virtually every aspect of shipping,
from the international shipping lines that controlled the ships, to the size of ships
required, to the infrastructure needed in harbours and the manner in which work was
done in harbours, to the physical process of loading and unloading ships. The change in
the nature of work, for the people responsible for the latter process, the stevedores, has
been a primary concern of this thesis, and thus this chapter will consider the changed
social and work relations produced by the technological innovation known as
containerization.
It is important to remember that while the actual technological innovation may be
the same everywhere, the contexts in which work happens are radically different. In
1 Among many works I could highlight the work ofBritish social historians, E.P. Thompson, Christopher
Hill, Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh stands out in their descriptions of industrial revolution in England. For
South Africa, I again highlight a single collection ofwork among many, Shula Marks and Richard
Rathbone. Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa, 1870-1930. London: Longman, 1980.
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South Africa, containerization happened approximately five years later than in the major
North American and European ports. While this difference in time is important and
reflects the interests of the international shipping companies and the structure of this
market, the South African labour market was unique for a more obvious reason. As I
discussed in Chapter 2, the necessity to secure a stable migrant labour force was a
primary interest of the Apartheid state, and the stevedoring industry fell very squarely
into these plans. Even before the 1980s, the Apartheid state was in crisis, with the
economic prosperity of the 1960s not sustained in the 1970s and the increasing suspicion
on the part ofbusiness that Apartheid, and especially its reliance on cheap African labour,
was no longer economically sustainable.2 In addition, the growth ofresistance among
African workers, especially in the form ofpoliticized trade unions suggested to the
government that urgent reforms in the structure of the labour force were necessary if it
was to maintain control. These reforms involved loosening influx control measures and
legalizing African trade unions; premised on the hope that these trade unions, once they
had gained access to lawful methods ofprotest and negotiation, would become de-
politicized, and would not provide yet another avenue of opposition to faltering
government control. While the actual violence and brutality administered by the state in
the 1980s seems to suggest its control of the forces of coercion, it belies its actual
weakness in maintaining a system which had become both unsustainable and generally
hated. Unlike the 1960s, the 1980s would see state administration having lost much
control of labour, and acting in an increasingly arbitrary manner.
In addition, the other critical phenomenon of the 1980s in South Africa, and in
particular in Natal, was the emergence ofpoliticized ethnicity. The politicization of
ethnicity was one of the worst legacies of Apartheid-manufactured tribal divisions. The
most prominent example was the Inkatha movement in Natal.3 Formed in 1975, Inkatha
claimed to represent the "Zulu nation" and was led by Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Buthelezi's
own involvement in South African politics stretched back to the late 1950s, when he
participated in homeland authorities and sat on native representative boards. While
2 Dan 0' Meara. Forty Lost Years: The apartheid state and the politics ofthe National Party, 1948-1994.
Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996. p. 176-178.
3 For more detailed discussion of Inkatha see Gerhard Mare and Georgina Hamilton. An Appetite for
Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of 'loyal resistance '. Johannesburg: Ravan, 1987, and Gerhard
Mare. Brothers Born ofWarrior Blood: Politics and Ethnicity in South Africa. Johanneburg: Ravan, 1992.
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formed as a "cultural association" for the Zulu people and in formal opposition to
Apartheid, Inkatha was built around the same logic as Apartheid, emphasizing the
differences that ethnic groups had, and mobilizing around one particular group. In the
1980s, Inkatha became an active and overt political force, especially in response to the
ANC-aligned United Democratic Front (UDF). In 1986, Inkatha launched its own union
movement, the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), in opposition to the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). In Natal and in hostels on the East
Rand, violent clashes were a prominent feature of the political landscape. As tempting as
it is to read this violence in terms ofurban radical dwellers verses Zulu migrant workers,
I will offer an alternative analysis in this chapter through the evidence of conditions
among predominately Zulu stevedores.4
These disparate contexts all feature in the stevedoring industry in Durban during
the 1980s. But this chapter will discuss stevedoring in Durban during the 1980s and will
focus specifically on unionization and worker responses to the destruction of their work.
It must be remembered that the specific paternalist structures and organization of work
that played such a crucial role in both maintaining order and facilitating production in the
1960s did not simply disappear but continued to play an important role in shaping worker
understanding of the technological change. This is not to say that this paternalist structure
did not undergo significant changes, as it evolved from a substantially hierarchical
arrangement between izinduna and workers towards a system in which izinduna became
respected gang leaders. Eventually, as more and more stevedores were retrenched by the
late 1980s, this structure became relatively insignificant.
However, this chapter does not confme itself to merely analyzing the structural
transformation ofwork and its effect on workers. I also emphasize the agency that
workers displayed during this period. Although the structural transformations inevitably
led to an overall decline in the amount of work available, this should not allow the careful
reader to believe that workers played no part in shaping the transformations that occurred.
In choosing one trade union over another, in their experiences and actions in response to
politicized ethnicity, and in their reactions to retrenchment, workers' decisions were
4 Drawing together the historiography of this violence, Mahmood Mamdani presents a clear analysis in
favour of this position. See Mamdani. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy oflate
colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 246-256.
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ultimately a crucial part of stevedoring after 1990.5 In continuing with the framework
developed in chapter two, the focus of the chapter will be on the "politics" of stevedoring
work within the workplace itself.
Equally important to the agency of the stevedores were the trade union decisions
during the 1980s that were fundamental in shaping the future structures of the
stevedoring industry. I will evaluate the success of the trade union movement in
comparison with trade union achievements in international ports. Given the difficulties
that trade unions experienced in South Africa, these comparisons may seem rather
uncharitable, since in European trade unions were freely allowed to organize for many
decades longer than South African trade unions and often enjoyed some state support.
Yet these comparisons are important because they show that the fate of stevedores in
South Africa was not the inevitable consequence of technological change. Instead I
understand the position of the stevedores working in Durban as a reflection of
technological change in combination with a state that regarded African workers as an
unavoidable hindrance to its racist ideology. We also cannot forget, that despite these
difficult conditions, trade unions did fail to push key decisions at critical times.
The legacy of the Labour Supply Company
While the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company ultimately did not succeed in
implementing Apartheid at a micro level, or in recreating the supposedly timeless tribal
structure among stevedores in Durban, it did create specific channels of power and
authority and cemented the power of izinduna over the stevedoring labour force. As I
have explored in the previous chapter, the Labour Supply Company began to falter in
supplying adequate amounts ofworkers to companies in the mid 1970s. By the end of the
decade, the remaining stevedoring companies decided to dissolve'the company because it
proved unprofitable, because of the extra distance that it created between management
and workers and because it was premised on the idea ofmaintaining a supply ofunskilled
5 In James Ferguson's contemporary study of urban life on the Zambian Copperbelt, he investigates the
effects of urban and industrial decay on urban residents. Although this chapter does again not address
consciousness directly, I hope that this project is the initial steps towards writing something similar to
Ferguson's project of "an ethnography of decline". See Ferguson. Expectations ofModernity: Myths and
meanings ofurban life on the Zambian copperbelt. Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1999.
81
African workers to the companies; a reality that companies no longer believed was
sustainable in the climate of technological change.6 While I will expand on these reasons
further on, for the moment I will reflect on the structures between workers and
management created in the Labour Supply Company. Understanding these structures is
crucial to comprehending the tasks that faced both trade unions and companies as they
attempted to re-organize the labour force, whether their end was a stable and profitable
labour force or one that could defend itself against exploitation or retrenchment.
The paternalism that developed as a defining characteristic of the relationship
between workers and their immediate superiors, izinduna, was certainly a productive
relationship that sustained the economic boom of the 1960s. Yet it was a relationship
marked by a structural division ofpower between workers and izinduna. Although at
various moments workers could be promoted to the position of izinduna, this relationship
was far from a fluid one. Unlike "normal" capitalist relations, workers were not promoted
to supervisory positions because of excellent work or commitment to the company.
Instead, promotion was fairly rare, and izinduna were often drawn from the ranks of
people with significant places within the structures ofhomeland authority. When workers
were promoted, conditions for promotion came from age and seniority.? The highest
position that an African could achieve was that of senior induna. Siza Makhaya, a
personnel officer during the 1980s, explains their status:
It ••• in the early years an induna was a father figure, and if[remember very well, when [joined the
company there was a boy who used to cookfor them and clean their rooms, and they were well looked
after. When [joined the company and I took over, I questioned the practice as to why was it necessary that
they should be getting preferential treatment. They gotfoodfrom the canteen that was specially prepared
for them. [think that we hadfour senior indunas during my time, and [ stopped this practice because [felt
that it was unfair. They were spoiled, and they got away with anything they wanted.... " . 8
It is crucial to realize that the paternalism that had developed during the 1960s came
specifically out of an adaptation by workers and izinduna to the conditions ofwork in the
6 Interview: Gordon Stockley, Operations Manager SASSCO 1978-1982, SAS 1982-1994.25 June 2001.
7 Interviews: Siza Makhaya, Personnel officer, SASSCO and SAS, 1978-1986, Themba Dube, SASSCO
and SAS 1980- .
8 Interview Siza Makhaya. 11 June 2001.
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industry. This came primarily from the gang structure itself, which was the central unit of
work in harbours across the world before containerization. A stevedore gang in Durban
comprised between eight and sixteen workers and included a winchman, a gangwayman
and an induna. The induna was ultimately responsible to white foremen for the success of
the gang, and had the freedom to recruit and assign tasks to the various stevedoring hands
at the point ofproduction. Other izinduna and senior izinduna controlled conditions at the
compound and co-ordinated how many gangs would work on any particular day. As I
pointed out in the previous chapter, a reciprocal relationship, albeit an unbalanced
reciprocity, developed between stevedoring workers and izinduna, with workers
dependent on izinduna for work, and izinduna dependent on worker reliability for their
positions.
What becomes critical in this period of technological change is the trimming, and
finally, the destruction of the gang unit itself. Work in the harbour had, for a considerable
time, been dependent on this relationship, and its destruction would inevitably result in
new relationships developing between izinduna and workers. Even before this, the end of
the Labour Supply Company meant that companies no longer invested as much power
and responsibility in the gang structure. Ye~ these structures ofpower were well
embedded in worker consciousness, for as one stevedore described in the early 1980s,
workers simply did not communicate socially with one another across different grades of
work, and the division ofpower was clearly laid out. 9 Furthermore, in the 1960s and
1970s, izinduna seldom supported any of the grievances of ordinary workers. 10 So the
problem becomes clear for the stevedoring companies; how was this divided workforce to
be transformed into a modem industrial workforce able to cope with the new demands of
containerization? For the unions the problem was similar: how was the workforce to be
united in the face of impending retrenchment?
9 Mr Khanye: Stevedore in Durban. Interviewed on 23 June 1983 by Tina Sideris. A collection of
interviews done by Sideris ofDockworkers in the early 1980s are located in SAIRR Oral History project,
AD 1722 FOSATU collection at the University of the Witwatersrand Dept ofHistorical papers. These
have proved invaluable to my work and my thanks goes to Mike Morris for informing me of their
existence.
10 David Hemson. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: The Dockworkers ofDurban. Ph.D thesis,
University of Warwick. The important exception to this, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, was the lB.
Buthe1ezi case.
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Structural changes in the stevedoring industry and early trade unionism in the early
1980s
Between 1976 and 1982, the landscape of the stevedoring industry changed
significantly. Stevedoring companies became involved in a series ofmergers in an
attempt to preserve the viability of the stevedoring industry. Work began on the
Container Terminal in Durban in 1974 and was completed in 1977. Faced with the
prospect of an increasing percentage of cargo transported in containers, and with
pa1letization (which was a process ofunitizing cargo) begun in the early 1970s,
companies realized that they were competing over a diminishing amount of work. From
13 Stevedoring Companies in 1970, there was an eventual merger into two by 1980,11
Rennies Grindrods Cotts and South African Stevedoring Service Company (SASSCO).
Rennies and Grindrods remained as separate companies as they ran other operations in
addition to stevedoring, but their stevedoring operations were merged. SASSCO ended
up running most of the stevedoring in Durban, and controlled most of the labour at a ratio
of approximately 6 to 1.12 In 1982, SASSCO and Rennies Grindrods Cotts merged into
one company called South African Stevedores, and effectively became the only
stevedoring company in Durban.
In 1979, the companies decided to stop recruiting any new labour to the docks. At
that stage, retrenchments were inevitable, and it was pointless to recruit new labour that
would face retrenchment. At this time, the remaining stevedoring companies decided that
the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company no longer served any useful function,
as it simply added extra costs to managing a labour pool that effectively was made up of
SASSCO's workers. They also felt that to remain competitive, workers would have to
identify with the company, and be trained in operating machinery such as forklift trucks,
an essential part ofpalletization. 13 The breaking of the Labour Supply Company can be
seen within a general trend of employers and white business no longer believing that the
system ofunskilled African workers (that was a fundamental premise ofApartheid
11 Mike Morris. The GWU and the Stevedoring Industry. South African Labour Bulletin, vo!' 11, no. 3,
1986. p. 94.
12 Interview Captain Dudley. SASSCO/SAS Regional Manager, Durban, 1977-1983. 15 August 2001.
13 Interview: Captain Gordon Stockley, Operations and General Manager SASSCO/SAS, 1976-1994.25
June 2001.
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policy) would be sustainable or profitable in the future. This was particularly acutely felt
in the stevedoring industry where, without re-training in the new working skills, the
workforce would become redundant. In any case, the end of the Labour Supply Company
set the stage for a new regime of industrial relations to develop on the docks during the
early 1980s.
While there had been some degree of loosely defined union organization amongst
stevedores in the 1940s and 1950s, this had been stamped out by the Labour Supply
Company.14 The two strikes by stevedores in Durban in 1969 and 1972 had not been
organized by any formal union body because African unions were illegal. During the
early 1970s, benefit funds and advice bureaus were established across the country and
were peripherally involved in the 1972 stevedore strike and the wider 1973 Durban
strikes when they attempted to highlight the immediate exploitation ofworkers in their
particular workplaces. 15 Yet these organizations were not unions, and were comprised
primarily ofwhite leftist intellectuals whose position was always to advise workers on
the best course of action. These intellectuals had little experience of the realities of
working under the difficult conditions that Apartheid had constructed. This is not to
question their often noble intentions, but to question their real significance in worker
consciousness and action. Furthermore, the danger of over-emphasizing their role in the
strike removes much of the agency that workers themselves displayed during the strikes.
In any event, the mid to late 1970s witnessed not only a resurgence in worker
militancy but also the beginnings of a new union movement in South Africa. Unions
began to form tentatively in many workplaces, and a new trade union federation, called
the Federation of South African trade unions (FOSATU), formed in 1977. Although these
unions often bore the hallmarks of the older benefit funds, unionists became more
14 David Hemson. "Dock workers, labour circulation and class struggles" in Journal ofSouthern African
Studies. vol. 4, 1977. p.95-100
15 Another example of this type of involvement with the African working class was the wages commissions
set up at white "liberal" universities across South Africa. A typical wages commission document would
advise workers of their positions and encourage them to strike for high wages. These documents were
available in both English and Zulu. For a University ofNatal wages commission document on the
stevedoring industry in Durban see University of the Witswatersrand, Fosatu Collection, AH 1999
C3.19.12.1 Wages Commision, University ofNatal. Also see Hemson's somewhat exaggerated account of
the role of the Benefit Fund in the 1972 Stevedore Strike in David Hemson. Class Consciousness and
Migrant Workers: The Dockworkers o/Durban, p. 605-670. For an account of involvement in the 1973
Durban Strike, again somewhat over-emphasized, see Gerhard Mare (ed) The Durban Strikes 1973
"Human beings with souls", Durban: Institute for Industrial Education, 1976. p. 69-76.
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adventurous and open in their practices of organizing. Unlike confident National Party
regimes of the past, the government adopted a new strategy towards these unions. Instead
of suppression and mass banning, the government, following the recommendations of the
Wiehahn commission, decided in 1978 to allow African trade unions to form and
organize workers, provided that they explicitly stayed out ofpolitics and concentrated on
industrial issues. The clear rationale behind this policy was an attempt to de-politicize an
increasingly confident and militant African working class. 16 The Wiehahn strategies
enjoyed very limited success, even in the early 1980s, and instead allowed trade unions to
become a platform for anti-apartheid organization and widespread resistance to
Apartheid.
In the docks, trade unionism spread in the late 1970s. Senior management in the
major stevedoring companies almost encouraged the development of trade unionism
within part of their plans to develop the workforce for the changes that were imminent in
the industry.17 Middle management were not very comfortable with the development of
trade unions during this initial period, with a number of recorded disciplinary incidents,
and one in particular where a white foreman told union members to collect their wages
from the union. 18 Despite these incidents, the two early unions in the docks, the South
African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) and the Transport and General Workers Union
(TGWU) were hardly able to claim anything near majority membership in the
stevedoring industry. In1980, the latter could claim a mere of300 stevedores ofa
possible 2500. 19
The rise and fall of the General Workers Union
In 1981, a union established in Cape Town called the General Workers Union (GWU)
arrived in Durban to organize the stevedoring industry. This union had grown out of the
former Westem Province Advice Bureau, and comprised a significant number ofwhite
16 Dan O'Meara. Forty Lost Years. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996. p. 273
17 Interviews: Captain Gordon Stockley, 25 June 2001, Siza Makhaya, 11 June 2001. Makhaya commented
that many in middle management regarded senior management as taking 'crazy and radical' steps in
refonning the workforce.
18 Wits Dept ofHistorical Papers, FOSATU Collection AH 1999 C.1.9.12.8.3 Grindrods Discipline
19 Jeremy Baskin. "The GWU and the Durban Dockworkers" in South Africa Labour Bulletin, vol. 8, no. 3,
December 1982. p. 20.
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intellectuals. The union had organized in a number of industries in the Cape, most
notably the meat workers?O They had considerable success in organizing stevedores in
Cape Town, and following their defeat in the meat industry, they decided to move
towards a national union of stevedores. By the beginning of 1981, they had organized
stevedores in Port Elizabeth and East London, and sent organizers, led by Mike Morris
and 'Rev' Marawu, an experienced union official from Cape Town, to establish a base in
Durban.21
However, organizing stevedores in Durban was not going to be a simple task. For
one thing, other unions already had some presence in the docks. Even more importantly,
the structures of authority surrounding work in Durban were distinct from other portS.22
These stemmed from the days of the Labour Supply Company. Organizers came to
Durban with an established sense ofhow to organize stevedores in Durban and
immediately encountered difficulties. Mike Morris recalled an incident where he
attempted to call a meeting at the same time as an induna, and nobody arrived at his
meeting.23 Eventually organizers realized that there would be no way to organize the
stevedores except through well-established routes. Morris explains;
The problem with the majority ofguys was that they were rural and didn't really understand the purpose of
a union. There was always confusion between union structures ofpower and tribal structures. The SASSCO
guys were never problematic in this regard, because Fatha Zulu never pulled that stunt, even though he
was a Zulu. Elison Ndebele was another key guy. It was highly problematic, and there was always this
interesting tension, and it taught me a lot, between dealing with tribal structures and union structures, but
there was literally no way around it. 24
There was also other resistance towards the General Workers Union. Workers generally
distrusted the motives of this union, especially because of different regional origins, and
20 Mike Morris. "The Stevedoring Industry and the General Workers Union, part 2" in South African
Labour Bulletin, vol. 11, no. 5, 1986. p. 101-103.
21 Interview: Mike Morris. 28 June 2001. Also see the film Passing the Message directed by Cliff Bestall
(1984) for an illustration of the initial attempts to organize stevedores in Durban.
22 Captain Gordon Stockley emphasized this particularity, having worked at all four major ports in the
country. Interview conducted on 25 June 200l.
23 Mike Morris cited in David Hemson. "Beyond the Frontier ofControl" in Transformation3. no. 30, 1996.
p.89.
24 Interview. Mike Morris, Organizer, General Workers Union, 28 June 2001.
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articulated these in ethnic terms, as "Xhosas meddling in their affairs".25 These
difficulties meant that the process of organizing was slow and difficult, and after 6
months of organizing, the GWU had recruited 500 out of a possible 2000 stevedores in
Durban.26
Yet the distrust that workers had in the GWU would not endure. By 1981,
retrenchments were already a reality for stevedoring workers. As one worker noted;
"When there were many ships work used to kill us, but now because of containers there is
no work".27 Word spread fast among the workers as to which union was successful at
representing workers:
There was a group ofworkers who took it upon themselves tojoin the union. But after that there was a
dispute in the factory about another worker who was on the verge ofbeing dismissed. GWU officials made
representation and this worker was taken back And the workers were amazed because it was the first time
for them to see a union doing such a thing. The workers started believing in GWU and they joined it.
28
The General Workers Union also succeeded in destroying old divisions of labour built up
during the 1960s and 1970s in the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company;
The union finished all those barriers. Because before the unions came, it was a tradition for winchmen,
gangways and indunas not to mix with stevedores. They were even told to do this. In fact even in the
compound they had their own rooms separate from the rooms ofordinary stevedores. Even in discussions it
was not allowedfor stevedore hands to mix with gangways, winchmen and indunas?9
Neither SAAWO nor Mangosuthu Buthelezi had an answer to these waves of
retrenchment. When workers had initially appealed to Buthelezi personally for help when
retrenchments began, the Kwazulu government replied to workers that "the law does not
25 Mr. Khanye: Stevedore in Durban. Interviewed on 23 June 1983 by Tina Sideris. University of the
Witwatersrand Historical Papers Collection, SAIRR Oral History Project #51.
26 Jeremy Baskin. "The GWU and the Durban Dockworkers" in South Africa Labour Bulletin. p. 19. Note
the change from 2600 in 1978 to 2000 in 1981 reflected the already significant processes of retrenchment.
27 Mr Ntshangase: Stevedore in Durban. Inteviewed on 19 November 1982 by Tina Sideris. University of
the Witwatersrand Historical Papers Collection, SAIRR Oral History Project #44. My thanks goes to Muzi
Hadebe for translating this document.
28 Mr. Khanye: Stevedore in Durban. Interviewed on 23 June 1983 by Tina Sideris
29 Mr. Khanye: Stevedore in Durban. Interviewed on 23 June 1983 by Tina Sideris
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stipulate how much money the employer must pay when retrenching workers".3o
Similarly, SAAWU promised workers large sums but failed to secure any compensation
money.31 In Tina Sideris' interview with Mr Ndebele, he describes how SAAWU
encouraged retrenched workers not to take the severance packages ofR600 that the GWU
had negotiated, saYing that the workers were entitled to RI 000. Some workers believed
this and joined SAAWU, but the organizers could not secure any extra money from the
employers.32 Another worker agreed that the only reason that the retrenched workers got
any compensation at all was due to the efforts of the General Workers Union.33 It was
becoming clear to workers which union to join and that "traditional" sources of support
had failed. Morris was able to claim that within a year of the union's presence in Durban
they were able to claim 90% ofthe stevedoring workers in the country and a significant
majority in Durban.34 By June 1982, the General Workers Union was able to claim
recognition in the four major ports in South Africa.35 Although the FOSATU union,
Transport and General Workers Union, had organized a number of workers in the docks,
they began to back away from the docks, especially after workers and management
recognized the GWU. It became obvious that that the GWU were a more far successful
union in the stevedoring industry. SAAWU, because of their support in Grindrods in the
late 1970s, continued to fight the GWU for a period, using under-handed tactics. Besides
making unrealistic promises to the workers, such as ofbeing able to prevent the merger
between Rennies Grindrod and SASSCO, they also claimed that the white unionists were
collaborators. The GWU, in an open letter to all independent unions, rejected these
claims, and argued that SAAWU was being divisive and violating the principle of
majority unionism.36 Within a year ofthe merger into SAS, SAAWU had all but
disappeared from the docks.
30 Mr. Khanye: Stevedore in Durban. Interviewed on 23 June 1983 by Tina Sideris
31 Mr. Khanye: Stevedore in Durban. Interviewed on 23 June 1983 by Tina Sideris
32 Mr. Ndebele: Stevedore in Durban. Interviewed on 23 June 1983 by Tina Sideris. University of the
Witwatersrand Historical Papers Collection, SAIRR Oral History Project #56.
33 Mr. Ntshangase: Stevedore in Durban. Interview on 19 November 1982 by Tina Sideris.
34 Mike Morris. "Stevedoring Workers and the GWU" in South Africa Labour Bulletin, vol. 11, no. 5, 1986.
35 "Deal gives GWU 4-port standing". Eastern Province Herald, 22 June 1982. The ports I am referring to
are Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town.
36 University of the Witwatersrand Historical Papers Collection. AH 1999, C6.8, FOSATU collection.
"General Workers Union letter to FOSATU", by David Lewis, 6 October 1982.
89
It is important to note that much of the success that the General Workers Union
achieved was due to working alongside existing structures rather than dramatically
reshaping them. The one important exception was perhaps in slightly altering the power
relationships between izindlUla and stevedoring hands into a shared understanding of
their exploitation by management, and their common position as workers. IzindlUla
became more like team leaders than authoritarian foremen. 37 However, the union was not
able to encourage Durban stevedores to support solidarity struggles ofworkers in other
portS.38 Of course, it is uncertain whether even the most organized worker from a country
without the same legacy of oppression would have supported a solidarity strike lUlder the
conditions ofmass retrenchment and little job security prevalent in Durban during the
early 1980s.
Besides organizing good retrenchment packages, the GWU also ensured the
introduction ofhealth and safety regulations. The major way that it was able to fight
retrenchment was through the introduction of a guarantee system. The guarantee system,
introduced in late 1981, was designed to ensure that all workers were guaranteed a
detennined number of days a week. In other words, it meant that rather than having one
stevedore work five days and another one day, it ensured that workers were paid for a
minimum ofthree days a week.39 It succeeded in curtailing the retrenchments that were
regular from 1979-1981 and was even increased to four days guaranteed work in 1982,
when the merger of stevedoring companies into South African Stevedores (SAS)
increased the demand for work. The guarantee system was introduced together with
compulsory lUlpaid leave that also limited the number of retrenchments during the
period.40 In a matter ofjust over a year in the docks, the General Workers Union achieved
spectacularly well, organizing rural and hostile stevedores into a union and ensuring their
stability in an industry whose presence was threatened by massive technological
restructuring, and one whose past had reflected the apartheid industrial relations system
in operation.
37 Part of this reshaping was a result of technological change, since both izinduna and stevedoring hands
faced retrenchment during containerization.
38 "Durban Dockers unlikely to back Cape go-slow". The Daily News. 31 August 1982.
39 Interview: Les Owen, Senior Industrial Relations Manager, SASSCO and SAS 1979-1984,5 June 2001.
40 Interview: Yoga Thinnasagren, middle management, SASSCO 1974-1982, SAS 1982-,6 September
2001.
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However, it was not just the GWU that was succeeding in challenging the old
industrial relations order and representing the stevedores in a very progressive way. As a
company, South African Stevedores (and South African Stevedoring Services Company
before them), certainly attempted to reform the landscape and offer their workers a good
deal. They offered training schemes for workers to learn English and re-skilled their
workers in the new machinery available in the docks, and attempted to reform the
compound, that had been a pivotal place for the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply
Company, the labour bureau of the stevedores in Durban.41 SAS commissioned a study
into the dwelling preferences and housing needs ofmigrant stevedores. The aim of this
study was to investigate whether workers would prefer a housing arrangement that would
allow them more flexibility in seeing their families, either by moving into flats or into the
township. The results of the study were conclusive and surprised the management of
SAS; workers preferred to live in the hostel, provided it was cleaned up a little.42 This
reflects an important point, that stevedores were un~ing to dispense with their rural
base during this period, despite the offer ofalternative and subsidized accommodation.
SAS did not simply try to fall in line with union demands or make life more
comfortable for workers. Indeed, they understood their position as one seeking to ensure
the long-term profitability of the stevedoring industry in South Africa, and believed
vehemently in the reality that this could only happen when practices of the past were
dispensed with.43 Many in the company, especially middle managers, thought that their
policies were too progressive and even mad.44 The commitment of the company to these
principles even extended to criticism of government policy towards unions, sharply
highlighted by Les Owen's public criticism of government "backwardness" in clashing
with the GWU over recognition ofrailway and harbour workers in Port Elizabeth in
1983.45 The company also intervened on behalfof a widow of a stevedore who had been
41 Interview: Captain Gordon Stockley, 26 June 2001.
42 Lawrence Schlemmer (et al) Future Dwelling Preferences ofHostel Dwelling Migrants: A study ofthe
housing needs ofstevedores in the Durban metropolitan area. (executive summary). Also Les Owen,
senior industrial relations manager of South Africa Stevedores, interview with the author, 6 June 2001. I
must thank Les Owen for providing me with this document.
43 Interviews: Les Owen, 6 June 2001 and Gordon StockIey, 26 June 2001.
44 Interview Siza Makhaya, 17 June 2001. Makhaya told me in our interview that middle managers couldn't
believe what the senior management were asking them to do.
45 Les Owen. Interview. 5 June 2001.
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killed as a result of cargo falling on him due to defective machinery belonging to South
African Railways and Harbours. The SARH was ordered to pay compensation to the
widow.46 Almost naturally, it seems, the relationship between SAS and the GWU was
described by both sides as a good one.47 Of course, this came in the context of a company
trying to maintain profitability in an industry that they saw as having too many workers.
Nevertheless, with union pressure, they were able to offer their workers better wages than
48ever.
With the benefit of hindsight, it could be suggested that the close relationship
between the General Workers Union and South African Stevedores may not have been
such a good thing. In the final analysis, the interest of the company was to ensure that an
industry facing severe decline maintained long-term financial viability and profitability
whereas the interests of the union were with the job security of the stevedoring labour
force. There can be little doubt that the lack of industrial action during the early and mid
1980s in the docks was due to the close relationship between the company and the union.
Hemson has suggested that while retrenchment was inevitable to some extent, the scale of
the retrenchment was too large; the size of the workforce fell from over 2500 workers in
1978 to 1200 in 1986, and that a significant portion of the work began to be done by
casual labour, particularly in the 1990s.49 The company argued that its fmancial
statements were open to the union, and that unionists could see the figures and the
inevitability of the retrenchments. They also argued that the emergence of competition at
the end of 1983 made the maintenance of their wage levels impossible.50 I would also
suggest that, operating within the Apartheid system, the antagonism between capital and
labour was obscured by the historically racist labour relations of the Apartheid State.
During the 1980s, especially in the docks, the failures of that system to ensure a workable
and profitable industry meant that, unlike the 1960s, capital and unions brokered a truce
to ensure a more humane system ofwork. However, the truce worked in the long-term
interests of the stevedoring company against the workers as the problems of the
stevedores in the 1990s emerged, which I will explore later in the chapter.
46 SARH vs SASSCO, South Africa Law Reports, 1983, part 1. p. 1066-1089.
47 Interviews: Stockley, Owen, Makhaya, Dudley, Morris.
48 "Wage increases for Stevedores". The Daily News. 23 December 1982.
49 David Hemson. "Beyond the Frontier of Control" in Transformation. 1996. p. 94
50 Interview with Gordon Stockley, 26 June 2001.
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What destroyed the relatively good wage levels was the arrival of a competing
company, Keeleys, in the docks. Keeleys stevedoring operation grew out ofISCOR's
desire to transport steel cheaply and efficiently. During 1984, Keeleys became serious
competition for SAS, by employing workers, often those who had been retrenched, at
casual rates. The GWU tried to organize Keeleys and although they were able to gain
some support among their workers, they failed to establish a uniform wage across the
indUStry.51 Inevitably, this meant that SAS dropped its rates, and much of the good work
done by the GWU was thus undermined.52
Another factor that destroyed the morale of organizers in the GWU was the
constant retrenchment. After securing many benefits in 1981 and 1982, 1983 and 1984
saw the union fighting retrenchments tooth and nail. The battle with Keeleys exacerbated
the problem. The retrenchment of 600 Durban Stevedores in February 1985 was perhaps
the last straw.53 For organizers like Morris, the combination ofKeeleys and constant
retrenchments really led them to give up hope.54 Hemson has also suggested that the
close relationship between the GWU and SAS fuelled speculation by the workers of
union and management co-operation. Particularly in the face of so many retrenchments,
workers believed that the union could have done more.55 By May 1985, the GWU left the
docks, officially having merged nationally with TGWU under the new union federation
COSATU. Effectively though, the driving force of the union officials in the early 1980s
was gone from the docks.
UWUSA in the docks: 1986-1990
In December 1985, COSATU was launched out ofFOSATU and some of the
non-FOSATU aligned unions, such as the GWU. One ofthe major principles of
FOSATU was a workerist position, in other words, it firmly believed in worker
controlled workplaces. The irony is that many ofthe upper ranks of FOSATU were
51 Mike Morris. Interview, 28 June 2001. Morris suggested that because the union maintained unregistered
status, it became impossible to fonn an industrial council, which he believed was the only way to safeguard
wage levels across the industry. See also Morris, M. "The Stevedoring Industry and the GWU, part 2".
52 "Wage detenninations: Payment Problems" in Financial Mail, 3 August 1983.
53 "600 Durban dock workers to lose their jobs" in Natal Mercury, February 18, 1985.
54 Mike Morris. Interview, 28 June 2001.
55 David Hemson. "Beyond the Frontier of Control" in Transformation, no. 30,1996 p.91
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controlled by leftist white intellectuals and there was always a distance between the
leadership and the membership of the organization. Yet the unionists in FOSATU did
succeed in organizing many migrant workers, and did not present a direct challenge to
traditional leadership that workers may have supported at home. In Natal, for instance, it
was possible to be a member ofboth FOSATU and Inkatha.56 FOSATU also had no clear
alliance with the United Democratic Front. The General Workers Union actually had an
interview published with the Secretary General explaining specifically why they refused
to align under the UDF.57
COSATU, on the other hand, certainly was not dominated by white intellectuals.
There was a constant debate in COSATU about the role ofunions in the "National
liberation struggle" and gradually, FOSATU's commitment to the centrality of shopfloor
politics and "workerism" was diluted in more pressing concerns ofnational politics. In
this regard, COSATU was far closer to being a voice of the ANC within the country, and
was strongly aligned to the UDF. The patterns of organization began to focus primarily
on urban African workers, as opposed to migrant labourers.58
Within a year, Inkatha responded to the launch of COSATU with the launch of
the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) in May 1986. The launch of
UWUSA was openly antagonistic towards COSATU, with the burning of a coffin with
the name of the COSATU president on the side. Mare has suggested that the reason for
launching the union was for Inkatha to be able to extend its influence into what was
becoming a critical area in South African politics.59 UWUSA advocated free market
principles and opposed sanctions, claiming that COSATU's policies would destroy the
economy and any possibility for peaceful reform in South Africa. The stage was set for a
new kind of workplace conflict in the docks.
Even with the relaxation of influx control laws in the early 1980s, and their
scrapping in 1986, most of the dockworkers opted to stay in the company hostel and not
56 Mahmood Mamdani. Citizen and Subject. Cape Town: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 253-255.
57 "General Workers Union and the UDF: Interview with David Lewis" in Work in Progress, no. 9, October
1983. Lewis argued that the union was only accountable to its members, and while its officials were
s~pathetic with the objectives of the UDF, the functions ofthe organizations were entirely different.
5 Mahmood Mamdani. Citizen and Subject. P. 255-257.
59 Gerhard Mare and Georgina Hamilton. An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of
'Loyal Resistance'. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987. p. 133 & p. 220.
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move into town with their families, often because this proved a much cheaper option.60
Although the TGWU now organized the stevedores, without nearly as much vigor as the
GWU, the union still had a strong following and company recognition. As early as 1983,
SAS perceived that unions were increasingly politicized and predicted that the political
demands of Inkatha would put pressure on stevedores.61 Even before the launch of
UWUSA, Inkatha members had tried to persuade the manager of the company not to
allow unions to organize for workers;
I got quite irritatedwith the Inkatha union, they came to see us, one ofthe members ofthe royalfamily and
his entourage, and I think it was this Prince Gideon. And we had this meeting and they said how distressed
they were with what was going on, that they believed that communism was coming into the ports, this was
sort ofin the early 1980s. And Gatsha Buthelezi didn't like this, and he was for the government, and
somehow we had to make it so the GWU couldn't get into the port. We had allowed them access to the
compound, and allowed anybody to have a meeting as long as they informed us first and went about it the
right way. I just said, nice talking to you and all ofthat, but these are the rules ofthe game, and you can't
have any preferential treatment. And I can always remember one guy pulling me aside at the end ofthe
meeting and saying that ifI ever have any trouble down there, one or two guys that you find causing
trouble, just let me know, and we will get rid ofthem for you. I realized that when we did investigations,
and we realized that all the younger guys were all GWU and all the older guys UWUSA. The break up of
the tribal structure was taking place.62
Captain Gordon Stockley: Manager SASSCO 1979-1982 SAS 1982-1994
The docks were to become just one sphere ofUWUSA operation from 1986. For
stevedores, this period would become a battle over the importance of ethnicity within the
context oftechnological change and retrenchment. But the struggle would not be between
permanent urbanized workers against migrant rural ones63, but rather about migrant
workers having to decide between two unions, one that seemed to negotiate better
conditions for them at work, and another that claimed to secure their 'traditional' way of
60 Lawrence Schlemmer (et al) Future Dwelling Preferences ofHostel Dwelling Migrants: A study ofthe
housing needs ofstevedores in the Durban metropolitan area and interviews with Themba Dube, Les
Owen, Gordon Stockley, Mike Morris.
61 South African Stevedores. SAS Corporate Plan 1984-1987. November 1983, p.45.
62 Interview Gordon Stockley, 25 June 2001.
63 This pattern in the union organization and workplace conflict may be correct in general, but it obscures
the fact of other conflicts, for instance generational ones, and also appears to deny the agency of migrant
workers in choosing which unions would serve them better.
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life. Within the particularly difficult environment ofretrenchment in the docks, the latter
option seemed additionally attractive.
Yet, UWUSA's operation was not simply one of contesting for the support of
stevedores by emphasizing different concerns. Underlying their promises was also a great
amount of intimidation. Much of the intimidation was based on a politics that occurred
outside the workplace and held such force, that many of the workers that I approached
still refuse to speak about it today. The official story of this intimidation followed the
lines of UWUSA members speaking to workers in the compound and using expressions
such as "Buthelezi won't be happy with your involvement in communism, and remember
where you live; don't bother coming North of the Tugela if you continue to involve
yourself in this union".64 Siza Makhaya, a personnel officer who had been instrumental
in abolishing the privileges of senior izinduna in the compounds in the early 1980s,
claims to have left his job because of threats from UWUSA in late 1986.65 His
replacement, Themba Dube, says that he did not suffer from the same threats but
recounted the story of a brave TGWU shop steward named Mtshali who refused to hear
UWUSA's position and be intimidated. He had been in the docks since the 1970s and
was keenly aware of the battles that the union had actually won. Dube recalls what
happened to Mtshali in 1987:
In fact, I saw him die. There were tensions at the hostel. I think it was a Friday, and it was myselfand
Jerry Mbatha, who was then hostel manager. We were phoned by the booking clerks that Mtshali had
just been stabbed We rushedfrom home to find that it was his last gasps. He was a prominent
shopsteward 66
Despite this, Dube would not directly implicate UWUSA in the killing.67 Perhaps this
was because the company wanted to distance itself from the politics of the time.68
64 Christopher Gcebu, TGWU shopsteward cited in Hemson. "Beyond the Frontier ofControl". p. 97.
65 Siza Makhaya, interview, 12 June 2001.
66 Interview: Themba Dube, 8 March 2002
67 Interview: Themba Dube, 8 March 2002.
68 Interview: Yoga Thinnasagren, 6 September 2001.
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Another shop-steward, Christopher Gceba, also received death threats in 1987 for
remaining faithful to TGWU.69
Members of SAS that I interviewed from top management to personnel officers
all argued that UWUSA did not function as a real union, used no membership cards and
were never able to successfully negotiate any benefits for workers.70 However, the
company did cancel the recognition agreement with TGWU, and from mid-1987 there
was a void in union recognition and the two unions both organized in the docks, both
going to meetings with management, but without real power. This certainly did not help
the cause of fighting retrenchments since major retrenchments followed in May and
November 1987.71
In 1991, TGWU convinced SAS to have a referendum among workers about
which union they supported, and TGWU was once again recognized as the official union
in the stevedoring industry. By this time, UWUSA had all but disappeared from the
docks. The period ofUWUSA in the harbour threw up conflicts across generation, and
around the changing sources of income and security for stevedores. Many of the gains
that had been established in the early 1980s were lost, and a situation was created where
stevedores were left embittered and disillusioned about the effectiveness of trade unions,
an attitude that would characterize the 1990s. The 1980s had offered the possibilities for
workers to choose the unions that they wished, and opened the door for workers to reject
both the tribal categories created by Apartheid and the paternalism that had become so
necessary for their survival in the docks during the 1960s. Yet the politics of ethnic
violence and intimidation dampened this conclusion, and workers were left on their own
again, facing a declining industry where their knowledge ofthe work meant less and less.
The destruction of morale: Stevedoring work in the 1990s
I will not be considering stevedoring work in the 1990s in any detail. This section merely
enables the reader to understand fully the implications ofthe turmoil in the industry in the
69 David Hemson. "Beyond the Frontier ofControl". p. 98
70 Interviews: Themba Dube, Gordon Stockley, Siza Makhaya. There is also secondary source support for
this position in David Hemson. "Beyond the Frontier of Control".
71 David Hemson. "Beyond the Frontier of Control". p. 97-99.
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1980s. The marginalization of stevedoring workers in Durban followed as a direct
consequence of the turmoil of the 1980s. Retrenchments would continue in the early
1990s, and the permanent workforce would be cut down to approximately 300 workers.
Much of the stevedoring work would be done on a daily basis by casual workers, and
with the loss ofjob security, stevedore morale plunged.
Besides the obvious cause ofretrenchment for the drop in worker morale, the
destruction of the gang structure that had for so many years been central to the labour
process on the docks also affected worker morale. Stevedores no longer felt part of a
team of strong "buffalo" who made the harbour work. In a series of interviews with
stevedores conducted by David Hemson in the early 1990s, he found that workers no
longer had any pride in their work, and felt that the mechanization of the port made them
"weak".72 Even before the 1990s, many stevedores realized that the prospects ofa long-
term future in the industry were small. Their responses were to turn back towards the
only area that they had any promise of security within the migrant labour system. For
instance, Mr. Ntshangase, interviewed in 1982, suggested that the only thing the union
could do was ensure a retrenchment package and then he would "go back home...to look
after my cattle".73 The majority of remaining stevedoring workers were over 40 years old,
a consequence of the Last-In, First Out, (LIFO) policy of retrenchment negotiated by
both the GWU and TGWU, and felt that the rural areas were the only alternative for them
after forced retirement or retrenchment.74 These views represented one of the bitter
ironies ofthe migrant labour system in the stevedoring industry in Durban. In the 1950s
stevedores had claimed Durban as their home, and engaged in a losing struggle with the
Apartheid state. By the end of Apartheid, stevedores had so little hope left in the industry
that they turned back towards the homeland areas that the Apartheid state had designated
as their homes.75
72 David Hemson. "The Global Imperative? Containerization and Durban Docks", Unpublished Paper,
University ofDurban-Westville, 1996. p 10-12. For a more complete account of the interviews see David
~emson. Migrants and Machines: Labour andNew Technology in the port ofDurban. HSRC report, 1995.
7" Mr Ntshangase interviewed by Tina Sideris on 19 November 1982. Wits Historical Papers, SAIRR Oral
History Project, interview #44.
74 David Hemson. "The Global Imperative? Containerization and Durban Docks" p. 8-14.
7S In a different context of industrial decline, Ferguson has shown that a 'return to the land' is by no means
unproblematic. See James Ferguson. Expectations ofModernity. p. 123-128.
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Among the growing numbers of casual workers in the harbour after 1990, union
organization was fragmented and largely characterized by opportunism.76 Part of the
problem was that stevedoring companies no longer directly employed casual labourers,
and instead left this process to be managed by a number of labour brokers, who
contracted workers out to stevedoring companies. This was part of a new regime of
industrial relations that developed in many industries, and established trade unions had
very little idea ofhow to deal with labour brokers.77 The best that the TGWU could
muster was an agreement for a National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) in which
employers would be forced to draw from a single pool of casual workers managed by a
single labour broker.78 In theory, this scheme was supposed to ensure basic benefits to
casual workers and provide a degree ofjob security. However, partly due to the
mismanagement of the pool and partly due to employers believing that the pool was too
expensive to maintain, the NDLS only lasted a year and a half. Again TGWU was
impotent in ensuring the rights of these workers. By the end of the 1990s, casual
stevedores still believed that a union could help them, but that organizers had to be
realistic and to understand both the industry and their own conditions.79
"Tribal structures" and trade unionism
Both union officials and company officials assumed that stevedores were organized along
the lines of 'tribal structures' and that technological change and unionization disrupted or
upset these structures. Yet as intensive as the efforts of the Apartheid state were in the
1960s to re-create tribal structures in workplaces around South Africa, these efforts failed
in the stevedoring industry in Durban. Instead, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, a
76 I thank Joe Guy, organizer, Dock and General Workers Union, 1998-2001, for much of the information
on casual workers.
77 Temporary work agencies have become a phenomenon of work across the world during the 1990s.
Manuel Castells. The rise o/network society. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. p. 223. For a local example of
labour brokers, a honours essay on the Engen refmery by Stephen Sparks; "Work and Technology at the
Wentworth Refmery" (2002) has been most illuminating.
78 Besides TGWU, the State was also involved in drafting the NDLS. It was based on the White Paper on
Transport Policy (1996) that "aimed to stabilize industrial relations in the port". For more on this see,
Simon Stratton. "The implementation ofthe dock labour scheme in the port ofDurban", unpublished paper,
University of Adelaide.
79 Interviews by the author: Mr Ndumo Dlamini and Jabulani Mchunu, 22 December 2000.
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paternalistic relationship developed between izinduna and stevedoring hands in Durban.
And in as much as this relationship was a hierarchical one, one that union officials had to
accommodate when organizing stevedores, it was a structure that was built and developed
in the workplace, rather than in homeland areas, or established as a consequence of
established 'Zulu tradition'. As workers and izinduna were unionized in the early 1980s,
many izinduna became shop-stewards and actively supported the demands of the GWU.
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It was this paternalist structure that changed during the 1980s in the docks.
The efforts of Inkatha and UWUSA to forcefully maintain or re-assert the
importance of 'tribal structures' were also based on the misconception of 'a loss of
culture' among workers. But these ventures into the docks were based on a more serious
political concern, since it seemed increasingly possible that Inkatha's traditional support
base might have supported the ANC, its main rival. UWUSA's attempts to organize the
stevedoring workers came at a crucial moment when retrenchments were an ever-present
concern for workers. Faced with the choice between unions, stevedores made pragmatic
choices based on their perceptions of a future in the industry and concern for their
families, many ofwhom lived in areas where Inkatha had a strong presence. Based on the
evidence presented in this thesis, it is impossible to understand the decisions of these
workers as part of their 'inherent Zulu tribalism'. Furthermore, the conflicts between
older and younger workers were surely not part of some long standing generational
conflict in Zulu society.SI Instead these decisions were pragmatic, as older workers had
families and interests in homeland areas and younger workers had far more at stake in the
industry.
In two significantly different contexts, Dunbar Moodie and Ari Sitas have
examined the process of organizing African workers during the late 1970s and early
1980s. Moodie' s research on mineworkers reflects on the attempts of the National Union
ofMineworkers (NUM) to improve the wages and working conditions of miners, set
against the context of migrant workers and what he refers to as 'the moral economy' of
80 Interview: Mike Morris, 28 June 2001.
81 See Benedict Carton. Bloodfrom your Children: The colonial origins ofgenerational conflict in
Southern Africa. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000; for an interesting argument about the
importance ofgenerational conflict. While Carton offers important discussion for the period (c. 1806-1910)
that he considers, I am not convinced that the theme of generational conflict is as significant in later
periods.
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the mine. He analyses the difficulties that a particular miner, Mlambi Botha, faced in
deciding between the older systems of alliances and authority and the new system. Botha
was deeply committed to the union and the struggles for non-racism and improved
conditions in the mines, but simultaneously remained loyal to his own Mpondo personal
identity. Botha also remained suspicious of radical African urban dwellers.
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In his investigation of the metalworking industry, Sitas has demonstrated that the
Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) was successful in destabilizing established
power relations in hostels and uniting migrants and urban dwellers behind a common
goal.83 He has also shown how individual workers became active parts of the union
• • 84
orgamzatlon.
Yet there are significant differences between these two cases and the particular
one that I am analyzing. The two glaring differences lie in the composition of the
workforce and in the nature of the union. In the mines and steelworks of the
Witswatersrand, there was a great diversity of ethnic groups working, whereas in the
docks in Durban the workforce was predominately ofZulu origin. By the early 1980s,
there was also a significant portion ofminers living in urban areas, unlike in the docks.
Furthennore, union organization on the mines took a different form, organized mostly by
African urban dwellers and lawyers, such as Cyril Ramaphosa. The particular biases of
union organizers on the mines may well have been towards an urbanized way of life. In
the docks, unionists came with other biases, but these reflected particular readings of
Marxism and white liberal identity. The analysis made by Moodie ultimately falls more
squarely onto a conventional reading of the violence ofthe late 1980s as being between
urban workers and rural migrants. As I have already demonstrated, the violence in the
docks did not follow this pattern. Nevertheless, it is important to evaluate the successes
and failures of trade unions in the industry. Crucially, however, this can only happen
within the particular conditions of the industry and not within a general framework of
trade unionism in South Africa.
82 Dunbar Moodie. GOingfor Gold. Johannesburg: Witswatersrand University Press, 1994. p. 263-265.
83 Ari Sitas. African worker responses on the East Rand to changes in the Metal Industry, 1960-1980. PhD
Thesis. University of the Witswatersrand. 1984. p. 415.
84 Ibid. p. 420-429.
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David Hemson has made the point that so many workers need not have been
retrenched, especially given that casuals do the bulk ofwork every single day.85 Certainly
ifwe look at stevedores internationally, organized labour unions have been able to keep
the majority of stevedores permanent by the maintenance of a register system which
shares out the work among stevedores, much like the guarantee system tried in the early
1980s by the GWU and SAS.86 This is a tempting point, for perhaps the General Workers
Union could have done better. However, this tends to minimize both the particularity of
the South African working class and the politics ofNatal in the 1980s. In the final
analysis, I believe that the General Workers Union was successful as a union and
revolutionary in that success, given the overwhelming conditions that it faced.
Nevertheless, its tendency to accept management's positions as an overall reflection of
the problems of stevedoring in the docks was a failure, and it certainly should have
pushed management harder against retrenchment. Finally, the disillusionment that the
union experienced amongst its organizers in 1985, and their subsequent departure from
the harbour, was an additional weakness that could have been prevented.
Conclusion
This chapter has reflected on the difficult process of organizing stevedores in Durban
during the 1980s. This process was difficult not only because it was set against the
restructuring of the stevedoring industry and the consequent retrenchment ofworkers, but
also because ofthe politics within and outside the docks. Within the stevedoring industry,
relationships between workers and izinduna had developed over many years, and these
far from uncomplicated processes had to be understood and worked with for any union to
be successful. Outside the workplace, the collapsing Apartheid structures and the
emergence ofpoliticized ethnicity emerged as prominent features during the 1980s,
which proved to be difficult obstacles in union organization.
85 David Hemson "Beyond the Frontier of Control".
86 Kees Marges, Secretary General ofthe International Transport Workers Federation. Containerisation and
Automation: how to survive as dockworkers. Address to a conference on 'Container handling automation
and technologies', 22 and 23 February 1999. Accessed on 25 February 2002.at
bU.p.:fLYfYfY{!jlf!.Qrg!Jlk{S.~9.1i.Q!l~LdQ.9-k~r~t.ilQ_J19JJJnp'~gm.~h.lm
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The trade union movement itself was far from uncomplicated. The General
Workers Union emerged out of a context of advising workers what to do, rather than
from workers within the industry. While they enjoyed much success during the early
1980s, they eventually withdrew from the docks when conditions became too difficult.
Had a union emerged strongly from inside the industry, a withdrawal would never have
been an option. And this withdrawal would prove crucial, since it opened the way for
both companies and for a movement ofpoliticized ethnicity. Following the withdrawal of
the GWU, retrenchment continued virtually unopposed, and violence became a feature of
workers lives. This violence and intimidation did not occur predominately at the
workplace, or between workers, but instead happened in workers' rural homes, a crucial
area for migrant workers.
Given these contexts stevedores displayed remarkable agency in making decisions
about their futures. When choosing unions, they resisted narrowly defmed ethnic
categories that both the Apartheid state and many scholars are so keen to place them in.
Ultimately, though, this chapter has reflected on a tragedy, in which a combination of the
technological changes in the ports and the legacy ofApartheid proved too difficult to
overcome. Part of the tragedy is that perhaps, had different decisions been taken by the
General Workers Union, some of the resulting retrenchment and loss of worker morale
may well have been prevented.
103
Conclusion
In one ofhis last published works, Pierre Bourdieu probes the difficulties and suffering of
contemporary society.l One of the major contexts that the book discusses is that of the
decline of industrial work and the resultant anxieties and pressures felt by people who
were no longer guaranteed any kind of secure or permanent employment. Particular
contributions to the book analyze the growth of temporary work and the difficulties that
arise, often pitting worker against worker in the struggle to survive.2 By presenting
interviews with workers, the book demonstrates the social effects of these changes, by
showing, for example, the harsh conditions under which 'temps' work and the impossible
task that trade unionists face in organizing the new workforce.
While the evidence for Bourdieu's book has been based largely on conditions in
France, it does not require a great leap of faith to extend his general conclusions to other
societies. We should return for a moment to Castells, whose general assertions are that
the new economy does not create or destroy work, but instead re-shapes the conditions of
work.3 On one hand, Castells is correct, work has certainly been reshaped, but as
Bourdieu shows, the numbers ofyoung computer experts are insignificant in number
when compared to the industrial workers who face uncertain and difficult futures.
Flexible work may have its advantages for the highly qualified technicians of the
information age, but is an extremely difficult fate to bear for industrial workers.
This thesis has discussed the emergence of this new economy for a group of
workers in South Africa. In the last twenty years, these workers have experienced
precisely the disillusionment felt by the workers in France presented by Bourdieu. The
stevedores in Durban suffer from poor morale; they realize that their skills are worth less
and less and that their prospects in the new economy are extremely limited.
However, we need to pose the question about the value ofolder style industrial
work. This work was often highly exploitative and many of the workers' struggles
throughout the world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were attempts to
lPierre Bourdieu. (ed). The Weight o/the World: Social suffering in contemporary society. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1999. (translated Priscilla Ferguson)
2 See articles by Michel Pialoux, Stephane Beaud, Louis Pinto and Bourdieu in Pierre Bourdieu. (ed). The
Weight ofthe World: Social suffering in contemporary society. p. 255-419.
3 Manuel Castells. The Rise a/Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. p. 265.
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improve the difficult conditions of industrial work. In South Africa, the exploitation of
industrial workers was amplified by the racial policies of the Apartheid state. I have
discussed the particular administration of stevedores in Durban and shown how, despite
some ingenuity on the part ofworkers, they formed part of the wider societal exploitation
of cheap African migrant labourers. During the height ofApartheid, the stevedores
worked for low wages, and were forbidden from organizing their workplace or protesting
against the state. They enjoyed little protection from the dangers of dock work and were
frequently injured at work. These workers were not part of an industrial system or a
society that recognized their rights as citizens, but were instead part of an industrial
relationship where they were treated more like subjects.
It is a tragic part of the history of South Africa that at the moment that workers
began to gain rights at work similar to their European counterparts, global economic
changes began to undermine the position of industrial workers as a whole. These changes
were felt particularly acutely by the stevedores working in Durban, because harbours
were the frontline ofthe new economy, where mass retrenchments were happening a
decade before these new economic conditions would manifest themselves in other
industries. The changes to the industrial relations system in South Africa meant that, at
the moment that containerization caused the destruction ofwork in the industry,
stevedores were being unionized for the frrst time. Unionists with little practical
experience were confronted simultaneously with the impossible task of re-making the
working relationships of the past and the specter ofmass retrenchment. Unlike in
European ports, the unions failed to prevent the casualization of the majority of the
stevedoring labour force. These casuals enjoy little of the freedom that casuals may have
enjoyed fifty years before, when companies were dependent on their work and workers
could often negotiate their conditions of employment.
In writing this thesis I have also reflected on the difficulties ofwriting a history
of the working class. To establish "knowledge of working class conditions" I have relied
on a careful analysis of the "production politics" present in the stevedoring industry in
Durban. I have based my conclusions on a wide range of government and company
sources in addition to a number of accounts from stevedores themselves. In contrast to
another major theorist ofworking class history, Dipesh Chakrabarty, I have not had to
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recreate these power relationships in the workplace based on the silences and absences in
my sources.4 By emphasizing the importance of the politics within the workplace itself I
have avoided sliding into the position of interpreting unusual forms of authority as
"culturally specific". While there is certainly much evidence to suggest that the Apartheid
state embarked on a project to create a culturally specific workplace, what I have shown
in this thesis is that this project failed and that the conditions of authority that prevailed in
the stevedoring industry in Durban were more akin to other stevedoring workplaces
internationally. This is not to say that the power structures created by Apartheid had no
effect at all, on the contrary, they were responsible for creating oppressive and
paternalistic relationships at work. Yet these relationships developed not as reflections of
cultural traditions, but out of a mediated struggle with power structures that allowed
African workers to survive Apartheid.
This is also not to suggest that "Zulu culture" played no role in the stevedores'
lives. Rather it is to recognize the caution with which we must approach the use of
cultural specificity as an explanatory framework when considering ideas of work and
authority. It has not been the aim of this thesis to investigate the relationship between
cultural change and the experiences of authority and decline that must have been
significant for workers during the period that I have considered. In future explorations of
the topic, I would like to address these experiences more completely, and following
James Ferguson, construct an "ethnography of decline" that would enable me to evaluate
the precise importance of "culture" in determining the choices made by the stevedores.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that while this thesis has primarily been about
structural change in the stevedoring industry and different regimes of labour
administration, I have attempted not to present merely a 'history from above'. Instead I
have shown that stevedores, while not having control of the wider economic and political
determinants of their situation, did play a significant role in shaping their conditions of
work and the nature of authority exercised over them. They also displayed remarkable
agency, given the structures ofpower, to make clear decisions about unions, ethnicity and
their future in the industry. But as the closing quote of this thesis reveals, the stevedoring
4 Dipesh Chakrabarty. "Conditions for Knowledge of Working-Class Conditions" in Ranajit Guha and
Gayatri Spivak (editors). Selected Subaltern Studies. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
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workers were always presented with difficult conditions of existence, whether it was
during the times ofApartheid Labour practice, retrenchment, or the "mere" process of
work itself.
"When there were many ships work used to kill us, but now because ofcontainers there is no work". 5
5 Mr Ntshangase: Stevedore in Durban. Inteviewed on 19 November 1982 by Tina Sideris. University of
the Witwatersrand Historical Papers Collection, SAIRR Oral History Project #44. My thanks goes to Muzi
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